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This dissertation is an attempt to understand and assess the traditional idea that 
God is not only the creator of the contingent world, but also its sustainer or conserver. 
Thus, it is a contribution to the field of philosophy of religion – or perhaps, philosophical 
theology. But I would add that it is equally a work of metaphysics. After all, creation and 
conservation are fundamentally causal notions, so the attempt to understand them is 
really an attempt to understand divine causation. For theists, divine causation plays a 
particularly important role in metaphysics. God is no mere cause among other causes. 
Rather, God is the primary cause and all other causes are secondary, in some sense 
derivative from and dependent upon God. But in what sense, exactly? Is it simply that 
God is the first cause – that if God had not gotten things rolling in the first place nothing 
else would have happened? That is surely part of it, but only deists stop there. As I 
already suggested, more traditional theists have maintained not only that God got things 
rolling at the initial moment of creation, but also that God keeps things rolling by 
continually and actively conserving the creation. All contingent reality depends 
immediately upon God for both its initial and its continued existence. Thus, for 
traditional theists creation and conservation are some of the most fundamental aspects of 
metaphysics, second perhaps only to the existence and nature of God. Moreover, as we 
will see in later chapters, creation and conservation are connected in interesting and 
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potentially problematic ways with other central metaphysical issues such as persistence 
and secondary causation. 
Although a handful of contemporary theists have begun addressing these topics, 
much more work is needed. Recent philosophical discussions of creation and 
conservation have been limited to scattered articles and book chapters; to date, they have 
not yet been given an extended, book-length treatment. Thus, the present work is hardly 
intended to provide the last word on the subject. (There rarely, if ever, is such a thing in 
philosophy anyway.) I am sure that many will take issue with some of the particular 
conclusions I defend, but hopefully by approaching creation and conservation 
systematically I can at least move the discussion forward by clarifying the central 
problems and identifying some of the most plausible solutions. 
 The dissertation is divided into three parts and I have attempted to make it as easy 
as possible to read each part (and in some cases, individual chapters) independently. 
Thus, I occasionally pause to repeat and summarize key points from earlier parts and 
chapters, and I sometimes refer readers directly back to relevant portions of previous 
chapters. Nevertheless, the latter parts do build upon the discussions and the conclusions 
defended in earlier parts, so they are most naturally read consecutively as a single 
continuing narrative. Following is a chapter-by-chapter summary of the contents. 
Part I is devoted to the task of “Understanding Conservation.” Chapter One will 
provide a brief overview of the historical context. Here we will see that over time divine 
conservation of the contingent world came to be understood as a continuous act of 
creation. The next two chapters will closely examine two contemporary attempts to 
analyze conservation. Chapter Two introduces Philip Quinn’s ex nihilo model of 
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conservation, which is firmly rooted in the continuous creation tradition, and Chapter 
Three discusses William Craig’s agent-patient model, which rejects that tradition and 
purports to offer a better alternative. I will defend Quinn’s more traditional ex nihilo 
model, arguing that it offers an internally coherent account of creation and conservation 
while the agent-patient model is fraught with serious internal difficulties. But although 
the continuous creation tradition offers an internally coherent account of creation and 
conservation, it faces two important external challenges. These will be the subjects of 
Parts II and III. 
 Part II, “Continuous Creation and Persistence,” is concerned with the allegation 
that continuous creation is incompatible with persistence. The ontological commitments 
of continuous creation play an important role in this discussion. Chapter Four will 
consider Jonathan Edwards’s thesis that continuous creation entails an ontology of 
instantaneous temporal parts. If Edwards’s thesis is correct, then continuous creation is 
incompatible with our commonsense understanding of persistence as endurance through 
time, but it would appear to comport nicely with the theories of persistence offered by 
contemporary temporal parts theorists – worm theory and stage theory. However, I will 
argue that upon closer examination neither worm nor stage theory are legitimate options 
for continuous creationists: thus, Chapter Four concludes that if Edwards’s thesis is 
correct, then continuous creation and persistence are indeed incompatible. However, in 
Chapter Five I will show that Edwards’s thesis can be resisted and that continuous 
creation is compatible with an ontology of enduring continuants. Thus, continuous 
creation is compatible with persistence as it is understood by endurantists, although not as 
it is understood by temporal parts theorists. 
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Finally, Part III addresses the even thornier problem of reconciling “Continuous 
Creation and Secondary Causes.” In Chapter Six we will examine Malebranche’s 
powerful argument that continuous creation entails occasionalism, the unpopular and 
disturbing view that there are no genuine secondary causes and that God alone is a true 
cause. Chapter Seven will assess three strategies for reconciling continuous creation with 
genuine secondary causes: causal overdeterminism, strong concurrentism, and weak 
concurrentism. I will argue that only weak concurrentism holds any real promise of an 
adequate reconciliation. But in order to offer a plausible alternative to occasionalism, 
weak concurrentism must offer some plausible account of secondary causation. One weak 
concurrentist, Philip Quinn, has attempted to meet this challenge and in Chapter Eight I 
will critically evaluate his argument. Quinn contends that weak concurrentists can help 
themselves to any of three popular approaches to secondary causation – regularity, 
counterfactual, or necessitarian theories. However, I will demonstrate that reductionist 
theories of causation, such as the regularity and counterfactual theories, are not legitimate 
options for weak concurrentists; their choices are limited to non-reductionist theories 
such as the necessitarian theory. Thus, I will argue that continuous creationists can 
respond adequately to each of the external objections raised against the doctrine, but only 
if they accept certain positions on controversial metaphysical issues. More specifically, 
continuous creationists are forced to accept the endurantist account of persistence and a 






The world was not just placed into existence once, at the beginning of all things, in such 
a way that it would have been left on its own afterwards. Rather, every creature is in 
need of conservation of its existence in every moment, and according to theological 
tradition such conservation is nothing else but a continuous creation. This means that the 
act of creation did not only take place in the beginning; it occurs at every moment. 
 




Conservation and the Continuous Creation Tradition 
 
The idea that the world’s dependence upon God extends far beyond the initial act 
of creation has roots in the scriptures of each of the three major theistic religions. True, 
the creation story in Genesis does depict God as creating for six days and then resting, 
but it is rather doubtful that God’s rest is intended to be understood literally. In many 
other passages, the Jewish scriptures portray Yahweh as actively involved in all the 
workings of nature. Consider, for example, Psalm 104:10-151:
He makes springs pour water into the ravines; 
 it flows between the mountains. 
 They give water to all the beasts of the field; 
 the wild donkeys quench their thirst. 
 The birds of the air nest by the waters; 
 they sing among the branches. 
 He waters the mountains from his upper chambers; 
 the earth is satisfied by the fruit of his work. 
 He makes the grass grow for the cattle, 
 and plants for man to cultivate— 
 bringing forth food from the earth: 
 wine that gladdens the heart of man, 
 oil to make his face shine, 
 and bread that sustains his heart. 
 
The Qur’an contains similar portrayals of Allah’s relationship to nature: 
Surely, it is Allah Who causes the grain and the date-stones to sprout. He 
brings forth the living from the dead and it is He Who brings forth the 
 
1 Other similar passages include Psalm 29; Psalm 65:9-13; Psalm 147:8-9, 16-18; and 
Psalm 148. Cf. God’s speech to Job in Job 38 and 39. 
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dead from the living. That is your Allah; wherefore, then are you turned 
back? He causes the break of day, and has made the night for rest and the 
sun and the moon for reckoning time. . . . It is He Who sends down water 
from the sky.2
Of course, such poetic passages are susceptible to a variety of interpretations, so their 
metaphysical significance is hardly beyond dispute. Nevertheless, they are quite naturally 
understood as affirming that God is intimately involved in even the most commonplace 
of natural events. 
A handful of passages in the Christian New Testament also indicate that the 
creation is continually dependent upon God. In Acts 17:27-28 Paul tells the men of 
Athens that God “is not far from each one of us. For in him we live and move and have 
our being.” And in Colossians 1:15-17 Paul first states that Christ created all things and 
then adds that “in him all things hold together.” Similarly, the author of Hebrews 
describes Christ as “sustaining all things by his powerful word” (1:3). 
In light of such scriptures, it is perhaps no surprise that theologians and 
philosophers in all three traditions have ascribed the continuation of the world to God’s 
conserving activity. What is perhaps more surprising is how little disagreement there has 
been over the nature of this act of conservation. Over time, the doctrine of conservation 
evolved into the doctrine of continuous creation. As we will see below, there has been a 
remarkable consensus among traditional theists that God’s conservation of the world 
should be understood as a continuous act of creation. 
It is not clear who first formulated the doctrine of conservation explicitly, nor is it 
clear who first identified conservation with continuous creation. A clear statement of the 
 
2 The quoted passage is 6:96-100. The translation is from Khan (1997) pp. 129-30. 
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doctrine of conservation can be traced back at least as far as St. Augustine (354-430), 
who wrote, 
[T]he power and might of the Creator, who rules and embraces all, makes 
every creature abide; and if this power ever ceased to govern creatures, 
their essences would pass away and all nature would perish. When a 
builder puts up a house and departs, his work remains in spite of the fact 
that he is no longer there. But the universe will pass away in the twinkling 
of an eye if God withdraws His ruling hand.3
Conservation was also defended by the medieval Jewish philosopher, Maimonides (1138-
1204). In The Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides offered the following response to 
certain theologians who claimed that the universe could continue to exist even if, per 
impossibile, God himself ceased to exist: 
They would be right, if God were only the maker of the Universe, and if 
its permanent existence were not dependent on Him . . . God, however, is 
Himself the form of the Universe, as we have already shown, and it is He 
who causes its continuance and permanency.4
The idea that conservation should be identified with continuous creation might 
have originated with the Islamic occasionalists, Ash‘ari and his followers. As David 
Burrell notes, these thinkers held that God alone is an active agent, and they understood 
all divine action as creation.5 Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), for example, maintained 
that all contingent things, their substances and accidents, which occur in 
the essences of living beings and inanimates, occur through God’s power 
and that He is unique in their creation, and not one of the created things 
 
3 Augustine (393) p. 117. Cf. chapter eight of De Immortalite Animae; Augustine (387) 
pp. 71-3. 
4 Maimonides (1190) p. 105. 
5 Burrell (1993) p. 52. 
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occurs through another [i.e. none by contingent power or tawallud] but
rather all occur through God’s power.6
In the Christian tradition, Aquinas (1225-1274) was at least an influential precursor of the 
continuous creation tradition, if not one of its earliest outright proponents. In the Summa 
Theologiae he quotes Augustine’s characterization of conservation approvingly, and 
offers similar characterizations of his own. He distinguishes between two ways of 
preserving the existence of another thing. The first way is indirect: the existence of a 
being can be preserved by protecting it from some “destructive force” (as, for example, a 
parent preserves a child’s life by preventing the child from falling into a fire). Aquinas 
continues: 
The second is a per se and direct way of preserving a thing in existence, 
insofar, namely, as the thing preserved is so dependent that without the 
preserver it could not exist. This is the way that all creatures need God to 
keep them in existence. For the esse of all creaturely beings so depends 
upon God that they could not continue to exist even for a moment, but 
would fall away into nothingness unless they were sustained in existence 
by his power . . . 7
Shortly below, Aquinas ties conservation (or preservation) directly to the act of creation 
when he comments that “God does not maintain things in existence by any new action, 
but by the continuation of the act whereby he bestows esse.”8
Later Christian thinkers would confirm Aquinas’s opinion even more explicitly 
and emphatically. For example, Suarez (1548-1617) wrote: “conservation is not an action 
different from the production (or creation), except merely conceptually or because of 
 
6 The passage is from the first chapter of al-Ghazali’s Al-Iqtisad Fil-I’Tiqad (or, Median 
in Belief). The translation is from Abu Zayd (1990) pp. 20-1. 
7 Aquinas (1273) [ST] Ia, q 104, a 1. Cf. Aquinas (1265) [ScG] 3.65.
8 Aquinas (1273) [ST] Ia, q 104, a 1, ad 4 (my emphasis). 
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some connotation and relation. . . . the conservation and the [initial] action are not in 
reality two actions.”9 He went on to explain that the conceptual difference between 
creation and conservation consists simply in the fact that “an entity (i) is not said to be 
conserved at the first instant at which it is created and (ii) is not said to be created after 
the first instant during the rest of the time in which it is conserved.”10 
Although much of medieval philosophy was called into question during the 
modern period, continuous creation only found more and more support. Descartes (1596-
1650) defended the doctrine in numerous places, most famously in the following passage 
from his “Third Meditation”: 
For it is quite clear to anyone who attentively considers the nature of time 
that the same power and action are needed to preserve anything at each 
individual moment of its duration as would be required to create that thing 
anew if it were not yet in existence. Hence the distinction between 
preservation and creation is only a conceptual one, and this is one of the 
things that are evident by the natural light.11 
Unsurprisingly, many of Descartes’s followers endorsed continuous creation as well. For 
example, Malebranche (1638-1715) defended it at length in the seventh of his Dialogues 
on Metaphysics and Religion, and as we will see in Chapter Six, the doctrine served as a 
premise in his most powerful argument for occasionalism. But continuous creation also 
had influential supporters outside of Cartesian circles. For example, Leibniz (1646-1716) 
writes in his Theodicy:
9 Suarez (1597) 21.2.3. 
10 Suarez (1597) 21.2.7. 
11 Descartes (1984) p. 33. See also Descartes (1984) p. 254; and Descartes (1985) pp. 
133, 200, and 243. 
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[W]e must bear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual 
immediate influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This 
dependence attaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and 
one can perhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians and 
philosophers in general, that it is a continued creation.12 
And Berkeley (1685-1753) wrote in a letter to Samuel Johnson: 
Those who have all along contended for a material world have yet 
acknowledged that natura naturans (to use the language of the 
Schoolmen) is God; and that the divine conservation of things is 
equipollent to, and in fact the same thing with, a continued repeated 
creation: in a word, that conservation and creation differ only in the 
terminus a quo. . . . it is no disparagement to the perfections of God to say 
that all things necessarily depend on Him as their Conservator as well as 
Creator, and that all nature would shrink to nothing, if not upheld and 
preserved in being by the same force that first created it.13 
One of the lengthiest discussions of continuous creation is found in Jonathan 
Edwards’s (1703-1758) treatise on the doctrine of original sin where he contends that 
“God’s preserving of created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a continued 
creation, or to his creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their 
existence.”14 And even more emphatically: 
God’s upholding of created substance, or causing of its existence in each 
successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate production 
out of nothing, at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is 
not merely in part from God, but wholly from him; and not in any part, or 
degree, from its antecedent existence. . . . God produces the effect as much 
from nothing, as if there had been nothing before. So that this effect 
differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially; as, in 
the first creation there had been no such act and effect of God’s power 
before: whereas, his giving existence afterwards, follows preceding acts 
and effects of the same kind, in an established order.15 
12 Leibniz (1710) p. 139. 
13 Berkeley (1729), pp. 345-346. 
14 Edwards (1758) p. 989 (his emphases). 
15 Edwards (1758) p. 990 (his emphases). 
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To my knowledge, Edwards was the first continuous creationist to explicitly discuss the 
doctrine’s relationship to persistence. We will consider his views on that subject in 
Chapter Four. 
A more complete survey could continue almost indefinitely, but the foregoing 
should be more than sufficient for our purposes. The thinkers quoted above represent a 
variety of time periods and philosophical traditions, and so their harmony on the topic of 
divine conservation is rather remarkable.16 Of course, given the diversity of their 
metaphysical views, there are bound to be subtle, and perhaps not so subtle, differences 
in their understandings of the act of creation. (Berkeley and Descartes, for example, 
would offer rather different explanations of what God must do to create a tree; on the 
other hand, they would likely offer quite similar explanations of what is involved in 
creating a human soul.) Nevertheless, such differences aside, these thinkers are all of one 
mind about the following point: whatever God does in creating an entity is the very same 
thing God does in conserving it. Conservation, they agree, is simply a continuation of 
creation. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley all indicated 
that this view was widely accepted among philosophers and theologians.17 
Thus, the doctrine of divine conservation – and more specifically, the doctrine of 
continuous creation – has an important place in traditional theism, and it deserves more 
 
16 In addition to a host of other historical figures, some contemporary thinkers who could 
be quoted include John Polkinghorne (1989) p. 54; Richard Swinburne (1993) p. 1; David 
Braine (1988) p. 180; Christopher Menzel (2001) pp. 71-3; and Thomas Morris (2002) 
pp. 154-8. 
17 Leibniz and Berkeley say this in the quotations above. Descartes says it in Descartes 
(1985) p. 133; and Descartes (1984) p. 254. 
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rigorous philosophical treatment. In the chapters that follow we will examine two recent 
attempts to analyze the concepts of creation and conservation. In Chapter Two we will 
consider Philip Quinn’s account, which attempts to remain as faithful as possible to the 
continuous creation tradition. And in Chapter Three we will consider William Craig’s 




Conservation ex Nihilo 
The God of traditional theism is both the creator and conserver of all contingent 
things, and we have seen that the time-honored conception of conservation is that of a 
continuous act of creation, or simply continuous creation. In this chapter and the next, I 
will carefully examine two contemporary attempts to analyze the notions of creation and 
conservation. Although both accounts understand creation similarly, they part ways 
significantly when it comes to conservation. In order to provide a background against 
which we may contrast these alternative models of conservation, I begin this chapter with 
some reflections on the nature of creation ex nihilo. In section two, I present Philip 
Quinn’s account of creation and conservation. I refer to Quinn’s approach to conservation 
as the ex nihilo model of conservation because it attempts to remain as faithful as 
possible to the tradition of identifying conservation with continuous creation. Our goal in 
this chapter is simply to better understand the continuous creation doctrine. We will not 
yet worry about criticisms of the doctrine or the philosophical puzzles it raises; these will 
be discussed in detail in later chapters. 
 
I. Creation ex Nihilo 
We commonly speak of sculptors creating statues, toddlers creating messes, 
beavers creating dams, and so on. In each of these instances, something is created out of 
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preexisting things, and the act of creation is in some sense non-basic. In each instance, it 
makes sense to ask what the creator does in order to create, and the answer to that 
question will point towards various more basic actions performed upon preexisting 
materials. Sculptors create statues by hammering and chiseling away at hunks of marble; 
toddlers create messes in countless ways, throwing food and spilling cups full of juice, to 
name just a few; and beavers create dams by strategically felling trees and then filling the 
gaps between them with stones and mud. Of course all of these actions, although more 
basic than that of creating, are non-basic as well. The sculptor chisels away at the marble 
by performing even more basic actions such as grasping the chisel, carefully positioning 
it, and striking it with a hammer. It seems that the analysis must eventually bottom out 
with actions that are basic simpliciter (although it is surprisingly difficult to define the 
concept of a basic action precisely or to determine which specific actions deserve that 
status).1 It is often assumed that simple body movements – e.g. raising one’s hand, 
turning one’s head, or moving one’s finger2 – are paradigm cases of basic actions, but 
even these can be problematic.3 Richard Swinburne (1997) suggests that the truly basic 
actions are what he refers to as “tryings.” For example, more basic than my moving my 
finger is my trying to move my finger. In most ordinary circumstances “tryings” are 
immediately efficacious, and so they typically go unnoticed; but they are more noticeable 
 
1 Two of the first attempts at definition are Chisholm (1964) and Danto (1965). See Baier 
(1971) for critical discussion of their proposals. 
2 For present purposes, I simply set aside atypical instances of these actions such as 
turning one’s head by pushing it with one’s hand or moving one’s finger by grasping it 
with one’s other hand. 
3 See McCann (1972) and Swinburne (1997) pp. 87-90. 
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when we consider the atypical cases in which they fail to produce their normal effects. 
For example, suppose that I have just been involved in a horrible accident, and a medic 
attending to me asks me to move my fingers. I try, but nothing happens, and I begin to 
realize that the accident has left me paralyzed. I do something when I try to move my 
finger, even though it fails in this instance to bring about any finger movements, and it 
seems pretty obvious that I do the same thing in ordinary instances when my finger does 
move. So I think Swinburne is right to suggest that my trying to move my finger is more 
basic than my moving my finger, and I also think he is correct that it is basic simpliciter.
No further regress can get started since, as Swinburne puts it, “to try to try to do x is to try 
to do x.”4 Of course, not every instance of trying is basic. We might watch a sculptor at 
work and comment that she is trying to create a statue, but that is not a basic instance of 
trying. She tries to create the statue by trying to chip away certain bits of stone, which in 
turn, she tries to do by trying to strike a chisel with a hammer, and so on. For present 
purposes, I see no reason to worry about which tryings are ultimately basic. The point I 
want to emphasize is simply that neither the act of creating a statue nor the act of trying 
to create a statue are basic, and the same is true of other familiar examples of creating. 
I think that contrasting the notion of creation ex nihilo with such familiar 
instances of creation reveals much of its import. If pressed to explain how a sculptor 
created a statue, we can refer to her selection of a block of marble, as well as to her 
manipulation of the hammers, chisels, and other tools she used to shape it.5 By contrast, if 
 
4 Swinburne (1997) p. 87. 
5 Bede Rundle (2004, p. 78) uses the same example – i.e. of a sculpture creating a statue – 
to contrast creation ex nihilo with more familiar instances of creation. However, he draws 
a rather different conclusion. According to Rundle, the fact that in creation ex nihilo there 
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pressed to explain how God creates things ex nihilo, it is far from clear what the 
questioner wants from us. In creating, God does not act upon previously existing things, 
but rather brings about the very existence of things, and so it seems that creation ex nihilo 
must be a basic act. God does not create by doing something else that is more basic; 
rather, God simply causes things to exist, end of story.6
Should we say that God’s trying to cause things to exist is more basic than God’s 
causing things to exist? I do not think there is any decisive consideration either in favor 
 
is nothing to be acted upon suggests not, as I argue, that it is a primitive and basic causal 
notion, but rather that it is not a causal notion at all. But I think this is the wrong way to 
proceed. It strikes me as utterly obvious that creation ex nihilo is a causal notion. Thus, if 
some notion of what is causal excludes creation ex nihilo a priori, the conclusion to be 
drawn is not that creation is not causal, but rather that that notion of the causal is too 
narrowly circumscribed. 
 Nevertheless, although I disagree with the conclusion Rundle draws, he does call 
attention to the fact that there are interesting (and often overlooked) connections between 
theism and causal theories. Two conflicting papers, both by Quentin Smith, also highlight 
this fact. Smith (1993) argued against several popular theories of causation by assuming 
that the concept of a supernatural cause of the universe is coherent and then showing that 
the causal theories are incompatible with that assumption. Interestingly, in Smith (1996) 
he changes his mind and runs the argument in the exact opposite direction: that is, he 
argues that the idea of a supernatural cause of the universe is logically impossible 
because it is incompatible with extant theories of causation. See McClellend and Deltete 
(2000) for a point-by-point critique of Smith’s (1996) argument. As they point out, Smith 
assumes that there must be a single definition that covers every instance of causation. But 
it is not obvious that this is correct. In fact, it does not seem at all implausible to assume 
that primary and secondary causation will require different definitions. 
6 Perhaps a Platonist would offer a sort of further story. She might say, for example, that 
there was just God and the world of abstract objects, and that in creating, God caused 
some of those abstracta to be exemplified (or instantiated, or something of that sort). Of 
course, such an analysis would simply move the primitive causal claim back one level. 
What should the Platonist say if she were pressed to explain how God causes those 
abstracta to be exemplified? It would not seem quite right to say that God uses or acts 
upon the abstract objects. They do not seem to be analogous to the sculptor’s tools or 
marble slab. Presumably, the Platonist should say that God simply wills that the abstracta 
be exemplified – that that is just what it is for God to create ex nihilo and that there is 
nothing more to say. 
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of or against saying that. I admit that it sounds paradoxical to speak of God as trying to 
do something; we usually say that someone is trying to do something only when the task 
is hard or when there is at least the realistic possibility of failure, and neither 
consideration seems applicable to God. But we are already using ‘try’ and its cognates in 
a somewhat technical sense that does not imply that the attempted task is difficult7 – e.g. 
moving my finger is not normally difficult – so that is no reason not to speak of God as 
trying. On the other hand, the fact that it is not even possible for God to try and fail to do 
something may weigh slightly against speaking of God as trying; after all, we arguably 
would have no reason to distinguish between my trying to move my finger and my 
actually moving my finger if the former never failed to be accompanied by the latter. But 
this is not compelling either. Even if my trying to do x and my actually doing x were 
inseparable, it would hardly follow that they were not distinct acts. Perhaps we would be 
unlikely to notice the distinction, but that is not to say that there would be no distinction 
to notice. The same point can be made with respect to God. So I do not see any decisive 
reason not to speak of God as trying in Swinburne’s sense. 
But in the end, I think little hangs upon whether God’s creating or God’s trying to 
create is most basic. My general point is that, unlike familiar human examples of 
creation, creation ex nihilo is a basic divine act. If the strict truth of the matter is that 
trying to create ex nihilo is basic and that creating ex nihilo is a single step removed from 
basic, that is near enough for my purposes. Either way, the ability to create ex nihilo must 
be conceived of as a primitive causal power or capacity. Thus, one who persists in asking 
how God creates simply does not grasp the concept of creation ex nihilo. It is possible, of 
 
7 Swinburne (1997, p. 87) notes this point explicitly. 
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course, that they do not grasp the concept because it is in some respect incoherent, but 
then the burden lies with them to demonstrate the contradiction. I am not aware of any 
non-question begging argument that creation ex nihilo is incoherent, and so I shall simply 
set this possibility aside. 
However, I do not mean to suggest that creation ex nihilo is an easy concept to 
grasp. Quite the contrary, in admitting that there is rather little one can say in response to 
the question of how God creates, I am also admitting that creation is bound to remain to 
some degree mysterious. We should expect as much, for the power of creating ex nihilo is 
not one with which we have any experience. At the same time, I do not wish to leave the 
impression that creation ex nihilo is so utterly mysterious that we cannot meaningfully 
discuss it or its implications. Indeed, I believe we can draw some further conclusions 
concerning the nature of divine creation. For example, reflection upon the contrast 
between creation ex nihilo and creation out of preexisting things suggests that creation ex 
nihilo is instantaneous. The more familiar examples of creation (e.g. of a sculptor 
creating a statue) involve processes of rearranging and organizing preexistent stuff. 
However, creation ex nihilo involves no such process. To create something in this sense 
is to bring an entirely new entity into existence, not to refashion previously existing 
things. So how could creation ex nihilo be other than instantaneous? How can an entity 
be in a process of coming into being at t and yet not exist at t? Non-existent entities 
cannot undergo processes, so it would seem that creation ex nihilo must be 
instantaneous.8
8 Similarly, Kvanvig and McCann (1998) argue that no distinction can be drawn between 
the world’s “coming to be” and its “being” (p. 19). Cf. McCann (1999) p. 307. 
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Similarly, we can characterize creation ex nihilo as a volitional act. If for no other 
reason, this conclusion is supported simply by the lack of any plausible alternative. If 
creation does not involve acting upon or modifying preexisting things, and if we wish to 
affirm a clear distinction between the creator and the created, then there simply does not 
seem to be any plausible alternative to conceiving of divine creation as the brute willing 
of things into existence.9 In fact, characterizing creation as volitional fits rather nicely 
with Swinburne’s view that our truly basic acts are tryings. When we speak of my trying 
to move my finger, the most natural way to understand it, I think, is as a mental act of 
willing that my finger move. This also relieves some of the strangeness involved in 
speaking of God as trying to do something, since it is not in the least unusual to say that 
God wills something. God’s trying to create x can be understood simply as God’s willing 
that x exist. 
Thus, we can offer at least a minimal characterization of creation ex nihilo: it is 
the basic volitional act of directly and instantaneously bringing about the existence of 
contingent beings. Since the continuous creation tradition understands conservation as a 
continuous act of creation, it seems only fitting to describe it as an ex nihilo model of 
conservation, or simply conservationxn. In the remainder of this chapter we will take a 
closer look at this model of conservation. 
 
9 I am assuming here that created beings are distinct from God’s being; that is, I am 
assuming that pantheistic and panentheistic conceptions of the relationship between God 
and creation are mistaken. 
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II. The ex Nihilo Model of Conservation 
An appropriate starting point for considering conservation ex nihilo is the 
contemporary work of Philip Quinn, who has developed and defended such an account of 
creation and conservation in a series of three essays published over the span of a decade. 
Although there is a great deal of continuity throughout Quinn’s essays, it is perhaps to be 
expected that his theory evolved in certain respects in each essay. For the sake of brevity 
and simplicity, I will focus most of my attention on the more elegant and concise 
formulations of the theory that appear in Quinn (1988) and (1993), relegating most 
comments concerning the original formulation in Quinn (1983) to footnotes.10 Before we 
consider the details of Quinn’s account, we must first take note of its intended scope and 
its primitive assumptions. 
II-A. Scope and Assumptions 
II-A-1. The Scope of Creation and Conservation 
By scope I mean the domain of entities whose creation and conservation the 
theory is intended to explain. Quinn explicitly restricts the scope of his theory to all 
contingent, concrete individuals. As I understand this restriction, concrete is intended to 
be contrasted not with the immaterial, but with the abstract. Thus, concrete individuals 
would include both material and immaterial non-abstracta: angels and Cartesian minds, if 
there are such things, should be counted among the concrete individuals. However, 
Quinn’s account leaves untouched anything that is abstract and/or necessarily existent. It 
is consistent, for example, with a Platonistic conception of things such as properties, 
 
10 Quinn discussed the themes of creation and conservation in an even earlier essay – 
Quinn (1979a). However, his purpose in that essay was not to develop a theory, but rather 
to critique Robert Oakes’ (1977) argument that conservation implies pantheism. 
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propositions, and states of affairs. According to Platonism, such entities are sui generis 
abstract objects, existing necessarily and a se; thus, they have no need of divine creation 
or conservation. 
Some theists would take issue with Quinn’s restricting the scope of his theory so 
narrowly. William Craig, for example, claims that the Christian scriptures (e.g. John 1:1-
3a) portray God as creating “literally everything” distinct from himself. Thus, Craig 
thinks Christian theists must reject Platonism: they must either reject abstract objects 
entirely, or else include them within the scope of creation.11 But this strikes me as 
misguided. It is an example of the unfortunate tendency to cite scripture in support of 
answers to questions its authors never intended to address. John’s prologue is plausibly 
understood as implying that God is the creator of every concrete thing distinct from 
himself, but I find it difficult to believe that John intended to say anything whatsoever 
concerning the status of abstracta. Whether there are abstract objects and, if so, whether 
God did and/or could have created them, are all intriguing questions for philosophical 
speculation, but the authors of scripture simply do not address them and one’s position on 
such issues certainly should not be treated as a test of one’s orthodoxy.12 By restricting 
 
11 See Craig and Copan (2004) pp. 167-173. For a more detailed discussion and defense 
of the view that the scope of creation must include everything distinct from God, see 
Clouser (2005) pp. 213-9. 
12 Morriston (2005 p. 354) notes with some irony: “I daresay it will come as a surprise to 
Alvin Plantinga – to pick just one obvious example – that his ontology is heretical, but 
that does seem to be the implication of what Copan and Craig say.” However, it is also 
worth noting that several theists have attempted to make sense of the idea of God’s 
creating abstract objects. See, for example, Morris and Menzel (1986) and Menzel 
(1987). 
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the scope of his theory to contingent, concrete individuals, Quinn focuses on what I take 
to be of fundamental concern to theists. 
However, in order to avoid confusion later on, something more needs to be said 
concerning the nature of the concrete individuals that God creates and conserves. Quinn 
is somewhat ambivalent on this matter: in one essay he indicates that he takes common 
items such as tables and chairs to be individuals, but in a later essay he backtracks, 
leaving the identity of the individuals an “open question” in order to make room for the 
possibility that things such as tables and chairs “are mere aggregates composed of 
genuine individuals.”13 The latter view strikes me as far more right headed. After all, the 
natural thing to say about the creation of a chair is not that it is a divine action, but rather 
that it is a human action consisting of modifying and arranging preexisting materials. 
Moreover, taking medium-sized objects like chairs to be primary objects of God’s 
creation and conservation seems problematic in a number of ways. First, it seems to 
threaten the role of secondary causes: if God created the chair I am sitting in, what shall 
we say of the role of its human maker? As we will see in Chapter Six, continuous 
creation may pose a threat to secondary causation regardless of how we characterize 
individuals; nevertheless, my present point is simply that the threat seems more direct if 
the primary objects of creation and conservation include artifacts commonly taken to be 
created by secondary causes. Second, taking things such as chairs and tables to be 
primary objects of creation and conservation saddles a theory of creation and 
conservation with all of the philosophical puzzles associated with such items. For 
example, what are the identity conditions for a chair? Is there a precise, determinate time 
 
13 See Quinn (1988) p. 51 and (1993) p. 596. 
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at which a chair begins to exist? If not, are there times when it is indeterminate whether 
God is creating and/or conserving a chair? Similarly, how shall we understand the 
relationship between the chair and the materials that compose it? Problems of material 
constitution result in similar problems for creation and conservation. Is the chair distinct 
from the wood that composes it? If so, must we say that God creates and conserves them 
separately? Are they identical? What then shall we say about the fact that God began 
creating and conserving the wood before creating and conserving the chair? I think it 
would be wise to avoid such disputed issues if at all possible. I do not mean to suggest 
that these questions are unimportant (far from it!) or unsolvable, but I do think that 
worrying about them would distract us from issues more important to our inquiry into 
creation and conservation. 
In order to sidestep such problems, I will follow van Inwagen’s lead and adopt an 
atomic conception of the individuals God creates and conserves.14 That is, I will assume 
that the material world is composed of some sort(s) of fundamental, indivisible material 
particles, and that God’s creation and conservation of the world as a whole is simply a 
function of God’s creating and conserving these micro-level particles. For the sake of 
convenience and simplicity, I will focus primarily upon the creation and conservation of 
the material world, but readers who think the world includes contingent non-material 
entities – angels or Cartesian souls, for instance – can supplement this picture with 
atomic non-material entities easily enough. 
 
14 See van Inwagen (1988). Here, van Inwagen treats this simply as a convenient 
idealization; however, in van Inwagen (1990) he defends an ontology of individuals that 
is nearly as minimalist. A similarly minimalist ontology of individuals is defended by 
Merricks (2001). See also Faber (1986) and Rosen and Dorr (2002). 
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As van Inwagen acknowledges, this atomic conception of things is scientifically 
naïve and contentious. Nevertheless, it is convenient for a number of reasons. First, to the 
best of my (rather limited) knowledge, contemporary physics has nothing like an agreed 
upon conception of the world’s fundamental ontological constituents, so even if we 
adopted some less naïve picture, we would not thereby avoid contentiousness. Secondly, 
if we adopted a less naïve picture, we would doubtless sacrifice the simplicity of the 
naïve picture. So there are good reasons for adopting the naïve picture, and although I 
cannot be certain, I suspect that van Inwagen is right when he says that it is a harmless 
idealization – that adopting a less naïve picture would not “affect in any essential way” 
our philosophical discussion of creation and conservation.15 Thus, in light of its 
convenience, I shall assume from this point forward that what God creates and conserves 
are fundamental atomic particles. I will, at times, continue to speak as though God creates 
and conserves composite entities such as chairs, cars, and human bodies, but this should 
be understood as nothing more than a convenient shorthand way of saying that God 
creates and conserves the particles these entities are composed of. 
II-A-2. Primitive Assumptions 
Quinn also makes use of two primitive assumptions in his theory. The first is that 
time is “a linear continuum composed of point instants, with t, t', and t'' as variables of 
quantification ranging over point instants of time.”16 This assumption conforms the 
theory with the mainstream conception of time, although as far as I can tell, it does no 
 
15 Van Inwagen (1988) p. 212. 
16 Quinn (1993) p. 596; cf. Quinn (1983) p. 57 and Quinn (1988) p. 51. 
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important work in the theory. That is, nothing in Quinn’s analysis of creation and 
conservation depends in any essential way on time’s being continuous.17 
However, Quinn’s second assumption – “that there is a special two-place relation 
of divine bringing about defined on ordered pairs of states of affairs”18 – is far more 
crucial, and his characterization of this relation is worth quoting at length. Quinn writes, 
Since it is a primitive locution, I have no definition of it to offer, but I can 
provide a partial informal characterization of it. Obviously, it must express 
a relation of metaphysical dependence or causation. Beyond that, I think 
this relation must have the following marks in order to serve its 
theological purposes: totality, exclusivity, activity, immediacy, and 
necessity. By totality, I mean that what does the bringing about is the total 
cause of what is brought about; nothing else is required by way of causal 
contribution in order for the effect to obtain. In particular, divine volitions 
do not work on independently existing matter, and so no Aristotelian 
material cause is required for them to produce existence. By exclusivity, I 
mean that what does the bringing about is the sole cause of what is 
brought about; causal overdetermination is ruled out. By activity, I mean 
that the state of affairs that does the bringing about does so in virtue of the 
individual involved in it. By immediacy, I mean that what does the 
bringing about causes what is brought about immediately rather than 
remotely through some extended causal chain or by means of instruments. 
By necessity, I mean that what does the bringing about in some sense 
necessitates what is brought about.19 
17 That is not to say that nothing could be modified if he adopted a discrete view of time. 
Because he assumes that time is continuous, Quinn cannot adopt the simple convention of 
using ‘t + 1’ to refer to the moment immediate following t (if time is continuous, t has no 
immediate successor). Instead, he adopts the convention of using ‘∆t’ to refer to a small 
increment of time, and ‘t + ∆t’ to refer to a moment slightly later than t. A discrete view 
of time would allow, although not require, him to adopt the simpler ‘t + 1’ convention. 
18 Quinn (1993) pp. 596-7; cf. Quinn (1988) pp. 52-3. One potentially significant respect 
in which the earlier formulation in Quinn (1983) differs from the formulations in the 
latter essays is that the earlier formulation depends on an agent-causal rendering of the 
bringing about relation. That is, the earlier theory says simply, “God brings about x,”
whereas the latter theories put it in terms of two states of affairs – one of God’s willing 
that a state of affairs obtain, and the other the willed state of affairs. “God’s willing that x
brings about x.” 
19 Quinn (1993) p. 597; cf. Quinn (1988) pp. 52-3. 
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With these preliminary considerations out of the way, we can summarize Quinn’s 
account of creation and conservation briefly. 
II-B. A Précis of Quinn’s Account 
Quinn’s most concise summation of his theory of creation and conservation 
consists of a single axiom: 
(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s 
willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t.20 
This formulation of the theory makes no distinction at all between creation and 
conservation, and so it takes the traditional claim that conservation is nothing but 
continuous creation quite literally. God’s creating/conserving x is simply God’s willing x
to exist. Furthermore, Quinn is critical of those who wish to draw any deeper distinction 
between creation and conservation. He comments that such persons 
seem to suppose that the kind of power required to create something ex 
nihilo is different from the sort of power needed merely to keep it from 
lapsing back into nonbeing once it has been created. Maybe they imagine 
God is like an athlete who needs more strength to lift a huge weight than 
to hold it aloft once it has been lifted. 
I consider this view to be mistaken. It seems clear to me that 
Descartes was correct in saying that “in order to be conserved in each 
moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and 
action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it 
did not yet exist.” In the case of conservation as well as in the case of 
creation, that power is whatever mysterious power that God possesses in 
virtue of which his volitions bring about contingent existence.21 
20 This single-axiom summary is based upon Quinn (1988) p. 54; Quinn’s own wording is 
slightly different but equivalent. 
21 Quinn (1988) p. 54. 
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Of course, Quinn is aware that we do make a distinction between creation and 
conservation, at least at a superficial linguistic level. In fact, he cites the authority and 
precedence of Scotus to this very effect. According to Scotus, 
Properly speaking . . . it is only true to say that a creature is created at the 
first moment [of its existence] and only after that moment is it conserved, 
for only then does its being have this order to itself as something that was, 
as it were, there before. Because of these different conceptual relationships 
implied by “create” and “conserve,” it follows that one does not apply to a 
thing when the other does.22 
In keeping with Scotus’s insight and our general linguistic practice, Quinn (1993) 
supplements (CC) with the following definitions23:
(Cr) God creates x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is no t' prior to t such that x exists at t'.
22 John Duns Scotus (1306) p. 276. Compare Aquinas (1273) [ST] Ia, q 45, a 3, ad 3 and 
the quotations from Suarez in chapter 1. 
23 Quinn (1993), p. 598. Quinn’s own wording of these definitions is slightly different, 
but equivalent. I should also note that I am glossing over a potentially significant 
difference between the accounts in Quinn (1988) and (1993). Quinn (1993) replaces (CC) 
with the following modally weakened postulate: 
 (P) For all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s willing that x 
exists at t brings about x’s existing at t. 
(CC) entails (P), but not vice versa. According to (CC), it is a necessary truth that every 
moment of the existence of all contingent beings is caused by the divine will. (P), on the 
other hand, is non-committal concerning the modal status of the claim. That is, (P) is 
consistent with supposing that God could have created contingent beings that persisted on 
their own, without any need of continuous divine conservation; but (P) is also consistent 
with the stronger position of axiom (CC). Unfortunately, Quinn (1993) offers no 
explanation for the change, so its significance is unclear. Perhaps it signals a shift in his 
conception of the modal status of the conservation doctrine, or perhaps he switched to (P) 
only because it is less committal and hence, less contentious. In any case, I will ignore 
the issue; for present purposes, I am concerned not with the question of whether things 
must necessarily be continuously conserved, but rather with how we should understand 
the assumption that they are continuously conserved. Nothing we shall say about 
conservation depends in any essential respect on our assuming (CC) rather than (P). 
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(Co) God conserves x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is some t' prior to t such that x exists at t'. 
 
Given these definitions, the traditional claim that conservation is continuous creation is 
rendered false, at least in its most strict and literal sense. God creates contingent beings 
only in the first moment of their existence, and God conserves them at all (and only) 
subsequent moments of their existence.24 Nevertheless, Quinn rightly points out that 
these definitions preserve what is most important to the traditional claim – namely, that 
God’s act is the same in both creation and conservation.25 What separates creation from 
conservation on these definitions is something extrinsic to the act itself. God does the 
same thing in conserving something as in creating it: in both cases, divine volitions cause 
the existence of an individual. Whether the volitional act is an instance of creating or 
conserving depends not on the intrinsic nature of the act, but simply upon whether the 
individual existed previously. Thus, the central and substantial assertion of Quinn’s 
account is consonant with its theological and philosophical heritage, the continuous 
creation tradition: each moment of a contingent individual’s existence is brought about – 
totally, exclusively, actively, immediately, and with necessity – by a divine volition. 
 
24 The requirement that created things must have a first moment of their existence has 
some interesting consequences. It implies, for example, that if the universe has always 
existed, then it was never created, although it has nonetheless been continuously 
conserved from eternity past. Even more interesting, I think, is the possibility of 
something which, although it has not always existed, has nonetheless existed for a finite 
interval that has no first moment. Such an individual would have been conserved at every 
moment of its finite past existence, yet never created. See Quinn (1993) p. 598. 
25 Compare, for example, Descartes’ claim in the “Third Meditation” that “the same 
power and action are needed to preserve anything at each individual moment of its 
duration as would be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in existence. 
Hence the distinction between preservation and creation is only a conceptual one.” See 
Descartes (1984) p. 33, my emphasis. 
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II-C. Options for Completing the Picture 
In the next chapter we will consider a criticism of Quinn’s theory and assess an 
alternative account of creation and conservation. But first, I want to briefly take note of 
several respects in which Quinn’s account is incomplete. To begin with the most obvious 
example, the account is non-committal concerning the timing of God’s volitions relative 
to their effects. It tells us that if x exists at t, then that state of affairs is brought about by 
God’s willing that x exist at t; however, it does not specify whether God’s volition occurs 
within time, perhaps at t or at some time prior to t, or whether it occurs at no time 
whatsoever in timeless eternity. Of course, incompleteness can be a virtuous trait of 
theories if nothing important depends upon it; there is no obvious harm in Quinn’s 
allowing his readers to interpret the theory in light of their own favored positions on the 
thorny question of God’s relation to time.26 Still, we should keep the question of the 
timing of God’s volitions in mind, as it may have some bearing upon the objections and 
puzzles discussed in later chapters. 
Another respect in which Quinn’s theory is incomplete and open to interpretation 
concerns the precise content of the divine volitions. What is it that God wills, exactly, 
when God wills that some individual x exists at t? The answer to this question is unclear 
in several ways, and in this case I think some important issues do hang upon it. As we 
discuss objections to conservation ex nihilo in later chapters, we will find that different 
answers have the potential either to help resolve or to exacerbate the problems. 
 
26 Quinn’s non-commitment on this issue is intentional. See Quinn (1993) p. 597; cf. 
Quinn (1988) p. 52. It is also one respect in which his earlier formulation of the theory 
differs from his latter formulations; as it is presented in Quinn (1983), the theory requires 
that God’s volitions occur within time, simultaneous with their effects. 
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For example, in Chapter Five we will see that the force of the objection that 
continuous creation is inconsistent with persistence over time depends in part upon how 
we understand the temporal content of God’s volitions. In order to clarify what I mean by 
“temporal content,” consider some individual x that exists through a finite temporal 
interval t6t'. There are two general ways we could understand the temporal content of 
God’s volitions with respect to x. The most natural interpretation of Quinn’s account is 
that each moment of x’s existence is brought about by a unique divine volition; thus, for 
any time t'' such that t6t' includes t'', God forms a distinct volition of the form “let x exist 
at t''.” However, there is another possible interpretation that could rob the objection 
concerning persistence of much of its force; on this interpretation, God has a single 
volition with respect to x’s existence – namely, God wills that x exist through the interval 
t6t'. This is, I admit, a somewhat unnatural way to interpret Quinn’s theory – Quinn 
always speaks of God’s willing that x exist at individual moments rather than through 
intervals. But despite appearances, I do not think the interpretation is that much of a 
stretch. Even if Quinn did not intentionally leave this interpretation open, there is reason 
to think he would view it favorably. After all, he has elsewhere argued at length that the 
notions of an object’s existing at a moment and of an object’s existing throughout an 
interval are mutually inter-definable; regardless of which notion is taken as conceptually 
basic, the other notion can be defined in terms of it.27 The same point should apply to 
God’s volitions. We could take God’s willing that x exist at an instant as basic and define 
God’s willing that x exist through an interval in terms of God’s willing that it exist at 
every instant included in that interval. But we could also take God’s willing that x exist 
 
27 See Quinn (1979b). 
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through an interval as basic, and define God’s willing that x exist at an instant in terms of 
it. After all, to will that x exist through t6t', is to will, at least implicitly, that x exist at 
every instant included in that interval. In Chapter Five, I will argue that continuous 
creation is compatible with persistence on either interpretation of the temporal content of 
divine volitions, but the compatibility is easier to establish for the latter interpretation 
than for the former. 
Here is another question concerning the content of divine volitions that will be 
particularly pertinent to the discussion of secondary causation in Part III: do the divine 
volitions have descriptive content, and if so, what is that content? Unless we are prepared 
to conceive of individuals as bare particulars, it would seem that the volitions must 
include some descriptive content specifying what a created/conserved individual is to be 
like. In that case, the question that arises is how extensive that descriptive content must 
be. To foreshadow the argument of Chapter Six, if divine volitions have complete 
descriptive content – that is, if they specify for any property P whether x has or lacks P at 
t – then the ex nihilo model risks undermining all secondary causation. Quinn (1988) 
quite explicitly rejects the view that the divine volitions have such complete descriptive 
content, but he does not offer any alternative account of their content. Of course, there is 
no lack of possible alternatives; the view that God creates bare particulars and the view 
that God creates individuals with complete sets of properties are but two extremes on a 
continuum that seems to contain many possible intermediate positions.28 It remains to be 
seen whether those intermediate positions can withstand scrutiny. 
 
28 A similar point is noted by McCann & Kvanvig (1991) p. 593. 
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But before we worry about such finer details of conservation ex nihilo, we must 
address a more fundamental concern. William Craig has argued that conservationxn (and 
the continuous creation tradition in general) fundamentally misconstrues the distinction 
between creation and conservation, and he has developed an alternative account of 
conservation intended to better elucidate the nature of that distinction. It would be foolish 
to worry about choosing our exact route if we are not even sure we are looking at the 
right map. Thus, in the next chapter, we will consider Craig’s criticism of conservation ex 





In Chapter Two, I argued that Quinn’s ex nihilo model of conservation remains 
faithful to the core commitment of the continuous creation tradition – namely, that the 
divine acts of creation and conservation are intrinsically indistinguishable. But William 
Craig has recently argued that this traditional conception of conservation should be 
rejected. He raises several criticisms, some of which will be addressed in detail in later 
chapters (e.g. that continuous creation is incompatible with persistence and secondary 
causation). However, Craig’s most fundamental objection to conservation ex nihilo seems 
to be that it fundamentally misconstrues the “intuitive” distinction between creation and 
conservation. In the first section of this chapter, I will explain and assess this criticism of 
conservationxn. In section II I will summarize Craig’s own agent-patient model of 
conservation, which he proffers as a superior alternative. Finally, in section III, I will 
identify a number of serious internal difficulties with Craig’s agent-patient model. In 
light of these difficulties, I conclude that Craig’s fundamental criticism of conservationxn 
is groundless and that his agent-patient model of conservation poses no significant 
challenge to the continuous creation tradition. 
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I. Craig’s Objection to Conservation ex Nihilo 
As I stressed in the last chapter, Quinn’s ex nihilo model of conservation makes 
only a minimal distinction between creation and conservation. The acts are intrinsically 
indistinguishable and the only difference concerns whether the individual that is 
created/conserved existed at previous moments. As Craig puts it, the only thing that 
distinguishes the conservationxn of x from the creation of x is “the adventitious fact of x’s 
prior existence.”1 Contra Quinn and the continuous creation tradition, Craig insists that 
the intuitive distinction lies much deeper, in the “terminus” of the act. In creation, God 
brings about the existence of something completely new, whereas in conservation, God 
acts upon a previously existing entity. 
Craig prefers to conceive of causation as a relation between two substances, an 
agent and a patient. This allows him to emphasize what he takes to be the crucial 
distinction: 
In creation there is no patient entity on which the agent acts to bring about 
its effect. It follows that creation is not a type of change, since there is no 
enduring subject that persists from one state to another. It is precisely for 
this reason that conservation cannot be properly thought of as essentially 
the same as creation. For conservation does presuppose a subject which is 
made to continue from one state to another. In creation God does not act 
on a subject, but constitutes the subject by His action; in contrast, in 
conservation God acts on an existent subject to perpetuate its existence.2
In other words, conservation fits the typical agent causation schema in which an agent 
substance acts upon a patient substance to bring about some change in it. In creation, on 
the other hand, there is nothing to act upon; creation is the unique causal activity of 
 
1 Craig (1998a) p. 182. A nearly identical presentation of Craig’s arguments can be found 
in chapter four of Craig & Copan (2004). 
2 Craig (1998a) p. 183. 
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bringing new patient entities into existence. This, Craig argues, is the intuitive distinction 
between creation and conservation, and it serves as the basis for his own analysis of the 
concepts. 
 Before we examine Craig’s theory, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the 
force of his appeal to intuition. On the face of it, Craig’s charge that conservationxn 
conflicts with the “intuitive” distinction between creation and conservation rings 
somewhat hollow. After all, in Chapter One I cited the likes of Aquinas, Suarez, 
Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Leibniz, and Jonathan Edwards, all agreeing that there 
is no substantive distinction to be made between these acts. In contrast, Craig cites only 
one historically significant theist – John Duns Scotus – in support of his allegedly 
“intuitive” view. Indeed, it gets worse, for in spite of Craig’s attempt to paint him as an 
ally, a brief look at what Scotus actually says will reveal that he too belongs on 
conservationxn’s list of esteemed supporters. 
Craig cites a passage in which Scotus writes, 
Properly speaking . . . it is only true to say that a creature is created at the 
first moment [of its existence] and only after that moment is it conserved, 
for only then does its being have this order to itself as something that was, 
as it were, there before. Because of these different conceptual relationships 
implied by “create” and “conserve,” it follows that one does not apply to a 
thing when the other does.3
We have seen this passage before; ironically, it is the very passage Quinn cited in support 
of his definitions (Cr) and (Co). That is, Quinn takes the passage to suggest simply that 
the concept of conservation implies that an object is conserved only if it has existed 
previously. Indeed, it is hard to read much more than that into the passage; it is certainly 
 
3 Duns Scotus (1306) p. 276. 
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difficult to find in it any suggestion of Craig’s view that conservation involves God’s 
acting upon a patient. Even more so in light of the following passage from Scotus, which 
occurs, incidentally, just a few pages prior to the previous passage. 
. . . there seems no need to admit that the fundamental reason for the 
creature’s relationship to God as creating and conserving is that it is being 
acted upon or affected. For properly speaking, the capacity of being acted 
upon [passio] occurs only when the patient receives some form from the 
agent . . . Therefore the passive potency is the principle of being changed 
or transmuted by another. Such a change only occurs when a patient 
receives something from an agent. But in conservation and creation this 
does not occur, but the whole is created and the whole conserved 
completely by the creator and the conserver, and it is not just a part of it 
as is the case when a patient receives a form from the agent.4
Here we find Scotus rejecting, in no uncertain terms, the agent-patient model of 
conservation Craig tries to saddle him with. He explicitly denies conservation involves 
acting upon patients, and affirms instead a view that sounds rather like creation and 
conservation ex nihilo.
Since tradition is aligned rather decidedly with Quinn’s minimalist distinction 
between creation and conservation, we may justly wonder whose intuitions Craig is 
appealing to in criticizing this account. At one point, Craig suggests that his appeal is to 
more general “pre-philosophical intuitions,”5 in which case he may consider citations of 
philosophical authorities to be less pertinent. However, the consistency of their testimony 
is hard to ignore, and it tends to undermine any appeal to mere pre-philosophical 
intuitions. The problem is not only that pre-philosophical intuition is often an 
untrustworthy guide to metaphysics. (That is surely a problem, but it is one that afflicts 
 
4 Duns Scotus (1306) p. 274, emphasis added. 
5 Craig (1998a) p. 181. 
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everyone; we have little choice but to begin with our intuitions and then submit them to 
analysis, refinement, and when necessary, rejection.) The real problem is that among that 
select group of persons who have moved beyond pre-philosophical intuitions and thought 
carefully about the matter, there is a strong consensus that there is no deep distinction 
between creation and conservation. This fact suggests that something is wrong with the 
intuition Craig appeals to. Perhaps it is not as widespread as he suggests or, perhaps it is 
widespread, but simply has not withstood careful analysis. I will not attempt to determine 
how widespread it is, but in the remainder of the chapter I will attempt to show that the 
account of conservation Craig bases on this intuition does not fare well under careful 
analysis. 
 
II. The Agent-Patient Model of Conservation 
As one might expect given his criticism of conservationxn, Craig proposes to 
analyze conservation in terms of an agent (God) acting upon patients. Thus I refer to his 
theory as the agent-patient model of conservation, or conservationap for short. He 
summarizes his theory of creation and conservation as follows6:
E1. e comes into being at t iff (i) e exists at t, (ii) t is the first time at which e
exists, and (iii) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact 
 
E2. God creates e at t iff God brings it about that e comes into being at t
E3. God conserves e iff God acts upon e to bring about e’s existing from t
until some t' > t through every subinterval of the interval t6t' 
6 Craig (1998a) pp. 183, 187; cf. Craig (1998b) p. 138; and Craig and Copan (2004) pp. 
158, 163. I have made some minor changes to render E3 consistent with the notation used 
throughout this chapter. 
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Unfortunately, apart from clause (iii) of E1, Craig offers very little discussion or 
explanation of the details of his account. Since he intends to offer an allegedly superior 
analysis of divine conservation, one would particularly expect Craig to pay careful 
attention to the details of E3, which is rather vague as it stands. As our attempts to clarify 
it will reveal, E3 is quite problematic. 
 E3 stipulates that in order to conserve e God acts upon e (i.e. upon an existing 
patient) to bring about its persistence through some temporal interval. However, William 
Vallicella has called attention to the fact that E3 fails to specify when God acts upon e to 
bring about this effect.7 The question is not whether the act occurs timelessly or within 
time, for Craig conceives of God as existing within time. Rather, what is at issue is when 
God acts upon e within time. Of course, there is a sense in which it may seem to be 
misguided to ask for a specific time at which God’s act takes place. Conservation, it may 
be argued, is a continuous act of causing an object to continue to exist. Thus, God acts 
upon e throughout its existence; the act of conservation occurs over a temporal interval 
no less than its effect. What then is the point of asking when God acts upon e to bring 
about its continued existence? 
In fact, I believe that the question of when God acts upon e is important and that 
E3’s silence on the matter hides difficulties. In order to understand the force of the 
question, it may help to relativize it to moments. Suppose that e endures throughout the 
interval t6t' and consider some moment t'' such that t < t'' < t'. Relative to t'', the question 
is: when does God act upon e to bring about its existing at t''? To reply that God’s act of 
conservation occurs continuously throughout the interval of e’s existence simply will not 
 
7 Vallicella (2002) p. 191. 
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do. It surely is not the entire temporal span of that act which is responsible for e’s 
existing at t''. For one thing, the sub-interval of God’s conserving that occurs after t'' 
clearly is not responsible for bringing about e’s existing at t''. So we can immediately 
limit the possibilities to t'' and times earlier than t''. God’s act of conserving e at t'' must 
be either simultaneous with its effect or prior to it. However, Vallicella points out that, 
for rather obvious reasons, we can also rule out the possibility that conservation is 
simultaneous with its effect.8 On Craig’s account, conservation requires a patient to act 
upon; thus, in order for God to act upon e at t'', e would need to exist at t'', and hence 
would have no need of being conserved at that moment. So agent-patient conservation 
cannot possibly be synchronic. 
Thus, Craig is forced to the position that conservation is diachronic. In order to 
conserve e at t'' God must act upon e at some moment, or during some duration, prior to 
t'' – the act of conservation must always precede its effect. The intuitive picture of 
conservation that emerges is one of God’s somehow pushing or propelling existing 
entities into the future, or perhaps of implanting in them a sort of existential inertia to 
carry them to next moment.9 On the face of it, this diachronic understanding of E3 seems 
to fit nicely with Craig’s agent-patient approach to conservation. Since the act of 
conservation always occurs prior to its effect, there is an existing patient entity for God to 
act upon, and the effect of that action is that e is propelled into the future. However, in 
the following section we will find that there are deep problems lurking beneath the 
 
8 Vallicella (2002) p. 190. 
9 I borrow the term ‘existential inertia’ from Vallicella (2002) p. 190. 
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surface of this account. I will first defend Craig’s account against an objection raised by 
William Vallicella, but then I will raise several more potent objections of my own. 
 
III. Objections to Agent-Patient Conservation 
III-A. Vallicella’s Objection: God cannot begin Conserving 
William Vallicella has argued that the diachronic reading of E3 makes it 
impossible for God to begin conserving anything. He writes, 
If God creates x at t ex nihilo, then precisely at t there is no patient entity; 
how then does God bring it about that x lasts from t to any time later than 
t? The problem is that there is nothing for God to act upon at t. Thus we 
trade in the old dilemma for a new one. In His capacity as conserver, 
either God acts upon x at t, or He acts upon x at a time later than t. The 
first alternative is impossible because conservation, on Craig’s view, 
requires a patient entity. So God acts upon x at a time later than t. But x –
that very individual – cannot exist at times later than t unless x has been 
continuously conserved from the instant of creation. This conservation 
from the instant of creation, however, is impossible to understand given 
Craig’s demand that conservation be an action upon a pre-existent 
individual.10 
What is puzzling about Vallicella’s criticism is why he insists that x does not exist at t. If 
he were correct on that point, then the objection would be successful, but there is little to 
be said in favor of the point. Vallicella claims, “If t is the moment of creation, then at t
there is no e for God to act upon; (e is coming into existence at t, and so does not yet exist 
at t).”11 In other words, Vallicella wants to insist that the moment of an object’s coming 
into existence and the first moment of its existence are distinct. However, a cursory look 
back at E1 and E2 reveals that this is simply a misunderstanding of Craig’s account. As 
 
10 Vallicella (2002) pp. 190-1. 
11 Vallicella (2002) p. 191. 
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Craig defines creation, to create something at t is to bring it about that it comes into being 
at t, and E1 stipulates that anything that comes into being at t exists at t. So while 
Vallicella’s criticism depends upon the assumption that the moment of e’s coming into 
existence is distinct from the first moment of e’s existence, Craig treats these moments as 
identical.12 
In fact, Vallicella’s attempt to separate these moments not only misinterprets 
Craig’s account of creation and conservation, but also seems to be conceptually confused. 
As I argued in Chapter Two, non-existent entities cannot undergo processes, so there is 
really no alternative to understanding creation ex nihilo as instantaneous.13 Craig’s 
analysis rightly implies that if God creates e at t, then e exists at t, and hence e could 
serve as the subject or patient of an act precisely at t. In other words, it is perfectly 
consistent with Craig’s analysis of creation and conservation to suppose that the moment 
of e’s creation (i.e. the moment of its coming into being) is identical to the first moment 
of God’s acting upon e to begin conserving it. At the very same moment God might both 
cause e to exist for the first time and begin acting upon e, propelling it into the future. 
Thus, Craig’s analysis of creation and conservation escapes Vallicella’s objection 
unscathed. 
 
12 In the paragraph immediately preceding this criticism of Craig, Vallicella (2002) 
explicitly notes that “the act of creation” in Craig’s account “is simultaneous with its 
effect” (p. 190). Since the effect of an act of creation is the existence of that which is 
created, it is indeed quite puzzling why Vallicella then denies that the created object 
exists at the moment of its creation. 
13 Similarly, Kvanvig and McCann (1988) argue that no distinction can be drawn between 
the world’s “coming to be” and its “being” (p. 19). Cf. McCann (1999) p. 307. 
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III-B. E3 and Discontinuous Conservation 
Although Craig’s diachronic agent-patient approach to conservation does not 
make it impossible for God to begin conserving e, I shall argue that it does make it 
impossible for God to conserve e continuously. According to Craig, “[a] crucial insight 
into conservation is that unlike creation, it does involve transition and therefore cannot 
occur at an instant.”14 A conserved entity persists over some temporal interval because 
God acts upon it continuously throughout that interval. Thus, there are fundamental 
temporal disanalogies between creation and conservation. Creation can be synchronic, 
but as we have already seen, agent-patient conservation must be diachronic. And creation 
is an instantaneous act that brings about an instantaneous effect, while conservation is a 
continuous temporally extended act that brings about a continuous temporally extended 
effect. These disanalogies seem innocuous enough at first blush, but I will argue below 
that the attempt to marry such disanalogous actions is really quite problematic. 
III-B-1. Setting the Stage 
If God creates some entity e at t, the effect of that act of creation is simply e’s 
existing at t. If e is to persist beyond t, it can only be because God acts upon e precisely at 
t to conserve it. God’s initial act of conservation cannot occur at any moment (or over 
any interval including moments) earlier than t because e does not yet exist and hence 
cannot be acted upon. Neither can it occur at any moment (or over any duration including 
moments) subsequent to t. After all, e’s existence after t is the very thing that divine 
conservation is supposed to explain; to explain it in terms of God’s acting upon e at times 
subsequent to t would presuppose what was to be explained. By process of elimination, 
 
14 Craig (1998a) p. 187. 
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we are left with but a single possible instant at which God can begin conserving e, and so 
it seems that, contrary to Craig’s intentions, the initial act of conservation must be 
instantaneous. But what effect is brought about by this instantaneous first act of 
conservation? The answer to that question will reveal that no continuous act of 
conservation can ever get started. 
However, before I pursue that question further, I want to launch a preemptive 
strike against a potential attempt to cut my criticism off at the start. Perhaps Craig would 
object to my speaking of an “initial act” of conservation. All that really follows from 
what I have said, he might insist, is that God’s act of conservation must begin at t; but 
that is very different from saying that an instantaneous act must occur at t. However 
plausible it may sound, this attempt to forestall my objection will not do. For even if 
Craig wishes to insist that God’s conserving an entity throughout the entire interval of its 
existence is in some sense a single action, it seems that he will be forced to allow the 
action to be divided into smaller parts. As we saw earlier, if we ask what brings it about 
that e exists at some moment t'', such that t < t'' < t', Craig cannot respond that e’s 
existence at t'' is brought about by God’s acting upon e from t to t'. Since the agent-
patient approach demands that divine conservation must precede its effect, Craig is 
forced to admit that e’s existence at t'' is brought about by God’s acting upon e at some 
moment or interval prior to t''. Thus, even if there is some sense in which God’s 
conserving e from t6t' is a single action and e’s existing from t6t' is a single effect, this 
cannot be understood in a way that prohibits the action and the effect from being divided 
into smaller parts. Moreover, certain parts of the action will be responsible for bringing 
about certain parts of the effect and not others – for example, parts of the action that 
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occur after t'' will not be responsible for e’s existing at t'' or any time prior to t''. Thus, 
regardless of whether we refer to it as God’s initial act of conservation or as the initial 
part of God’s act of conservation, we can appropriately ask what effect is brought about 
by God’s acting upon e at t. And as I said above, the answer to that question will reveal 
that no continuous act of conservation can ever get started. 
 There are only two general sorts of answer that might be given: the answer must 
be either that God’s acting upon e at t brings about e’s existing at some moment later than 
t, or that it brings about e’s existing through some interval subsequent to t. I will 
demonstrate below that either sort of answer leads to a problematically discontinuous 
conception of conservation.15 
III-B-2. The Momentary Effect Interpretation 
Let us begin with the former sort of answer. If the effect of God’s acting upon e at 
t is e’s existing at some subsequent moment, the natural thing to want to say is that God’s 
act at t brings about e’s existing at the very next moment after t. But assuming that time is 
continuous, the problem is that there is no unique next moment following t, and thus it is 
impossible for the effect of God’s act to be e’s existing at the very next moment.16 Thus, 
if the effect of God’s acting upon e at t is e’s existing at some subsequent moment t'',
then no matter how near t'' is to t, they will nonetheless be separated by some finite 
interval during which e fails to exist. Moreover, the same pattern will repeat itself 
 
15 Aspects of the argument presented below are modeled upon aspects of the arguments 
for the impossibility of self-sustenance and for the impossibility of a diachronic causal 
nexus found in Kvanvig and McCann (1988) and McCann and Kvanvig (1991). 
16 Strictly speaking, the objection I am raising requires only the weaker assumption that 
time is dense. For a discussion of discrete, dense, and continuous conceptions of time see 
Newton-Smith (1980) ch. VI. 
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indefinitely. God can only act upon e at times when it exists, so it cannot be acted upon 
again until t'', and the effect of that act will occur at some moment which is separated 
from t'' by a temporal interval. So if we take the effect of God’s acting upon e at t to be 
instantaneous, we get the absurd result that e exists at a series of instants separated from 
each other by intervals during which e pops out of existence. Although some may be 
willing to entertain the possibility that an entity might possibly cease to exist and then 
begin existing again at a later time,17 no one, I think, would be willing to tolerate a 
conception of conservation that entails that every created entity is of necessity constantly 
popping out of existence only to reappear at isolated instants before vanishing again. That 
is simply too much to stomach. 
Of course, Craig could avoid this problem if he were willing to adopt a 
discontinuous, discrete view of time according to which each moment is followed by a 
unique next moment with no temporal interval between them. In that case, if God creates 
e at t, God can also act upon e at t to conserve it at the very next moment, and at that next 
moment God can act upon it again to conserve it at the next, and so on. However, 
adopting a discrete view of time comes at a cost, for it entails a similarly discontinuous, 
discrete account of motion and other changes. That is, if time is discrete, then an object in 
motion must “jump” discontinuously from one location at one moment to another 
location at the next moment. The result is a sort of film strip picture of reality, where 
each moment is analogous to a single frame of the film; the appearance of continuity in 
 
17 Quinn, for example, is open to the possibility that this is how we should understand the 
Christian doctrine of the resurrection. See Quinn (1983) pp. 76-7. However, it is not a 
possibility that Craig is willing to consider; indeed, he criticizes Quinn’s account for 
being compatible with such gaps in existence. See Craig (1998a) p. 184-5 
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time and change is, like the appearance of continuity in a film, an illusion produced by 
the fact that the jumpy changes occur too quickly for us to detect. Such a picture of time 
does have certain benefits – for example, it offers easy resolutions to some of Zeno’s 
paradoxes because it denies that time is infinitely divisible. But most have judged its 
disadvantages to far outweigh its advantages.18 Moreover, it seems rather doubtful that 
Craig would accept this solution to the difficulties in his account of conservation, as he 
has elsewhere described the implications of discrete time as “disturbing” and “bizarre.”19 
Thus, we have found that the momentary effect interpretation leads inevitably to 
the consequence that conservation is in some sense discontinuous. Taking time to be 
discrete has the predictable consequence that both the act of conservation and its effects 
inherit the sort of jumpy, discontinuous unfolding inherent in such an approach to time. 
But less predictably, we have found that continuous time renders conservation 
discontinuous in a far more radical sense – both the acts of conservation and their effects 
occur only at disjoint instants separated by intervals of non-occurrence and non-
existence. Thus, taking the effect of God’s initial act of conservation to be e’s existence 
at a later moment has proven to be a dead end. 
III-B-3. The Interval Effect Interpretation 
It is time, then, to consider the alternative possibility that the effect of God’s 
initial act of conservation at t is e’s existing over some subsequent temporal interval. In 
 
18 Le Poidevin (2003) pp. 119-21 discusses very briefly, but also very accessibly, some of 
the strange consequences of taking space and time to be discrete. For more detailed 
discussions of discrete versus dense and continuous conceptions of time, see Lucas 
(1973) ch. I.6; Lucas (1984) ch. V; and Newton-Smith (1980) ch. VI. Lucas and Newton-
Smith both reject discrete time in favor of either dense or continuous time. 
19 Craig (2001) pp. 158-59. 
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order to do so, it will be helpful to draw some distinctions between several different types 
of intervals. Thus far, whenever I have referred to an interval, say t6t', I have intended 
that it be understood intuitively as including t, t', and every moment in between. I will 
refer to such intervals as II-intervals because they are internally bounded at both their 
beginning and their end. Although this is the most natural way to think of intervals, there 
are obviously other possibilities. I will refer to intervals externally bounded at both ends 
as EE-intervals; if t6t' is an EE-interval it will include every moment between t and t',
but not t and t' themselves. EE-intervals are unique in that, although finite in duration, 
they have neither a first nor a last moment.20 Finally, there are the hybrid varieties of IE-
intervals and EI-intervals. If t6t' is an IE-interval, it will include t and every moment 
between t and t', but will not include t'; thus IE-intervals have a first moment, but no last 
moment. And if t6t' is an EI-interval, it will include t' and every moment between t and 
t', but will not include t; thus EI-intervals have a last moment, but no first moment. 
The first thing to note about the interval interpretation of agent-patient 
conservation is that the effect of God’s acting upon e at t cannot be e’s existing through 
an interval that is internally bounded at the beginning – that is, we can rule out II-
intervals and IE-intervals. Here is why. We have already seen that conservationap must be 
diachronic – e’s existing at t cannot be part of the effect of God’s acting upon e at t. So if 
the interval were internally bounded at the beginning, its first moment would need to be 
 
20 I am assuming here that time is continuous. There is no point in distinguishing between 
internally and externally bounded intervals on a discrete view of time, because if time 
were discrete, either type could be defined in terms of the other. For example, if time 
were discrete and t6t' were an II-interval, it would be identical to EE-interval, t-16t'+1;
likewise, if t6t' were an EE-interval, it would be identical to II-interval, t+16t'-1.
Discrete time does away with topologically open boundaries – every interval has a first 
and a last moment regardless of whether it is internally or externally bounded. 
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some time t'', such that t < t''; the problem this poses is that no matter how close t and t'' 
are, if time is continuous (as we are supposing) they will be separated by a temporal 
interval. Thus, any time God created an individual, it would exist for a single moment, 
then cease to exist for some interval, after which it would begin existing again. Once 
again, conservationap results in an unacceptably discontinuous conception of both the act 
of conservation and of its effect. 
The only way to avoid this gap between the first and second moments of a created 
entity’s existence while also honoring the requirement of diachronicity is to take the 
effect of God’s acting upon e at t to occur over an interval that is externally bounded at its 
beginning by t. Either an EE-interval or an EI-interval would solve this gap problem, 
resulting in a smooth transition from the effect of the act of creation to the effect of the 
act of conservation. Nevertheless, although this approach removes any ugly 
discontinuities on the side of the effect, discontinuities on the side of the divine action 
prove more difficult to eliminate. Recall that we are supposing that e exists through the 
interval t6t' and that t'' is an instant falling somewhere within that interval. Let us further 
suppose that the effect of God’s acting upon e at t is e’s existing through the interval t6t''.
It will make things simpler if we can suppose that the interval has a final moment, so let 
us assume for now that t6t'' is an EI-interval. The reason this way of conceiving things 
renders God’s action discontinuous is simply that there is no need for God to act 
continuously on e throughout the interval t6t'' because, by hypothesis, God’s initial 
momentary act of conservation at t is sufficient to bring about e’s continued existence 
throughout the entire interval. Thus, there is no need for God to act upon e again until t'',
at which point e must be conserved again if it is to continue to exist beyond that moment. 
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But at this point, the original problem arises again. What will be the effect of God’s 
acting upon e at t''? It cannot be e’s existence at the next moment, since there is no next 
moment. It must be e’s existence over some temporal interval externally bounded at its 
beginning by t''. And of course, since God’s acting upon e at t'' would be sufficient for its 
continued existence throughout that interval, God need not act upon e again until the end 
of that interval. Obviously, this pattern will repeat itself indefinitely. But this is a rather 
counterintuitive and ad hoc way to conceive of conservation. Although it has the 
advantage of removing any gaps or discontinuities on the side of e’s existence (i.e. on the 
side of the effect), the divine act remains radically discontinuous. 
Furthermore, we should note that taking t6t'' to be an EE-interval rather than an 
EI-interval would only worsen the situation. If the interval is externally bounded at its 
end, it has no last moment, and thus it is not possible for God to wait until the final 
moment to act upon e again. Nevertheless, it remains true that there is no need for God to 
act upon e continuously throughout the entire interval, since God’s act upon e at t is 
sufficient to conserve it through that interval. The result is that God must act upon e again 
at some time prior to t'', but there is no need for God to act upon e at any particular 
moment, since for any such moment, God could wait until a later moment. So taking the 
effect of God’s initial act of conservation to be e’s existing through an EE-interval simply 
adds to the ad hoc nature of the overall picture. 
Thus far, I have contended that taking the effect of God’s initial act of 
conservation at t to be e’s existence over a temporal interval results in a discontinuous 
conception of the divine action – God does not act upon e continuously, but rather at 
disjoint instants. This result is clearly contrary to Craig’s intention, and it is probably 
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sufficient grounds by itself for dismissing the interval interpretation. But there is one 
further problem with this interpretation that is worth noting before we move on. The 
problem is simply that the interval interpretation undermines the need for any further 
divine action subsequent to t. We assumed above that God’s acting upon e at t brings 
about e’s existence through the interval t6t'', which is a sub-interval of e’s existence 
through t6t'. But once it has been granted that God’s acting upon e at t can bring about 
e’s existence over some interval, there can be no non-arbitrary reason to restrict the 
length of that interval. If an instantaneous act of divine conservation can bring about e’s 
continued existence over a brief interval, say some very small fraction of a second, there 
would seem to be no reason to deny that an instantaneous act of conservation could bring 
about e’s existence over a slightly longer interval. If a fraction of a second, why not a 
second? But then, if a second, why not a minute, or an hour, and so on? Indeed, why not 
suppose that it brings about the entirety of e’s existence? I, for one, can see no principled 
justification for restricting the length of the interval, and so I conclude that the interval 
interpretation threatens to reduce conservationap to a single momentary action performed 
at the moment of an individual’s creation. 
III-B-4. Summing up the Argument 
I claimed at the beginning of this section that Craig’s diachronic agent-patient 
approach to conservation has the unintended consequence that it is impossible for God to 
conserve an entity continuously. After examining all the alternatives, we have made good 
on that claim; however, the argument has involved a fair amount of detail, so it may be 
helpful to briefly summarize its central points. First, we observed that the initial act of 
conservation must occur at the instant of creation, and that the effect of that act must 
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occur either at a subsequent moment or over a subsequent interval. We found that if it 
occurs at a subsequent moment, then conservation and its effects are discontinuous in one 
of two senses. If time is continuous, then conservation and its effects are discontinuous in 
the radical sense that conserved entities exist and are acted upon only at disjoint moments 
separated by intervals of non-existence during which there is nothing for God to act upon. 
The only way to avoid this result on the momentary interpretation is to adopt a discrete 
conception of time. But in that case, creation and conservation are discontinuous in the 
sense that they unfold in the jumpy, discontinuous fashion entailed by discrete time. For 
this and other reasons, discrete time has few proponents and Craig certainly is not one of 
them. Turning to the alternative possibility that the effect of the initial act of conservation 
occurs over an interval, we found that the interval must be externally bounded at its 
beginning, for if it were internally bounded at the beginning, every created entity would 
cease to exist immediately following its creation only to reappear after some interval of 
non-existence. Taking the interval to be externally bounded at its beginning can solve this 
problem and remove any discontinuity on the side of the existence of the conserved 
entity. However, the divine act of conservation remains discontinuous, occurring either at 
disjoint moments throughout the conserved entity’s existence, or all at once at the 
moment of its creation. E3’s failure to specify when God acts upon e to conserve it 
conceals all of these problems, but once they have been brought to light it becomes clear 
that an instantaneous act of creation simply cannot be followed by a continuous act of 
diachronic conservationap.
I conclude, then, that the agent-patient approach to conservation simply cannot 
satisfy all of the criteria Craig wants it to. However, although each of the possible 
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interpretations of conservationap discussed above fails in some way or other, their failures 
are not all equally damning. For example, interpretations that entail that conserved 
entities pop out of and back into existence are worse off than those interpretations that do 
not have such entailments. More generally, I think those interpretations that entail that the 
effects of divine conservation are discontinuous are worse off than those that entail that 
the divine act is discontinuous. In particular, I think it is worth noting that the final 
interpretation of conservationap discussed above bears a certain resemblance to one of the 
interpretations of conservationxn mentioned earlier. I argued earlier that Quinn’s ex nihilo 
account is open to some interpretation concerning the temporal content of the divine 
volitions. One interpretation I suggested is that in order to create and conserve an 
individual from t to t', God simply wills that that individual exist throughout t6t'. This 
single volition version of conservationxn is not entirely unlike the version of 
conservationap which holds that God performs a single momentary act of conservation 
upon an individual at the moment of that individual’s creation, with the effect of that 
action unfolding throughout the remainder of the individual’s existence. 
The similarity between them invites the following question: if we were to choose 
between these two “all at once” interpretations of conservation, is there any reason to 
prefer one over the other? One consideration is simply that the agent-patient version 
requires two divine actions – one of creation (i.e., the brute willing into existence of a 
patient entity) and a simultaneous act of conservation performed upon the created entity – 
while the ex nihilo version requires a single divine action of willing that the entity exist 
throughout the entire interval. So at the very least, an Ockham’s razor-type principle – do 
not multiply actions (or kinds of actions) beyond what is necessary to produce the effect – 
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seems to favor the ex nihilo version. Another consideration is that on Craig’s agent-
patient model of conservation, it is far from clear what God does to an individual to 
conserve it. Up to this point I have made due with rather woolly characterizations of 
conservationap such as God “propels individuals into the future” or “implants in 
individuals a sort of existential inertia.” But it is far from clear how we are to parse such 
metaphors, and I will argue in the following section that the prospects for a more precise 
characterization of the action look rather grim. If the argument below is successful, then 
we will have a decisive reason to prefer the ex nihilo approach to conservation over any
interpretation of the agent-patient approach. 
III-C. E3 and the Nature of Conservationap 
Just as E3’s failure to specify when God acts upon individuals hid difficulties, so, 
I shall argue, does its failure to specify how God acts upon them. For upon closer 
examination, the question of what God does to an individual to cause it to persist proves 
troublesome. I argued earlier in the chapter that there is little that can be said in response 
to the question of how God creates ex nihilo because it must be understood as a basic 
action, or something very near to basic – God simply wills that things exist, and that is all 
there is to it. If that is right, then the ex nihilo model of conservation can set aside the 
question of how God conserves individuals, for it claims that in creation and conservation 
God does the very same thing. However, Craig cannot plausibly make the same appeal 
for his agent-patient account of conservation because it seems to involve a rather 
different sort of divine action. 
Craig seems not to recognize this, for he repeatedly denies that the difference 
between creation and conservation lies in the nature of the act itself. According to Craig, 
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“those who differentiate creation and conservation need not, pace Quinn, find the 
intrinsic difference between them in the divine power and action, but may see it rather in 
the terminus of that action.”21 Similarly, he contends that “[t]he act itself (the causing of 
existence) may be the same in both cases, but in one case may be instantaneous and 
presupposes no prior object, whereas in the other case occurs over an interval and does 
involve a prior object.”22 But this cannot be correct; surely these acts cannot differ only in 
their terminus. How can the instantaneous act of willing a new entity into existence be 
intrinsically indistinguishable from that of acting upon that entity at one moment (or 
duration) to bring about its existence at a later moment (or duration)? These seem to be 
fundamentally different kinds of acts, and Craig offers no reason for thinking they are the 
same. Acting upon (doing something to) a patient entity to bring about its existence at a 
later time does not seem to be a basic and primitive causal notion. If God conserves 
things by somehow acting upon them, then it seems perfectly natural and appropriate to 
ask what God does to them. What does God do to e that causes it to exist at a later time? 
Apart from some answer to that question, Craig’s analysis of conservation 
remains utterly mysterious. But is there a plausible way to fill this lacuna in his account? 
Metaphors such as “propelling objects into the future” or “implanting existential inertia in 
them” are fine for the getting an intuitive grasp of the picture, but they are ultimately too 
non-specific and impressionistic to pass philosophical muster. 
 
21 Craig (1998a) p. 183. 
22 Craig (1998a) p. 187. 
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Perhaps we would do better to pursue Craig’s suggestion that conservation 
involves some sort of change in the conserved object.23 Unfortunately, he does not 
elaborate on what sort of change he has in mind. Could the conserved object’s continued 
existence be the change he is referring to? That seems improbable for at least two 
reasons. First, it is not altogether clear that the continued existence of something qualifies 
as a change. If e exists now and continues to exist until a later moment, then what exactly 
has changed? With respect to e’s existence, nothing seems to have changed (e’s ceasing 
to exist at the later moment seems better qualified to count as a change).24 But secondly, 
even if e’s existence until a later moment does count as a sort of change, noting that fact 
would do nothing to remove the mystery in Craig’s account. In order to bring about that 
change at a later moment, God must do something to an individual now. The question 
remains: what does God do to it? 
A slightly more promising suggestion is that in acting upon e, God causes it to 
possess some sort of feature – a property, disposition, power, or something of the sort – 
that results in its continued existence. The proposal, then, would be that God brings about 
e’s continued existence indirectly by directly causing e to possess what Kvanvig and 
McCann (1988) refer to as a self-sustaining feature (SS). On this suggestion, divine 
 
23 This seems to be implied by what he says in Craig (1998a) p. 183. 
24 Compare Lombard (1986, p. 84): 
I take it to be obvious that no object changes merely in virtue of its being 
the case that it persists. Persisting is a paradigmatic case of not changing. . 
. . [I]t might be suggested that nothing changes unless it persists; but 
persistence itself is not a change. 
Rundle (2004, p. 91) makes essentially the same point. 
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conservation and its direct effect (i.e. e’s possesion of an SS) can be conceived 
synchronically. Thus, it promises an answer to the question of when God acts upon e that 
apparently avoids the difficulties of diachronic conservation. 
However, the appearance of an improvement here is illusory. In the first place, 
although God’s act of implanting an SS in e may be synchronic, the SS must produce its 
own effects in e diachronically. That is, e must exist at t if God is to implant an SS in e at 
t, and so any effect attributable to e’s possession of the SS must be e’s existence at some 
moment or through some duration subsequent to t. All of the temporal problems of 
diachronic conservation discussed above will simply reappear in a slightly new guise.25 
So despite initial appearances, there is no escaping the problems raised by the diachronic 
nature of the agent-patient approach. 
Furthermore, explaining conservation in terms of God’s implanting SS’s in 
individuals undermines the very notion of divine conservation. For if individuals persist 
due to the operation of SS’s, God could simply create individuals with SS’s in the first 
place and leave them be. There is no apparent need for continued divine involvement. Of 
course, a theory of that sort can no longer be described as a theory of divine conservation; 
rather, it is a theory according to which God creates individuals that have no need of 
conservation. Regardless of whether such an account is philosophically tenable, it has 
clearly fallen off the map of theological orthodoxy and onto that of deism. 
Thus, we are still without an adequate answer to the question of how God acts 
upon individuals in order to cause them to persist. The answers we have considered have 
 
25 For a discussion of various problems raised by the attempt to explain persistence 
through appeal to self-sustaining features see Kvanvig & McCann (1988) pp. 37-48. 
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all been problematic, and I am not aware of any plausible alternatives. Obviously, that 
does not establish with any certainty that there is no plausible answer to the question, but 
it does cast further doubt upon agent-patient conservation by adding to its already 
significant list of problems. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Quinn’s ex nihilo model of conservation follows the continuous creation tradition 
in denying that there is any substantive distinction between creation and conservation. In 
this chapter I have defended this tradition by responding to William Craig’s charge that it 
fundamentally misconstrues the intuitive distinction between creation and conservation. 
According to Craig, conservation should be understood in terms of God’s acting upon a
patient entity to cause it to continue existing. However, we have found this agent-patient 
model of conservation to be fraught with difficulties, so much so that I think we can 
safely conclude that it poses no real threat to the traditional ex nihilo model. 
Throughout the remaining chapters I will focus exclusively upon the continuous 
creation tradition and its ex nihilo version of conservation. Thus, I will forgo the 
subscripts and modifiers: when I refer to conservation without any qualification, I mean 
conservation ex nihilo as defined by (Co), and when I speak of continuous creation I
mean the theory stated in (CC), (Cr), and (Co). Unlike the agent-patient model, 
continuous creation seems to offer an internally consistent account of creation and 
conservation. However, it remains to be seen whether continuous creation can withstand 
other common criticisms. In Part II (Chapters Four and Five), we will consider the 
objection that continuous creation is incompatible with persistence, and in Part III 
59





Continuous Creation and Persistence 
 
If the existence of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of 
God’s immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as 
much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, 
is a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past 
existence . . . 
 - Jonathan Edwards (1758, p. 991) 
 
[I]n a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no 
any-thing, can be the same with that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same. 
 




Continuous Creation and Temporal Parts 
 
The doctrine of continuous creation is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it 
is incompatible with persistence. Indeed, some authors have taken the denial of 
persistence to be partly constitutive of the doctrine.1 That is, they have taken continuous 
creation to be the view that moment-by-moment God is creating new things that replace 
those that existed previously. However, I think this is an unhelpful way to approach the 
issue. Historically, the vast majority of continuous creationists seem to have seen no 
conflict whatsoever between continuous creation and persistence. They do not claim that 
God continuously creates a succession of replacement worlds and world-inhabitants, but 
rather that God continuously creates this world and its inhabitants. Moreover, I suspect 
that many continuous creationists would have rejected (or at least reconsidered) the 
doctrine if they had thought it to be incompatible with persistence. 
 
1 For example, Crisp (2003) distinguishes between what he calls strong conservation and 
continuous creation as follows: “a strong conservation thesis preserves this notion of 
temporal persistence whereas a continuous creation thesis denies conservation, since 
nothing persists through time” (p. 64). Similarly, Richard Watson (1993, pp. 80-1) 
acknowledges that an interpretation of continuous creation compatible with persistence 
would be more charitable, but he suggests that the “more common” interpretation of the 
doctrine understands it to be incompatible with persistence. However, with the possible 
exception of Jonathan Edwards (whose views I will discuss later in the chapter), I am 
aware of no textual evidence to support this suggestion. Moreover, even Edwards does 
not argue that continuous creation is inconsistent with persistence per se, but only that it 
is inconsistent with what he takes to be a mistaken understanding of persistence. 
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In addition to being historically skewed, the suggestion that the denial of 
persistence is partly constitutive of continuous creation clearly does not apply to Quinn’s 
theory of continuous creation. Recall that Quinn’s theory consists of the following axiom 
and definitions: 
(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s 
willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t. 
(Cr) God creates x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is no t' prior to t such that x exists at t'.
(Co) God conserves x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is some t' prior to t such that x exists at t'. 
 
(CC), (Cr), and (Co) in nowise deny persistence; indeed, as (Co) defines conservation, 
only persisting entities can be conserved. 
Thus, a better way to approach the issue is to think of the denial of persistence as 
an alleged implication of continuous creation. The problem is not that continuous 
creation explicitly denies persistence. Rather, the problem is that there are (allegedly, at 
least) reasons to worry that accepting continuous creation implicitly commits one to 
denying persistence.2 Put another way, the worry is that there is some hidden 
incompatibility between continuous creation and persistence, and thus, that consistency 
requires rejecting at least one of them. 
 
2 This way of approaching the problem is parallel to the standard way of approaching the 
more commonly discussed problem of freedom and foreknowledge. The doctrine of 
omniscience is traditionally understood as involving divine foreknowledge of all future 
free choices. There are well-known and hotly-debated arguments that purport to show 
that omniscience, so understood, implies the denial of libertarian free will. To my 
knowledge, no one who defends these arguments has ever suggested that the denial of 
libertarian freedom is partly constitutive of the traditional doctrine of omniscience. 
Instead, they argue simply that those who endorse that version of omniscience are 
implicitly committed to rejecting libertarian freedom. 
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If we find that continuous creation and persistence really are incompatible, I think 
that continuous creation is the one we would need to reject. That seems to be the right 
choice for at least two reasons. The first is simply that it is more evidently true that many 
things persist than it is that God continuously creates everything. Thus, if persistence and 
continuous creation really are incompatible, the rational thing to do would be to stick 
with the more evidently true – i.e. to stick with persistence. Perhaps some would 
challenge this first reason by an appeal to faith and tradition; that is, they might argue that 
even if the truth of continuous creation is less evident by the lights of reason alone, it 
should nonetheless be upheld because it is a time-honored tenet of their faith. However, 
any such appeal would be undermined by the second reason for choosing persistence over 
continuous creation: namely, that persistence is far more important to the major theistic 
religions. Continuous creation may be a popular and traditional doctrine, but it is not 
essential to these religions – they could get along well enough without it. However, the 
same cannot be said of persistence. Without persistence, doctrines and concepts essential 
to theistic religions would be rendered senseless. How could we make sense of 
immortality apart from persistence? What about guilt for past sins, or forgiveness and 
redemption? If persons do not persist, many such core doctrines and beliefs would turn 
out to be meaningless at best – more likely, they would be just plain false. Thus, if 
continuous creation is incompatible with persistence, theists would have to reject 
continuous creation. 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves, for we do not yet know whether they are 
incompatible, and thus, we do not yet know whether we really must choose. In this 
chapter and the next, we will attempt to answer that question. The task is complicated by 
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the fact that philosophers disagree about the nature of persistence. Three different 
theories dominate the discussions – endurantism, worm theory, and stage theory. Section 
I of the chapter will provide a brief introduction to each of these theories. Then, in section 
II we will examine Jonathan Edwards’s views on continuous creation and persistence. 
Edwards argued that continuous creation entails an ontology of temporal parts – I refer to 
this as Edwards’ Thesis. If Edwards is right, then continuous creation is incompatible 
with endurantism, but would appear to be a natural fit with either worm or stage theory. 
Indeed, Edwards defended a view of persistence that is strikingly similar to those of 
contemporary worm and stage theorists. However, in the remainder of the chapter, I will 
argue that neither of these theories are legitimate options for continuous creationists. Any 
plausible version of worm theory will include necessary conditions for persistence that 
are incompatible with continuous creation, and stage theory must be rejected because it is 
an unacceptable theory of persistence. Thus, in this chapter I defend the following 
conditional conclusion: if Edwards’s thesis is correct, then continuous creation is 
incompatible with persistence. Whether continuous creationists can plausibly reject 
Edwards’s thesis and embrace endurantism will be the topic of Chapter Five.  
 
I. Three Theories of Persistence 
 It will be helpful to begin by summarizing and comparing the three predominant 
approaches to persistence discussed in the contemporary literature. My purpose here is 
not to offer an exhaustive overview of these theories, but rather to briefly explain how 
each theory understands the nature of persistence. Thus, I will generally ignore the 
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arguments offered for and against the positions, except where such arguments are 
particularly helpful for the purpose of understanding a view.3
I-A. Endurantism. 
Even most critics of endurantism will concede that it is our default, pre-
philosophical, commonsense conception of persistence. According to endurantism, to say 
that an object persists is to say that it is “wholly present” at different times. Endurantism 
is sometimes referred to as three-dimensionalism because it conceives of persisting 
objects as three-dimensional continuants, entities that continue to exist in their entirety 
over a period of time. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the significance of these 
characterizations of endurantism is to contrast them with those of its principal competitor, 
worm theory or four-dimensionalism.
I-B. Worm Theory. 
Four-dimensionalists conceive of the world as extended in both space and time – 
i.e. as a four-dimensional spacetime manifold. According to this metaphysical picture, if 
we could somehow step outside of the spacetime manifold and view persisting objects 
from an atemporal or omnitemporal “God’s eye” perspective, we would see them as 
“spacetime worms” spread out in all four dimensions of the manifold. Most four-
dimensionalists consider these worms to be composed of infinitely many instantaneous 
temporal parts or stages, each of which is a three-dimensional slice of the worm across 
 
3 For those interested in a more thorough and systematic exposition and assessment of 
each of these theories, Benovsky (2006) is an excellent (although certainly not impartial) 
entry point with ample references to the literature. Also, the collection by Haslanger & 
Kurtz (2006) includes many of the most important readings on each theory. 
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the temporal axis.4 According to worm theory, when we refer to persisting objects, we are 
really referring to four-dimensional spacetime worms. 
Unlike enduring objects, worms are not “wholly present” at any particular 
moment: rather, they are “partly present” at every moment where5 they have a temporal 
part. They persist through time in much the same way that bodies are spread out in space. 
At this moment, someone could accurately describe my body as resting on both a chair 
and an ottoman. What this means, of course, is not that my body is resting entirely on a 
chair and entirely on an ottoman, but rather that part of my body is resting on a chair and 
another part on an ottoman. Likewise, argue worm theorists, persisting objects can be 
said to exist at different times by virtue of the fact that they have temporal parts that exist 
at those times. Objects have temporal parts in essentially the same way that they have 
spatial parts; the only difference concerns which dimension of the spacetime manifold the 
parts are spread throughout. By way of contrast, endurantists draw a sharp distinction 
between the spatial and temporal features of objects. When they affirm that persisting 
objects exist wholly at different times, they thereby deny that persisting objects have any 
 
4 A clarification and a qualification are in order. First, I should clarify that not all 
temporal parts are instantaneous: only the smallest and most fundamental ones are. Any 
subset of an object’s instantaneous temporal parts (or at least any continuous, non-gappy 
subset of them), is itself a four-dimensional temporal part of the larger four-dimensional 
object. However, such four-dimensional temporal parts are themselves composed of more 
fundamental three-dimensional parts. Second, I should add the qualifier that while most 
friends of temporal parts agree that the smallest temporal parts are instantaneous, there 
are a few notable exceptions. For a discussion of this issue, see Zimmerman (1996) pp. 
121-4; Zimmerman cites Bertrand Russell and C.D. Broad as influential temporal parts 
theorists who reject instantaneous parts. 
5 “Where” is appropriate in this context because four-dimensionalists tend to spatialize 
time. That is, they place a heavy emphasis upon the similarities between space and time 
and typically write off most dissimilarities as purely phenomenal. 
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temporal parts.6 To mark the difference between the theories, worm theorists say that 
objects persist by perduring rather than by enduring.
I-C. Stage Theory. 
A handful of philosophers, most notably Ted Sider and Katherine Hawley, have 
recently defended an alternative account of persistence known as stage theory.7 From an 
ontological point of view, stage theory and worm theory are indistinguishable: both 
affirm the existence of instantaneous three-dimensional temporal parts, or “stages,” and 
of four-dimensional spacetime worms composed of these parts. However, while worm 
theorists identify persisting objects – cars, books, bodies, and so on – with worms, stage 
theorists identify them, as one might guess, with stages. 
On the face of it, identifying such things with stages seems to imply that none of 
them persist. Indeed, Sider’s claim that “all continuants are stages” seems flatly 
contradictory: since stages are instantaneous they cannot continue.8 However, Sider 
proposes that stage theory can meet this objection by adapting Lewis’s counterpart 
theoretic analysis of de re modal predication to temporal predication.9 As I will explain 
below, the problems and their proposed solutions are both quite similar. 
 
6 D.H. Mellor (1998, p. 85) argues that what distinguishes events from objects is that 
events have temporal parts while objects do not; cf. Lombard (1986) pp. 69-70, 127-31. 
Trenton Merricks (1995), on the other hand, argues that enduring and perduring entities 
are incompatible – in other words, if objects endure, then it is impossible for events to 
perdure. See Lombard (1999) for a response to Merricks’ argument. 
7 See Sider (1996) and (2001); and Hawley (2001). For a critical assessment of stage 
theory from the perspective of a worm theorist, see Benovsky (2006) ch. 7. 
8 Sider (2001) p. 191. 
9 First developed in Lewis (1968). 
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Let us begin with Lewis’s account of modal predication. By modal predications, I
mean assertions that individuals could have differed in some respects from the way they 
actually are; for example, “David Lewis could have been an unrepentant Platonist” 
asserts that David Lewis might have held different philosophical views from those he 
actually held. The standard analysis of modal predications assumes that the very same 
individual can exist in a variety of possible worlds, possessing different properties in 
various worlds. For example, on the standard analysis, my statement about Lewis is 
understood to be true if and only if there is some possible world in which Lewis exists 
and is an unrepentant Platonist. However, Lewis has to reject that analysis because he 
denies that individuals can exist in more than one world.10 In other words, he rejects the 
idea that there is such a thing as literal “transworld identity”; rather, he holds that any 
individual that exists in a world is a “world-bound” individual. But if individuals are 
world-bound, it looks as though every property they possess is essential to them. After 
all, if individuals are world-bound, they cannot even exist in other worlds, much less 
possess different properties in them. Lewis solves this problem by introducing the 
counterpart relation. Although individuals are world-bound, they nevertheless have 
counterparts that exist in other worlds. Simply put, an other-worldly counterpart of an 
individual is a distinct individual that exists in another world and that stands in some 
contextually relevant similarity relation to that individual. Lewis then analyzes modal 
 
10 By “exists in” I mean “exists wholly in.” As an unrestricted mereologist, Lewis accepts 
the existence of individuals such as the mereological sum of the Eiffel Tower and a 
planet that exists in a different possible world. However, while such individuals exist, 
they do not exist in any possible world, at least not as I am using “exists in.”  Of course, 
if we used “exists in” in a derivative sense such as “has a part that exists in,” we would 
have to say that such individuals exist in two worlds. See Lewis (1986) pp. 211 ff. 
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predication in terms of counterparts rather than in terms of transworld identity: for 
example, the statement “Lewis could have been an unrepentant Platonist” is analyzed as 
being true if and only if some possible world contains a counterpart of Lewis that is an 
unrepentant Platonist. 
Lewis’s counterpart theoretic analysis of modal predication for world-bound 
individuals translates rather straightforwardly to stage theory’s problem of analyzing 
temporal predication for “moment-bound” individuals or stages. While no two stages 
existing at different times are identical, they can nonetheless stand in similarity relations 
– in other words, they can be related as temporal counterparts. Sider proposes that 
the truth condition of an utterance of ‘Ted was once a boy’ is this: there 
exists some person stage x prior to the time of utterance, such that x is a 
boy, and x bears the temporal counterpart relation to Ted. Since there is 
such a stage, the claim is true. Despite being a stage, Ted was a boy; he 
has the historical property of once being a boy.11 
Thus, according to stage theorists, persisting individuals are instantaneous stages; 
nevertheless, they persist as long as they have counterparts that exist at other times. 
 
II. Edwards’s Thesis 
 Now that we have at least a basic understanding of these three accounts of 
persistence, we can turn to the question of their compatibility with the doctrine of 
continuous creation. Readers unfamiliar with Jonathan Edwards’s The Great Christian 
Doctrine of Original Sin Defended (hereafter, simply Original Sin) will undoubtedly 
think it a strange place to begin such an inquiry. But in the process of responding to 
criticisms of the doctrine of original sin, Edwards offers what is to my knowledge the 
 
11 Sider (2001) p. 193. 
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first explicit discussion of the relationship between continuous creation and persistence. 
Critics of the doctrine had charged that by imputing Adam’s sin and guilt to his posterity 
original sin mistakenly (and unjustly) treats distinct persons as though they are one and 
the same. Edwards responded by attempting to show that the objection rests upon a 
mistaken understanding of identity and persistence.12 The objection assumes that the 
reason it is just to punish me for a sin I committed yesterday is that the I-of-today is 
strictly identical with the I-of-yesterday and that the reason it is unjust to punish me for 
the sin of Adam is that I am entirely distinct from Adam. The truth of the matter, argues 
Edwards, is that there is no such thing as strict identity over time. All created things exist 
only for a moment: “what exists at this moment . . . is a new effect; and simply and 
absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and 
follows it according to a certain established method.”13 
It was Edwards’s commitment to the doctrine of continuous creation that led him 
to such a radical conclusion. According to Edwards, if God is at every moment creating 
everything ex nihilo, then there is a constant influx of newly created things. Although 
they may be very similar to the entities that preceded them, the entities that exist at each 
moment are “new effects,” distinct from everything that existed previously. As Roderick 
Chisholm has observed, Edwards was an early proponent of what has come to be known 
in contemporary philosophy as the doctrine of temporal parts.14 Indeed, we can 
 
12 He considers and replies to this objection in pt. IV, ch. III of Original Sin; Edwards 
(1758) pp. 982-96. For philosophical discussions and assessments of Edwards’s defense 
of this doctrine, see Wainwright (1988) and Rea (2007). 
13 Edwards (1758) p. 991. 
14 See appendix A of Chisholm (1976); cf. Helm (1979). 
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understand Edwards as claiming that the doctrine of continuous creation entails the 
doctrine of temporal parts. I will refer to this claim as Edwards’s Thesis.
When critics of continuous creation claim that it is incompatible with persistence, 
they almost invariably mean that it is incompatible with persistence qua endurance. So 
there is a sense in which Edwards’ agrees with the critics: after all, if Edwards’s thesis is 
correct, then continuous creation is incompatible with endurantism. But Edwards was 
hardly a critic – indeed, he was one of continuous creation’s most enthusiastic 
proponents. Rather than concluding that continuous creation is incompatible with 
persistence, Edwards’s contended that we simply need to correct our understanding of 
persistence. He outlined an alternative approach to persistence that anticipates those 
offered by contemporary believers in temporal parts (i.e. stage and worm theorists). 
Edwards writes, 
And there is no identity or oneness in the case [of an effect that is like the 
effects that preceded it], but what depends on the arbitrary constitution of 
the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these 
successive new effects, that he treats them as one, by communicating to 
them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so, leads us to 
regard and treat them as one.15 
Although successive effects are strictly distinct, they nevertheless bear various 
similarities to each other. God has created me at this moment with nearly all of the same 
properties had by a previous person-stage, and because of these similarities the present 
me and that previous person-stage are treated as though they were the same thing. 
Persistence is analyzed in terms of similarity, not strict identity. 
 
15 Edwards (1758) p. 991. 
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This approach to persistence served Edwards’s purposes in Original Sin, for it 
implies that there is no fundamental difference between God’s holding the me-of-today 
responsible for the sin committed by the me-of-yesterday and God’s holding me 
responsible for the sin of Adam. In either case, “if we consider matters strictly, there is no 
such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but 
what depends on God’s sovereign constitution.”16 Thus, if God so wishes, God can treat 
me and Adam as the same because “a divine constitution is what makes truth, in affairs of 
this nature.”17 
Of course, the jargon and theoretical apparatus of temporal parts, person-stages, 
spacetime worms, counterparthood, and so on were not available to Edwards and so it 
should come as no surprise that his views are less developed than those of contemporary 
temporal parts theorists. I do not find, for example, any compelling reason to align 
Edwards with either the worm or stage view; indeed, I rather doubt he ever recognized 
them as distinct options.18 Nevertheless, the fundamental similarity between his view and 
these contemporary positions is striking: Edwards clearly accepted an ontology of 
 
16 Edwards (1758) p. 992. 
17 Edwards (1758) p. 992. There is some debate concerning how to interpret the force of 
such statements in Edwards. Chisholm (1976, p. 139) interprets Edwards as appealing “to 
a doctrine of truth by divine convention,” according to which God could choose to treat 
any sum of temporal parts, no matter how diverse, as a single being. However, Helm 
(1979) attempts to downplay the force of such statements, arguing that Edwards’s 
approach to identity is essentially Lockean. On Helm’s interpretation, in order for A and 
B to constitute a “moral unity” such that God can punish B for A’s offense, “it is not 
sufficient merely that God decides to treat A and B as a unity. It is also necessary that 
there is a certain fitness in the relation between A and B” (p. 47). See Helm (2003) for a 
more recent and thorough assessment of the relationship between Locke’s and Edwards’s 
views on identity. 
18 Cf. Rea (2007) p. 335. 
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instantaneous temporal parts or stages, explicitly denied that any two distinct stages are 
strictly identical, and yet argued that they can be united as stages of the same thing by 
relations of continuity and similarity. 
 But there are also some noteworthy differences between Edwards and 
contemporary worm and stage theorists. For one thing, Edwards takes the similarity or 
counterpart relations that obtain to be divinely underwritten. The reason we find 
similarities among successive stages is that God has chosen to create them with “like 
properties, relations, and circumstances.”19 This leads to a second difference, closely 
related to the first: unlike most contemporary temporal parts theorists, Edwards denies 
that earlier stages cause the existence of later stages.20 Instead, God brings about the 
existence of all stages. Finally, Edwards seems to be more flexible about what kinds of 
similarities are sufficient for sameness or persistence than many contemporary theorists 
would be comfortable with. According to Edwards, 
There are various kinds of identity and oneness, found among created 
things, by which they become one in different manners, respects, and 
degrees, and to various purposes . . . . Some things, existing in different 
times and places, are treated by their Creator as one in one respect, and 
others in another; some are united for this communication, and others for 
 
19 Edwards (1758) p. 991. 
20 Any continuous creationist must deny this because the denial is implied by continuous 
creation. (Unless, that is, we adopt a view according to which the existence of later stages 
is causally overdetermined by both divine continuous creation and by the contributions of 
earlier stages. For reasons I will discuss in Chapter Seven, I do not find such 
overdetermination to be at all plausible and so I ignore the possibility here.) However, it 
is interesting that for Edwards the inference goes in the other direction as well; he 
defends the doctrine of continuous creation on the basis of an argument that it is not
possible for earlier stages to cause the existence of later stages. In other words, he reasons 
roughly as follows: the existence of later stages must be caused; their existence is caused 
either by earlier stages or by God; it cannot be caused by earlier stages; thus, it must be 
caused by God. See Edwards (1758) pp. 988-90. 
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that; but all according to the sovereign pleasure of the fountain of all 
being and operation.21 
For Edwards, it seems that the similarity relations can be as flexible as it suits God’s 
purposes for them to be. Of course, Edwards needs the relations to be pretty flexible if 
they are to serve his theological purposes in Original Sin. He needs to be able to unite or 
“stick together” not only the various stages of what we regard as the “same person,” but 
also the stages of all of mankind. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, Edwards’s overall approach to 
persistence is remarkably similar to those of contemporary worm and stage theorists. We 
will more carefully examine the prospects for combining continuous creation with these 
theories in sections III and IV below.22 
21 Edwards (1758) p. 992. Then again, some contemporary theorists might not be put off 
by Edwards’s flexibility. Sider (2001, p. 206-7) suggests that the flexibility allowed by 
the counterparthood relation may be “counterpart theory’s greatest strength.” He points 
out that for any modal intuition or persistence intuition we might have (even those that 
conflict with other intuitions), counterpart theorists can conjure up a counterpart relation 
to justify it. Conflicting intuitions simply involve different counterpart relations. 
22 To my knowledge, the only contemporary continuous creationist who has explicitly 
defended a temporal parts approach to persistence is William Vallicella (2002). However, 
Vallicella defends a decidedly unpopular view that he calls “presentist four-
dimensionalism.” On the face of it, presentism and four-dimensionalism appear to be 
incompatible doctrines. Four-dimensionalism identifies persisting entities with four-
dimensional spacetime worms composed of infinitely many instantaneous three-
dimensional temporal parts. Presentism, on the other hand, claims that the only things 
that exist are things that presently exist, which entails that no four-dimensional spacetime 
worm ever could exist. At most, presentism is compatible with the successive existence 
of a series of temporal parts. But since only one of these parts exists at any moment, they 
can never compose four-dimensional spacetime worms. For a defense of presentist four-
dimensionalism see Brogaard (2000). For a more detailed development of the sort of 
criticism I have raised above see Benovsky (2006) ch. 3. 
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III. Continuous Creation and Worm Theory 
The vast majority of those who accept a temporal parts ontology also accept 
worm theory’s account of persistence. According to worm theorists, persons, books, cars, 
and so on, are four-dimensional spacetime worms; to say that these things exist at 
specific times is simply to say that they have temporal parts that exist at those times. 
Thus, worm theory requires some revisions to our commonsense conception of 
persistence. According to worm theory, it is not, strictly speaking, me that exists right 
now, but only a small part of me – I exist right now only in the derivative sense that I 
have a temporal part that exists right now. 
Some critics have found this objectionable; for example, Mellor observes that 
only a worm theorist “would say that only parts of Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing 
Norgay climbed only a part of Everest in 1953. The rest of us think those two whole men 
climbed that one whole mountain.”23 But although these implications of worm theory are 
counterintuitive, I do not think they are objectionably so. The analogy worm theorists 
draw between spatial and temporal parts is particularly helpful here. After all, in our 
everyday speech we frequently attribute features of spatial parts to their wholes. I 
describe my car as gold-colored, but only the body of it is really that color. We say that a 
bicycle is broken if it has a broken chain, even if it is otherwise in perfect condition. We 
say that a soccer team scored a goal, when in fact it was a single player who scored the 
goal for the team. And we say that the player scored the goal by kicking the ball, but 
 
23 Mellor (1998) p. 86. Although he is making a somewhat different point, compare the 
following observation in Simons (2000, p. 62): “Outside philosophical seminars a four-
dimensionalist never says ‘A two-hour phase of me last night was a waking-phase’; he 
says, with the rest of us, ‘I was awake for two hours last night’.” 
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really it was only her foot that struck the ball. In each of these instances, something is 
attributed to a larger whole in virtue of being attributable to one of the parts. Worm 
theory simply asks us to understand talk about persistence in an analogous way. We are 
to understand an object’s persisting, or existing at different times, in terms of its having 
parts that exist at different times. And we are to understand temporal predications, such 
as “Ted was once a boy,” as being true at t if and only if Ted has an earlier-than-t part 
that is a boy. Upon reflection, worm theory’s analyses of persistence and temporal 
predication make good sense, even if they are somewhat counterintuitive. 
Moreover, worm theory seems to comport well with the doctrine of continuous 
creation. Indeed, it seems to offer a quite simple and straightforward way of 
understanding the doctrine – to say that God is continuously creating me is simply to say 
that at each moment God creates the temporal part of me that exists at that moment. 
Nevertheless, I shall argue below that, contrary to appearance, continuous creation is 
incompatible with any plausible version of worm theory. In section III-A, I will argue 
that any plausible version of worm theory will require that the stages of persisting 
individuals be causally related to each other in some way. Then, in section III-B, I will 
argue that continuous creation is incompatible with this causal requirement.  
III-A. How to Make Worms out of Stages 
 Just above I defended worm theory as an adequate approach to persistence, but I 
must add one important qualification to this endorsement. Worm theory identifies 
persisting entities with sets or mereological sums of instantaneous three-dimensional 
temporal parts, but it needs to say more concerning why we should regard such pluralities 
of distinct temporal parts as more than mere pluralities. That is, why should we think that 
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a plurality of instantaneous three-dimensional entities composes some further four-
dimensional persisting entity? Why not regard them as merely a succession of 
instantaneous, non-persisting entities? Worm theorists owe us some account of the 
metaphysical glue that unites temporal parts so that they compose a single persisting 
individual. 
Perhaps this will seem like an unnecessary demand. After all, if worms are sets 
(or mereological sums) of temporal parts, their parts are already united by membership in 
a set (or, perhaps, by a fusion principle that generates the mereological sum). But the 
demand is necessary because set membership is too indiscriminate a relation (and 
assuming that mereology is unrestricted,24 the same holds for mereological sums). There 
are obviously far more sets (mereological sums) of temporal parts than there are 
persisting entities. Consider, for example, the set (mereological sum) whose members are 
your even-year temporal parts and my odd-year temporal parts. Membership in this set 
(sum) surely does not unite those temporal parts into a single persisting individual! Thus, 
worm theorists need to offer some account of what distinguishes sets (sums) of temporal 
parts that compose persisting objects from those that do not. I will argue below that the 
most plausible accounts worm theorists have offered include necessary conditions for 
persistence that are incompatible with continuous creation. 
 
24 And taking mereology to be restricted in some way only shifts the problem. If 
mereology is unrestricted, then the challenge is to explain which sums of temporal parts 
compose persisting individuals. But suppose mereology were restricted such that the only 
mereological sums of temporal parts are those that do compose persisting individuals. 
Then the challenge simply shifts to one of specifying how exactly mereology must be 
restricted in order to achieve the right result. 
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What important features distinguish the set composed of all and only my temporal 
parts from the set composed of your even-year parts and my odd-year parts? The most 
obvious answers would seem to be spatial and temporal continuity. If we traced my 
temporal parts through time and space, we would follow a continuous path, but if we 
traced the parts of the other set through time and space, we would find strange 
discontinuities. There would be spatial jumps at the end of each year, and assuming that 
you and I were born several years apart, there would be year-long temporal gaps at the 
beginning (in the even years if I was born earlier and in the odd years if you were born 
earlier). And of course, if we die several years apart there will be year long temporal gaps 
at the end as well. So a natural first thought is that the sets that compose persisting 
individuals are all and only those that are spatiotemporally continuous. 
However, in spite of its initial attraction, numerous thought experiments highlight 
the shortcomings of spatiotemporal continuity. For example, Shoemaker (1979) imagines 
two machines, one a “table canceller” and the other a “table producer.” The first can be 
set to annihilate any tables that exist at some specific time and location, and the second 
can be programmed to cause a table to materialize instantly. Suppose that by sheer 
accident the table producer is programmed to produce a table at the exact time and place 
that the table canceller is set to annihilate a table. Suppose further that the table producer 
just happens to be programmed to produce a table exactly like the one that is to be 
annihilated. People watching the table(s) throughout this process would be unaware that 
anything remarkable had taken place – they would simply observe a spatiotemporally 
continuous succession of table stages and they would assume that they composed a single 
persisting table. Nevertheless, if we then explained to the observers what had really 
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happened, they would surely change their opinions. They would no longer say that a 
single table has survived, but rather than an earlier table was destroyed and replaced by a 
perfect, but nonetheless distinct, replica. Shoemaker also offers an alternate version of the 
thought experiment in which the machines are replaced by a single “absent-minded deity” 
who on one occasion decrees that something should be annihilated at some specific time, 
and on another occasion, having forgotten the earlier decree, decrees than an exactly 
similar thing should come into existence at that very same moment. Armstrong (1980) 
offers another variation of the thought experiment in which one deity annihilates Richard 
Taylor at precisely the same moment that a second independent deity decides to create a 
person exactly like him. 
The common moral drawn from these thought experiments is that spatiotemporal 
continuity is not by itself sufficient for persistence.25 But they also seem to point to a 
simple diagnosis of the problem and a way forward. Each thought experiment describes a 
situation in which there are spatiotemporally continuous sets of table- or person-stages 
that we do not regard as constituting a single persisting table or person. Why not? Why, 
for example, do we deny that the table stage caused by the table producer and the table 
 
25 Cf. Morreall (1980) and Swoyer (1984). Swoyer argues that similar thought 
experiments reveal that spatiotemporal continuity is not necessary for persistence either. 
Suppose that Shoemaker’s table producer were paired with a “table shifter” – a machine 
that could instantaneously move a table from one position to another. Now suppose the 
table shifter moves a table ten feet to the left and at the very same moment the table 
producer replaces the shifted table with an exact replica. Like the other thought 
experiments, this one demonstrates that spatiotemporal continuity is not sufficient for 
persistence since the spatiotemporally continuous set of table stages involves two 
different tables. But since in this version the original table has survived (it is now sitting 
ten feet to the left of where it was originally), it shows that spatiotemporal continuity is 
not necessary either. I am unsure what to make of this version of the thought experiment 
because I am unsure of whether it is possible for a table to be instantaneously shifted. I 
simply have no strong modal intuitions either way. 
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stage annihilated by the table canceller are parts of the same table? It seems that the 
answer must involve causation: the later table stages are not causally related to the earlier 
table stages in an appropriate way to be part of the same table. Indeed, the later stages are 
not causally related to the earlier stages at all.
A causal account of what unifies the stages or temporal parts of persisting entities 
has several important advantages over a spatiotemporal account.26 First, as I have just 
noted, a causal account offers the most natural explanation of why our intuitions conflict 
with the spatiotemporal account in the above thought experiments. Second, a causal 
account also explains why spatiotemporal continuity was such a natural and tempting 
account in the first place. As Armstrong observes, “spatiotemporal continuity of phases 
of things appears to be a mere result of, an observable sign of, the existence of a certain 
sort of causal relation between the phases.”27 Under normal circumstances (when we are 
not deceived by cancellers, producers, absentminded deities, and so on) spatiotemporal 
continuity is our best evidence of persistence, and that makes it easy to mistake the 
evidence for its underlying explanation. The reason that the stages of an individual are 
spatiotemporally continuous is that they are causally connected, and this is also the 
reason why they compose a single persisting individual. Finally, a causal account garners 
further support from the analogy between temporal and spatial parts. We are far more 
 
26 For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of causal over spatiotemporal 
accounts of persistence, see Swoyer (1984). 
27 Armstrong (1980) p. 76. Compare Shoemaker (1979, p. 242): “I do not know whether 
material persistence requires spatiotemporal continuity; but I suspect that if it does, this is 
because the relevant sorts of causality require it.” Likewise, Swoyer (1984, p. 602): “even 
if it should turn out that the transtemporal identity of objects is in fact always 
accompanied by spatiotemporal continuity, it would still be reasonable to regard a causal 
account of identity as basic and use it to explain the presence of the continuity.” 
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inclined to regard a rock as a single object than we are a heap of rocks, even though both 
a rock and a heap of rocks have spatial parts that exhibit spatial contiguity. The difference 
is causal. Although the spatial parts of a heap of rocks do bear some causal relations to 
one another (e.g. some rocks happen to rest upon others), the spatial parts of a single rock 
bear much stronger and more permanent causal relations to each other, and it is for this 
reason that we do not hesitate to regard the rock as a unity. If causal relations are 
necessary for uniting the spatial parts of a single object, then given the close analogy 
between spatial and temporal parts, we should not be surprised to find that causal 
relations are also necessary to unite an object’s temporal parts.28 
The preceding considerations support the conclusion that any plausible version of 
worm theory will have to include causal relations as a necessary condition in its account 
of what unites a plurality of stages as parts of a single persisting entity. Several 
philosophers have suggested that some sort of causal relation(s) will be both necessary 
and sufficient for persistence, although the exact nature of such a relation remains 
unclear. As Shoemaker notes, 
It is obvious that not just any relation of causal dependence between 
successive thing-stages is sufficient to make the stages belong to the 
history of a single persisting object; otherwise forgeries of paintings would 
be identical to the originals from which they are copied, with all the 
absurdities that entails.29 
28 Armstrong (1980, p. 74) also draws attention to the importance of causal relations 
between spatial parts. 
29 Shoemaker (1979) p. 247. 
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Unfortunately, relatively little has been done in the way of specifying exactly what causal 
relations would be both necessary and sufficient for persistence.30 Shoemaker describes 
the task as “probably impossible” and does not even try. Swoyer is slightly less 
pessimistic (he describes the task merely as “extremely difficult”), but he contends that 
the task is to be carried out by scientists, not philosophers.31 
However, we do not need any very precise characterization of the required causal 
relations to recognize the problems they will raise for combining worm theory with 
continuous creation. Generally speaking, if a series of temporal parts is to be united as 
stages of a single persisting individual, it seems that the earlier temporal parts will have 
to causally contribute to one (or both) of the following: (a) the existence of the later 
temporal parts, and/or (b) at least some of the properties possessed by the later parts. Call 
the former version existence-causal worm theory and the latter version property-causal 
worm theory. I will argue below that both versions are problematic for continuous 
creationists. 
III-B. Why Continuous Creationists Cannot Make Worms out of Stages. 
 Although many temporal parts theorists affirm that earlier stages cause the 
existence of later stages, David Armstrong is the only one, to my knowledge, who has 
explicitly claimed that existence-causation is necessary for persistence. According to 
Armstrong, uniting distinct stages of a persisting object requires “the actual bringing into 
 
30 Zimmerman (1997) is a noteworthy exception. I will discuss his proposal below. 
31 See his discussion in Swoyer (1984) pp. 604-11. 
83
existence of later by earlier temporal parts.”32 Unfortunately, this existence-causal version 
of worm theory is flatly inconsistent with continuous creation. As Edwards clearly 
realized, if God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of everything at every 
moment, then nothing else is in on the act. Thus, since continuous creationists deny that 
earlier stages cause the existence of later stages, it seems that the property-causal version 
of worm theory is their only option. 
But is the property-causal version of worm theory acceptable, and can it be 
consistently conjoined with continuous creation? Vander Laan (2006) entertains the 
possibility, but concludes that it is vulnerable to too many problems. For example, he 
points out that the stages of distinct individuals often make causal contributions to the 
properties possessed by one another, without thereby being united as stages of a single 
persisting entity: 
The heat of the match and the coolness of the air together bring about the 
tepidity of the water, but the water is not identical to the match or to the 
air. Besides this, the character of the first created objects could only have 
 
32 Armstrong (1997) p. 74; cf. pp. 104-7. For most four-dimensionalists, the primary 
motivation for saying that earlier stages cause the existence of later stages is that it offers 
a plausible reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (1983) caricature of four-dimensionalism as 
the crazy view that new things are “constantly coming into existence ex nihilo” (p. 213). 
Contrary to Thomson, most temporal parts theorists deny that temporal parts pop into 
existence uncaused, insisting instead that they their existence is caused by the parts that 
preceded them. See, for example, Sider (2001) p. 217; Heller (1990) p. 19; and Oderberg 
(1993) p. 86. Although Oderberg is himself a critic of four-dimensionalism, he accepts 
this response to Thompson’s objection as adequate. 
Of course, continuous creationists who are attracted to four-dimensionalism have 
their own plausible response to Thomson’s charge. When she says that new things keep 
coming into existence ex nihilo, she means that they pop into existence entirely uncaused;
but continuous creationists would insist instead that they are created (i.e. caused to exist) 
ex nihilo by God. 
84
been caused by God’s action, but of course God is distinct from the 
objects so created.33 
Thus, Vander Laan rejects the property-causal theory of persistence because he thinks it 
will be unable to distinguish between identity-grounding and non-identity-grounding 
instances of property-causation, and more specifically, because he thinks it will be unable 
to distinguish between the creator and the first creatures. 
However, Dean Zimmerman (1997) has defended a property-causal theory of 
persistence that seems to handle such cases easily.34 He explains his theory in terms of 
the distinction between determinable and determinate properties. Being colored is an 
example of a determinable property under which various determinate properties fall – e.g. 
being red, being green, etc. Similarly, having shape is a determinable property under 
which determinates such as being square and being triangular fall. Zimmerman’s theory 
claims that “the possession by an object of intrinsic properties falling under a certain 
determinable must be caused, in part, by the object’s earlier exemplification of intrinsic 
properties falling under the same determinable.”35 In other words, in order to be united as 
stages of a persisting object, the determinate shape of an object-stage must be caused, at 
 
33 Vander Laan (2006) p. 165. In a similar vein, he wonders: “If the character of an object 
is caused in part by its earlier character and in part by its environment, why is it the latter 
[sic] that (so to speak) passes its identity to the causal patient?” 
34 Zimmerman’s account clearly places its primary emphasis upon appropriate kinds of 
property-causation between earlier and later stages. However, it is not clear to me 
whether Zimmerman thinks that earlier stages must also cause the existence of later 
stages. If he does think so, then his approach is not a pure property-causal one. 
35 Zimmerman (1997) pp. 450-1. Although Zimmerman explains his theory in terms of 
the distinction between determinable and determinate properties, he seems to think the 
theory could be reformulated without it if that distinction turned out to be specious; see 
Zimmerman (1997) p. 452. 
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least in part, by the shape of the object’s earlier stages. Likewise, its determinate mass 
must be caused, at least in part by the mass of the earlier stages, and so on for, color, size, 
etc. This offers tidy solutions to all of the cases Vander Laan finds problematic. Consider, 
for example, the case of the match that causally contributes to the tepidity of the water. In 
order to demonstrate that the water is distinct from the match, all we need to find is one 
determinate property of the water that is not caused by the match’s possession of a 
property falling under the same determinable. Thus, since the match’s mass makes no 
contribution to the water’s having the mass it has, the match and the water are not 
causally related to each other in the way persistence requires. Similarly, since God has no 
mass properties at all, God cannot be causally related to anything that has mass in a way 
that satisfies Zimmerman’s property-causal account of persistence. So Zimmerman’s 
theory also has the resources to properly distinguish between creatures and creator. 
Since existence-causal versions of worm theory are flatly inconsistent with 
continuous creation, it seems that a sophisticated property-causal version such as 
Zimmerman’s is probably the most plausible option for continuous creationists. 
Nevertheless, this approach faces a further difficulty that is not easily overcome: namely, 
that of explaining how causal interactions between stages are possible at all. This opens 
the door to a large and complicated issue that we will explore in detail in Part III. Here I 
can do little more than gesture in the general direction by noting that it is paradoxical, to 
say the least, to insist that earlier temporal stages make causal contributions to the 
properties of later stages when those later stages would not even exist unless they were 
immediately created by God. If God has to step in at later moments to create them, then it 
is hard to see how anything other than God can contribute to the properties these later 
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stages possess. As we will see in Chapter Six, there is a rather powerful argument to be 
made for the conclusion that continuous creation is incompatible with secondary 
causation. Unless that argument can be rebutted, it seems that continuous creation will be 
incompatible with any plausible version of worm theory – existence-causal or property-
causal. 
 
IV. Continuous Creation and Stage Theory 
Let us pause to briefly review the argument thus far. According to Edwards’s 
thesis, the doctrine of continuous creation entails an ontology of temporal parts. If 
Edwards is right, then continuous creation is incompatible with endurantism, but would 
appear to be a natural fit with temporal parts approaches to persistence such as worm 
theory. But worm theorists need to explain why a bunch of distinct instantaneous objects 
(stages) should be regarded as composing a further persisting individual or worm, and the 
most plausible accounts worm theorists have offered all require some kind of causal 
relation(s) between stages. Unfortunately, continuous creation seems to be incompatible 
with such causal relations between stages, and so we have concluded that continuous 
creation is not really compatible with worm theory after all. 
At first glance, it may seem to follow that continuous creation is incompatible 
with stage theory as well. After all, stage theorists endorse the very same ontology as 
worm theorists do – they too insist that there are worms composed of stages. So if 
continuous creation prevents worm theorists from offering an adequate account of what 
unites stages into worms, it will raise the same problem for stage theorists. However, the 
conclusion that continuous creation and stage theory are incompatible is premature. 
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Although stage theorists such as Sider and Hawley do, as a matter of fact, accept the 
existence of worms, that commitment is not in any way essential to their theory of 
persistence. Stage theory’s approach to persistence requires only two things – stages and 
the counterpart relation. Of course, if the counterpart relation requires causal relations 
between stages, the same problems will simply emerge again in a slightly different form. 
But since stage theorists do not need to insist that stages literally compose a further four-
dimensional entity, similarity and spatiotemporal continuity alone may be adequate for 
the counterpart relation. So for present purposes, let us simply stipulate that causation is 
not a part of the temporal counterparthood relation.  
If counterparthood can simply be a matter of similarity and continuity, there is no 
apparent reason why stage theory and continuous creation should be incompatible. 
Indeed, I am willing to grant their compatibility. Nevertheless, I will argue that stage 
theory must be rejected, not because of some implicit incompatibility with continuous 
creation, but rather because it not really a theory of persistence at all. 
IV-A. Why Stage-Theoretic Persistence is not really Persistence 
I have already summarized stage theory’s account of persistence above, so I will 
be very brief here. Persisting objects such as books, cars, and persons are instantaneous 
three-dimensional stages that persist by having counterparts at different times. Although 
the copy of Sider’s Four Dimensionalism lying on the floor next to me is an 
instantaneous book-stage, it is nevertheless true that it was previously sitting on my desk. 
What makes that statement true is the fact that a previous book-stage once sat on my 
desk, and that previous book-stage happens to be a counterpart of the book-stage lying on 
the floor next to me. We can say that the book lying next to me has persisted (or will 
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persist) as long as it has past (or future) counterparts. And we can say that it was (or will 
be) read as long as one of its counterparts once was (or will be) read. That, in a nutshell, 
is how stage theory deals with matters of persistence and temporal predication. 
 Counterpart theory in both its modal and its temporal guises has been 
consistently met with the objection that the truth conditions it offers are utterly irrelevant 
to the truth or falsehood of the statements they are intended to analyze.36 If I tell you, 
“Ted was once a boy,” I most assuredly do not mean that there once was something 
distinct from Ted that was a boy. On the contrary, I mean to say that the very individual 
we refer to right now as ‘Ted’ existed at an earlier time and at that time was a boy. Stage 
theorists assent to the sentence but use it to express a very different proposition. As they 
use it, it expresses the proposition that there once was a person-stage that was a boy and 
that this person-stage stands in some similarity relation to the person-stage we now call 
‘Ted.’ But that is just a case of changing the subject! I am saying something about Ted –
that he himself was once a boy. Stage theorists, on the other hand, are saying that 
someone else was once a boy (and it must be someone else, for stage theorists say that 
persons are stages, and stages exist only for/at a single instant). 
It is little wonder that Plantinga and other critics have charged that counterpart 
theory manages to achieve nothing more than verbal agreement with the rest of us.37 In 
 
36 The “irrelevance objection” has been repeated often. See, for example, Kripke (1972) 
p. 45; Plantinga (1982) pp. 114-20; Plantinga (1987) pp. 209-10; Perry (1972) 479-80; 
and Salmon (1986) pp. 98-9. 
37 Plantinga (1982) pp. 117-9. Plantinga’s criticism is directed towards modal counterpart 
theory, but it is equally germane to temporal counterpart theory. 
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his review of Katherine Hawley’s How Things Persist, Trenton Merricks emphasizes just 
how superficial this verbal agreement is. He explains: 
The only difference between Hawley’s theory and the thesis that ordinary 
objects are instantaneous and do not persist lies in Hawley’s definition of 
‘persist’ (and corresponding definitions of past- and future-rooted 
predicates like ‘was green’). . . . Stripped of this linguistic innovation, hers 
is simply the theory that no ordinary object lasts over time.38 
In other words, stage theory is nothing but a fancy way of dressing up non-persistence. 
Remove the fancy garb and all that is left is the entirely unattractive metaphysical thesis 
that nothing persists. 
Perhaps this criticism seems too easy – surely, one might think, stage theory is 
being represented uncharitably. Actually, I think that Merricks’s comments cut to the 
heart of what is wrong with stage theory. But for those who remain skeptical, I will 
attempt to drive home the point by coming at the problem Merricks has identified from a 
slightly different direction. Call the following view Replacement Theory:
Nothing persists. The only things that exist are instantaneous, non-
persistent individuals. These individuals are replaced, moment-by-
moment, by similar, but distinct, instantaneous, non-persisting individuals. 
 
Replacement theory is an unattractive view – one I certainly hope is false. Nevertheless, I 
think it must be admitted that it is a perfectly coherent metaphysical theory. Indeed, I 
claim that it is more evident that replacement theory is coherent than it is that stage 
theory is a theory of genuine persistence. This poses a problem for stage theory, for if we 
accepted its construal of persistence, replacement theory would be incoherent. According 
to stage theory, persisting just is being replaced by similar but distinct objects (or 
 
38 Merricks (2003) p. 147. Merricks suggests that a more appropriate title for Hawley’s 
book would have been Things Don’t Persist.
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counterparts), and so replacement theory would both affirm and deny that things persist. 
Since it is evident that replacement theory is not incoherent, it follows that stage-theoretic 
persistence must not be genuine persistence. 
Instead of trying to convince us that stage theory offers an account of genuine 
persistence, stage theorists ought to be more candid and admit that they think our 
commonsense beliefs about persistence are mostly false.39 Far from being a theory of 
genuine persistence, what stage theory really amounts to is the view that genuine 
persistence is a fiction. If stage theorists are right that all “continuants” are instantaneous 
stages, then nothing really does persist. Of course, we might still pretend that they do, but 
that is another matter. Indeed, stage theory could be more aptly understood as an account 
of how we feign persistence than as a theory of true persistence. 
IV-B. Why Feigning Persistence is not enough 
My reference to “feigning persistence” is intended to call to mind the views of 
Roderick Chisholm. Although Chisholm is certainly not a stage theorist (he is really an 
endurantist of sorts), he has famously defended the view that in our everyday, non-
philosophical ways of thinking and speaking about the world we frequently feign the 
identity or persistence of entities that, strictly speaking, do not persist. Moreover, he 
argues that our doing so is pragmatically useful and hence, justified.40 Could a candid 
 
39 I say mostly false because at least some of our commonsense beliefs would still be true. 
For example, many non-persistence beliefs (e.g. my belief that the apple I am about to eat 
will not exist a minute from now) would no doubt still be true, although they would be 
true for different reasons than what we commonly suppose. 
40 Chisholm accepts the endurantist account of persistence for simples and for composite 
entities that do not undergo any changes in their parts. However, he argues on the basis of 
mereological essentialism that any time a composite object loses or gains a spatial part, 
the former object ceases to exist and is replaced by a new composite object. For example, 
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stage theorist adopt this line and develop it into a defensible position? That is, could a 
stage theorist candidly acknowledge that nothing really persists, and simply defend the 
view that stage theory offers an account of how we justifiably feign persistence? 
With respect to vast stretches of reality, such a position might be defended as 
generally inoffensive. For example, I frankly do not care all that much whether the car in 
my garage is strictly identical to the car I parked there last night. I do think and speak as 
though they are strictly identical, but when it comes down to it, as long as there is a car 
there this morning suitably similar to the one I parked there last night – e.g. if it looks the 
same, runs as well, is recognized as belonging to me, etc. – I could care less whether they 
are literally the same car or merely temporal counterparts. Moreover, even if I came to 
believe that they were merely counterparts, I would still continue to speak of them as if 
they were literally the same. It would complicate our language immensely to speak of 
each temporal part as a distinct object. That would be the literal truth of things if stage 
theory were correct; nevertheless, it would be pragmatically useful to adopt the fiction of 
 
when I take my car to the mechanic for new brakes, the car I drive home in is not, strictly 
speaking, identical to the car I drove to the shop. Nevertheless, there are good pragmatic 
reasons for treating them as though they are the same. Thus, we “feign their identity” or 
“play loose with the ‘is’ of identity.” See Chisholm (1976) ch. III. 
I have presented stage theory as though it were supposed to be an account of 
genuine, rather than merely feigned, persistence. This seems to me to be the most natural 
way to understand Sider’s repeated claims that stage theory is true persistence. However, 
there is a tension between those claims and Sider’s later suggestion that persistence is 
merely a matter of convention. There he claims that Chisholm’s view “pretty much 
amounts to a three dimensionalist counterpart theory”; see Sider (2001) p. 207. But I 
would contend that there is a crucial difference between Chisholm’s view and Sider’s. 
Chisholm explicitly denies that his is an account of true persistence; he makes clear that 
he is merely offering an explanation of how we feign the persistence of entities that, 
strictly speaking, fail to persist. If that is how Sider understands stage theory, he should 
stop claiming that it is an account of true persistence!
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persistence whenever we left the philosophy department.41 My car is not unique in this 
respect. I could say essentially the same things concerning a vast array of familiar 
objects: I could really care less whether most things – the books on my shelf, the tree in 
my front yard, the carpet in my office, etc. – really persist or are simply replaced by 
counterparts.42 
However, there is at least one segment of reality in which feigning identity is 
more deeply offensive and problematic. When it comes to persons and their persistence, I 
 
41 Peter Simons (2000) seems think that such considerations favor endurantism over its 
rivals. He writes: 
no one has ever put in the sheer hard graft required to see how a language 
would look and function which treated all particulars as occurrents. . . . I 
would not be so confident as to deny that such a feat is possible, only that 
its feasibility awaits demonstration. So until further notice I claim we are 
justified in upholding the commonsense position that there are continuants 
(p. 62). 
His target in this passage is worm theory, but an analogous point could be made 
concerning stage theory – nobody has worked out all the details of a language that treated 
all particulars as stages, and it is not at all clear that such a project is feasible. But how 
exactly does this lend support to endurantism? Why should we think that a true 
metaphysical description of the world must be linguistically feasible? I suspect that any 
metaphysically rigorous description of the world would result in a highly complex, and 
hence unfeasible language. The unfeasibility is a result of human cognitive limitations 
and should not be counted against metaphysical views. Cf. Melia (2000) p. 86. 
42 There are some instances in which it might seem to matter. Consider, for example, a 
collectible item that is valuable because of something in its past history. Suppose I paid 
top dollar for a baseball that Lou Gehrig once hit out of the park for a grand slam. 
Suppose further that after reading Sider I have become convinced that what I purchased is 
not really the baseball Gehrig hit, but merely a counterpart of that baseball. Should this 
revelation bother me? I think it would surely temper my enthusiasm, at least temporarily, 
but perhaps my disappointment would be short lived. Perhaps I would grow to be content 
with owning a counterpart of the ball Gehrig hit. I might tell myself: “The ball that 
landed over the fence was itself merely a counterpart of the ball that contacted Gehrig’s 
bat. Owning the sole present counterpart of the ball Gehrig hit is as good as it gets.” 
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care a great deal about whether strict identity is involved.43 It would deeply trouble me to 
discover that I am not really identical to “my former selves.” Likewise, it would bother 
me a great deal to learn that the woman I refer to as my wife is not identical to the girl I 
met in college, later proposed to, and eventually exchanged vows with. For cars and most 
other things I can put up with mere counterparts (any car-stage with certain 
characteristics will do). But when it comes to persons I cannot be so pragmatic. One of 
my most fundamental beliefs is that I and other persons persist in some robust sense – 
that, as Chisholm and Bishop Butler would put it, persons maintain their identity in “the 
strict and philosophical sense.”44 It is a belief I would abandon only in the light of very 
weighty counterevidence. 
Moreover, if we were forced to reject this belief, we would have to face squarely 
the radical consequences of doing so. I think the costs are especially high for certain 
moral concepts like responsibility and the related concepts of reward and punishment. 
The idea of rewarding or punishing persons for the actions of their counterparts makes no 
sense whatsoever. If you are unsure about this consider the following parallel. If David 
Lewis was right, you have modal counterparts who commit all sorts of heinous acts, but it 
would surely be absurd to hold you responsible for their actions. (It would be absurd, I 
 
43 I acknowledge that this is a controversial opinion. Some philosophers do not think that 
identity is really what matters when it comes to the persistence or survival of persons. 
Most notably, Derek Parfit has defended the view that what really matters is not identity 
but mental continuity – having the right sort of connections among one’s mental states; 
see Parfit (1971), (1984), and (1995). But others are as insistent as I that identity is 
important for the persistence of persons; Lewis (1976) describes the assumption that 
identity matters as “a compelling commonsense answer, an unhelpful platitude that 
cannot credibly be denied” (p. 18). 
44 Chisholm (1976) p. 92 and Butler (1798) p. 360. 
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claim, even if Lewis’s views about possible worlds were spot on. Your innocence does 
not hinge upon whether or not Lewis’s metaphysics was correct!) Now consider: does 
punishing persons for the actions of their temporal counterparts make any more sense 
than punishing them for the actions of their modal counterparts? I simply see no reason 
why it should. In either case, persons would be punished for actions performed by other 
individuals – individuals, I might add, over whom they have no control. If the stage 
theorist is right that persons are stages, the practices of punishment and reward are 
manifestly unjust, and so in this context, feigning identity would be morally 
reprehensible.45 
I argued at the beginning of this chapter that persistence is crucially important to 
theistic religions because doctrines and concepts central to these religions – immortality, 
forgiveness, redemption, etc. – would be rendered meaningless or simply false if we 
denied persistence. Clearly, these doctrines and concepts would be undermined by 
feigning persistence no less than they would by rejecting it outright. If feigning 
 
45 If we interpret Edwards as a stage theorist, then this moral complaint can be developed 
into a critique of Edwards’s strategy for defending original sin. Edwards saw that if we 
adopt a temporal parts approach to persistence, then the current “me” is distinct from my 
earlier “person-stages” no less than it is distinct from Adam. The conclusion he drew was 
that God’s holding me responsible for Adam’s sin is no less just than God’s holding “the 
present me” responsible for the sins of my earlier person-stages. But if responsibility 
requires identity, then what Edwards’s argument really does is lower the moral status of 
holding a person responsible for his or her “own” past sins (for they are not really his or 
her own sins). The proper conclusion to draw is not that both cases are equally just, but
rather that both are equally unjust.
Quinn (1983) raises another noteworthy criticism of Edwards’s strategy. If 
persons are instantaneous, and if all actions take time to perform, then no human person 
exists long enough to perform an action. Assuming that sinning involves performing an 
action, it follows that no one exists long enough to sin. (Cf. Benovsky (2006) pp. 100-
101.) Quinn concludes that given Edwards’s metaphysics, “no one actually ate the 
forbidden fruit, and the great Christian doctrine of original sin is not defended, but 
dissolved” (p. 66). 
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persistence is incompatible with moral responsibility, then it is likewise incompatible 
with forgiveness and redemption (I cannot be forgiven for that of which I am not guilty). 
And feigned immortality cannot be a rational source of hope (or fear). In light of all these 
considerations, stage theory is a grossly unattractive option. 
 
V. Conclusion 
So where does this leave us? We have now examined the two competing accounts 
of persistence offered by temporal parts theorists – stage and worm theory – and found 
that neither is a legitimate option for continuous creationists. Thus, it seems that if we 
accept Edwards’s thesis – i.e. the thesis that continuous creation entails a commitment to 
an ontology of temporal parts – we will be forced to conclude that continuous creation 
and persistence really are incompatible. Furthermore, I have suggested that if we are 
forced to that conclusion, then, since persistence is essential to so many fundamental 
doctrines and concepts of theistic religions, we will be forced to reject the doctrine of 
continuous creation. Since Edwards’s thesis has such far-reaching and unwelcome 
ramifications, we would do well to scrutinize it a bit more closely. Is it really true that 
continuous creation entails a temporal parts ontology? Or, can continuous creationists 
resist Edwards’s thesis and consistently endorse the more intuitive endurantist account of 
persistence? These are the questions we will address in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Continuous Creation and Continuants 
 
Our discussion of continuous creation and persistence thus far has yielded some 
unexpected conclusions. On the face of it, temporal parts theories of persistence seem to 
be the most promising option for continuous creationists because continuous creation and 
a temporal parts ontology seem to be a natural fit for each other. If different entities (i.e. 
different temporal parts) exist at every moment, it is quite easy to understand what 
continuous creation would amount to: at each moment, God would create the temporal 
parts that exist at that moment. Unfortunately, we have found continuous creation to be 
incompatible with any plausible account of what unites temporal parts as parts of a single 
persisting individual. Thus, our only remaining hope for reconciling continuous creation 
and persistence rests upon endurantism. 
However, as I noted in the last chapter, those who charge that continuous creation 
is incompatible with persistence almost invariably mean that it is incompatible with 
endurantism, and it is not difficult to see why they would think this. Endurantism requires 
an ontology of continuants – individuals that exist in their entirety at different times. But 
a continuant ontology does not seem to comport well with continuous creation. Does it 
even make sense, critics ask, to say that God continuously creates the very same 
individual? Edwards clearly thought the answer was no. According to Edwards’s thesis, 
continuous creation entails a temporal parts ontology and thus, is incompatible with a 
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continuant ontology. In this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate that in spite of the 
intuitive plausibility of Edwards’s thesis, continuous creationists can resist it. If the 
argument is successful, it shows that continuous creation is compatible with endurantism 
and its continuant ontology. Hence, there is no need to choose between continuous 
creation and persistence. 
 In section I, I will suggest a way of interpreting continuous creation such that 
only the effect of God’s act of creation, and not God’s creative act itself, is really 
continuous or ongoing. I will then argue that this interpretation of the doctrine 
undermines any intuitive support for Edwards’s thesis. Then, in section II, I will discuss 
Quinn’s strategies for resisting Edwards’s thesis. His strategies would allow us to resist 
Edwards’s thesis even if we understand both God’s creative acts and their effects to be 
ongoing and continuous. Although Craig and Vallicella have raised several objections to 
Quinn’s strategies, I will argue that none of them is convincing.  
 
I. Resisting Edwards’s Thesis I: 
The Interval Interpretation 
 
Let us suppose that at t God creates a fundamental particle which I will dub 
Speck. Let us further suppose that Speck is a continuant that persists throughout the 
interval t6t'. (CC) stipulates that for any moment t'', such that t6t' includes t'', Speck’s 
existing at t'' is brought about by God’s willing that Speck exist at t''. As I noted at the 
end of Chapter Two, there are at least two different ways in which we can understand 
this. The most natural way to interpret (CC) is as affirming that for every moment t'' at 
which Speck exists, God forms a specific volition with the content “let Speck exist at t''.”
On this interpretation, God’ volitions concerning Speck’s existence can be mapped one-
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to-one with the moments at which Speck exists. I will refer to this as the Moment-by-
Moment interpretation of continuous creation. An alternative way of understanding (CC) 
is what I will refer to as the Interval interpretation. According to this interpretation, God 
forms a single volition concerning Speck’s existence: namely, “let Speck exist throughout 
t6t'.” In order for Speck to exist throughout the interval t6t', Speck must exist at every 
moment included in the interval; indeed, it is quite natural to suppose that existing 
through an interval just is or amounts to existing at every moment included in that 
interval. Thus, to will that Speck exist throughout t6t' is to will, implicitly, that Speck 
exist at each moment included in t6t'. So even though the interval interpretation of (CC) 
does not represent God as forming a separate volition of the form “let Speck exist at t'',”
it still offers a perfectly legitimate sense in which it can be said that Speck’s existing at t'' 
is brought about God’s willing that Speck exist at t''.
It seems to me that the interval interpretation of (CC) entirely undermines the 
intuitions that support Edwards’s thesis. The intuitive plausibility of that thesis depends 
upon a picture on which God performs a discrete act of creation for every moment of an 
individual’s existence. But if we abandon that picture and adopt instead the picture of 
God’s performing a single act of creation – e.g. God’s willing “let Speck exist through 
t6t'” – then I can see no reason to suppose that the effect of that creative act should be a 
succession of temporal parts. On the contrary, if we assume the interval interpretation, it 
seems most natural to suppose that the effect of God’s creative act would be the existence 
of a continuant, or an enduring individual. 
I have already conceded that the interval interpretation is a somewhat less natural 
way to interpret the doctrine of continuous creation, but I do not think there is anything 
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deeply objectionable about it. Perhaps some might object to describing God’s issuing a 
single volition as an instance of continuous creation. In other words, some might accuse 
me of reinterpreting the doctrine of continuous creation in a way that renders the modifier 
continuous meaningless. My reply is that the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. 
When creation is described as continuous, that modifier is intended primarily to describe 
the way in which the effect, the created individual, depends upon the divine action, and 
not so much to describe the divine action itself. Until recently, theists have almost 
universally conceived of God’s eternity as an immutable existence outside of the 
temporal realm. Time, change, and succession have been thought to apply only to 
creatures, not to the eternal creator. Theologians and philosophers within this tradition 
could not have meant to affirm that God in any literal sense performs a continuous 
succession of discrete creative acts. As I emphasized in Chapter Two, the core claim of 
the continuous creation tradition is that each moment of a creature’s existence depends 
upon God in the same way. In other words, what is affirmed to be literally continuous is 
the creature’s dependence upon God for its existence; it is continuity on the side of the 
effect rather than on the side of the cause that is most important. And since that is 
affirmed by the interval interpretation of the doctrine no less than it is by the moment-by-
moment interpretation, I think it must be admitted that the interval interpretation is a 
legitimate form of continuous creation. 
Indeed, if God is timeless, I think there is at least some reason to think that the 
interval interpretation is preferable. There seems to be a tension (although not a direct 
incompatibility) between the moment-by-moment interpretation and timeless eternity. A 
timeless God could create in a way compatible with the moment-by-moment view either 
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by timelessly issuing multiple volitions (i.e. “let Speck exist at t,” and “let Speck exist at 
t',” and so on) or by timelessly issuing a single conjunctive volition (i.e. “let Speck exist 
at t, and let Speck exist at t', and . . .”).1 However, I can think of no reason why a timeless 
God would choose either of these options since the single non-conjunctive volition, “let 
Speck exist throughout t6t',” seems to be a far more efficient option. Since the interval 
interpretation of continuous creation also seems to be immune to the threat of a 
commitment to temporal parts, it appears to be the overall more attractive option. 
However, many contemporary philosophers find the idea of timeless eternity to be 
problematic and prefer to understand divine eternity as everlasting existence within time. 
As far as I can tell, the view that God exists within time is also compatible with either the 
moment-by-moment or interval interpretations of the doctrine. However, I think there 
could be some tension between the interval interpretation and some of the motivations for 
adopting a temporal conception of God. One of the reasons that many have rejected 
divine timelessness is that it is difficult to see how a timeless God could be genuinely 
related to temporal creatures. Many proponents of a temporal God do not conceive of 
God as willing from eternity past exactly what will occur, but rather as personally 
interacting with and responding to creatures as time unfolds. Such theists may prefer to 
think of God’s creative volitions as literally occurring moment-by-moment, simultaneous 
with their effects. Thus, it would be nice if the moment-by-moment interpretation were 
also compatible with endurantism and its continuant ontology. I will argue below that it 
is. 
 
1 On the latter option, it would be distinct conjuncts of God’s volition that mapped one-
to-one with the moments of a created entity’s existence. 
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II. Resisting Edwards’s Thesis II: 
The Moment-by-Moment Interpretation 
 
Although I have suggested that (CC) can be understood along the lines of either 
the interval or the moment-by-moment interpretations introduced above, Quinn himself 
seems to have intended the moment-by-moment interpretation. Moreover, he argued that 
this interpretation of the doctrine is consistent with taking the objects of God’s 
continuous creation to be continuants. In the sections below, I will explain and defend 
Quinn’s strategies for resisting Edwards’s thesis, but first I will try to clarify exactly why 
the moment-by-moment interpretation is thought to be in tension with endurantism in the 
first place. 
II-A. Clarifying the Problem. 
It might be tempting for proponents of the moment-by-moment interpretation to 
simply dismiss Edwards’s thesis out of hand. Perhaps they might argue as follows: 
We do not say that God moment-by-moment issues volitions of the form 
let a Speck-part exist at t''. Rather, we say that God moment-by-moment 
issues volitions of the form let Speck exist at t''. Since it is Speck that God 
wills to exist, it would be strange indeed if the effect of God’s volition 
were that a mere Speck-part came into existence at t'' instead of Speck 
itself! 
 
While I am not entirely unsympathetic toward such a response, I do not think it ultimately 
goes far enough. In fact, as it stands, it might justifiably be accused of begging the 
question. An Edwardsian might reply as follows: 
You are simply assuming at the outset that God can repeatedly create the 
very same thing, but surely that is nonsense! To create something just is to 
bring something new into existence, so to continuously create is to 
continuously bring new things into existence. You cannot defend yourself 
merely by reaffirming nonsense. 
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This imaginary Edwardsian has placed her finger on the fundamental underlying issues 
that a moment-by-moment endurantist must address: what is the relationship between 
creation and newness, and how can any sense be given to the notion of repeatedly 
creating the very same thing? 
 If the moment-by-moment interpretation of continuous creation is to be 
compatible with endurantism, then it must be possible for God to repeatedly create the 
very same entity. The problem is that our intuitive idea of what it is to create something is 
the idea of bringing about the existence of something new. If I create an artwork, I bring 
about the existence of an artwork that did not previously exist; likewise, in creating 
something ex nihilo, it would seem that God causes something not previously existent to 
come into existence. This intuitive idea of creation contains two conditions, one causal 
and one temporal; to say that God creates x at t is to say (a) that God causes x to exist at t 
(the causal condition) and (b) that x did not exist at any time prior to t (the temporal 
condition). The temporal condition is what underlies the intuitive plausibility of 
Edwards’s thesis. If we are to understand divine conservation literally as continuous 
moment-by-moment creation, and if creation always involves bringing something new 
into existence, then it is impossible to create the same thing more than once and thus, 
Edwards’s thesis seems unavoidable. 
II-B. Quinn’s Solutions. 
Quinn actually adopted two subtly different, but very closely related, ways of 
dealing with this problem in his essays on continuous creation. Both are implicit in my 
summary of Quinn’s theory in Chapter Two, although I did not draw attention there to the 
way in which they bear upon this issue. Crucial to both is a simple assumption: namely, 
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that it is possible to repeatedly cause the existence of the same individual. Unlike 
creation, causation carries no connotation of newness, and thus there is nothing obviously 
objectionable about the assumption. If this assumption is granted, then continuous 
creationists can avoid Edwards’s thesis in one of two ways. The first and simplest is to 
simply drop the temporal condition from our understanding of creation ex nihilo. In other 
words, the strategy is to modify our idea creation ex nihilo so that it carries no 
connotation of newness: God’s creating x at t is understood simply in terms of God’s 
causing x to exist at t, irrespective of whether or not x existed at times prior to t. Since 
there is nothing obviously incoherent about the claim that God repeatedly causes the 
same entity to exist, there is nothing obviously incoherent about continuous creation 
given such a definition of creation. Quinn adopted this strategy in his earlier papers on 
continuous creation, where he drew no distinction between the acts of creation and 
conservation.2
However, as we noted in Chapter Two, this first strategy runs counter to our 
linguistic practice. Our intuitive idea of creation does carry the connotation of newness 
and, by the same token, our intuitive idea of conservation carries the connotation of non-
newness. Thus, in his final essay on the subject Quinn chose to supplement his axiom, 
(CC), with the following definitions3:
(Cr) God creates x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is no t' prior to t such that x exists at t'.
(Co) God conserves x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is some t' prior to t such that x exists at t'. 
 
2 See Quinn (1983) and (1988). 
3 Quinn (1993), p. 598. 
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(Cr) retains the temporal condition for creation, and so it implies that God can create an 
entity only once. And (Co) introduces a complementary temporal condition for 
conservation, such that an entity can be conserved only if it has existed previously. Thus, 
on these definitions, creation and conservation have entirely distinct extensions. 
Nevertheless, the acts of creation and conservation differ only extrinsically; the intrinsic 
nature of both acts is simply that of causing something to exist, and so it still seems 
appropriate to consider the later theory to be a version of continuous creation (even 
though, strictly speaking, it is a theory according to which God creates once and then 
continuously conserves). 
When it comes down to it, the differences between Quinn’s two approaches are 
purely verbal. Although they differ over how we speak about what God does, they are in 
complete agreement about how to describe what God does. God simply causes the 
existence of things, and for enduring continuants, God does so repeatedly at each moment 
of their existence. However, a number of critics have remained unconvinced that Quinn’s 
solutions really resolve the underlying problem. In the following section I will defend 
Quinn’s position against several such criticisms. 
II-C. Objections and Replies 
II-C-1. The Skeptical Questions Objection 
As the name suggests, this objection is put in the form of a series of questions 
which are, presumably, supposed to reveal something problematic about Quinn’s 
solutions. William Craig, for example, poses the following queries:  
Is it even coherent to affirm that God creates a persistent entity anew at 
every instant? If at every t God creates ex nihilo, is it really x which exists 
at successive instants rather than a series of simulacra? Since there is no 
patient subject on which the agent acts in creation, how is it that it is the 
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identical subject which is re-created each instant out of nothing rather than 
a numerically distinct, but similar subject?4
And William Vallicella echoes Craig’s concerns, adding some questions of his own: 
If God re-creates an individual instant by instant out of nothing, as 
opposed to operating upon an individual that already exists, then ‘its’ 
being or existence is new at each instant. How then can ‘its’ identity fail to 
be new at each instant? How can it fail to be a different, though perhaps 
qualitatively indiscernible individual, at each instant?5
For all of their rhetorical skepticism, I do not think there is much substance to 
Craig and Vallicella’s objections. Indeed, I think Quinn could justifiably complain that 
their questions are posed in a misleading and perhaps even question-begging fashion. For 
example, Craig asks whether it is “even coherent to affirm that God creates a persistent 
entity anew at every instant,” and Vallicella represents Quinn as saying that God “re-
creates an individual instant by instant.” But does Quinn actually claim that God “re-
creates” or “creates anew” at each instant? The answer depends, of course, upon which of 
Quinn’s essays (and hence, which of his two strategies for avoiding Edwards’s thesis) we 
are considering. As I explained above, in his earlier essays, Quinn divorced any 
connotation of newness from the idea of creation: as it is defined in these essays, to create 
x is simply to cause x to exist. When he assumes this definition, Quinn does affirm that 
God repeatedly creates a persistent entity at every instant, although I think he would 
prefer to avoid the language of creating anew for fear that the connotation of newness 
would shift from God’s action to its object. By contrast, in Quinn’s later essay, where he 
adopts a definition of creation that does imply newness, (Cr), he no longer affirms that 
 
4 Craig (1998a) p. 184. 
5 Vallicella (2002) p. 189. 
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anything is repeatedly created; rather, he affirms that they are created once, and then 
repeatedly conserved (and conservation is explicitly divorced from any connotation of 
newness). 
The point is that the choice of words is crucial. By posing their questions in terms 
of “re-creating” or “creating anew,” Craig and Vallicella appeal to our tendency to 
associate creation with newness in order to make Quinn’s position sound nonsensical. 
But their rhetorical questions seem far less compelling when they are restated in more 
neutral terms. For example, I think Quinn could have no complaint against the following 
rendering of Craig’s question: is it even coherent to affirm that God repeatedly causes a 
persistent entity to exist at every instant? But of course, when it is put that way, it loses 
its rhetorical force. It is far from obvious there is anything incoherent about saying that 
God repeatedly causes the same thing to exist. Of course, I do not know how to prove 
that it is coherent, but I do not see why I should have to. The burden lies with those who 
contend that it is incoherent to identify and show us the contradiction. Skeptical questions 
alone are not enough. 
II-C-2. The Nature of Continuants Objection 
Vallicella has offered another criticism that purports to explain why the idea of 
repeatedly causing the existence of a continuant is incoherent. He argues that if we 
consider the nature of continuants, we will see that they are self-conserving and thus have 
no need of divine conservation. If that is right, then Quinn’s theory of continuous creation 
107
must be mistaken, for it claims that God is the total and exclusive cause of the continued 
existence of everything.6
But what is it about continuants that leads Vallicella to conclude that they are self-
conserving? When I introduced endurantism at the beginning of Chapter Four, I 
characterized continuants as being wholly present at each moment at which they exist 
and, coming at the point from a different direction, as having no temporal parts. Unlike 
temporal parts and the worms composed of them, continuants are capable of existing, in 
their entirety, at more than one moment. According to Vallicella, these characterizations 
reveal that continuants are “existentially complete” in some way that is incompatible with 
their being externally conserved. He writes, 
[I]f God conserves a continuant, His conserving activity must be directed 
to the continuant as a whole and not to its temporal parts. But this is 
impossible to make sense of. For as soon as continuant S exists, it exists as 
a whole. Thus as soon as God creates S, S exists as a whole, which is to 
say that all God has to do to keep S in existence is to (1) refrain from 
annihilating S, and (2) arrange S’s empirical environment in a propitious 
manner. . . . for continuants the metaphysical ‘default setting’ is existence, 
not nonexistence. Thus, there is simply no need for divine conservation of 
continuants. If there are any continuants, they are self-conserving.7
6 Vallicella actually raises the objection as a criticism of Craig’s agent-patient theory of 
conservation (which I critiqued in chapter three), but it is equally germane to Quinn’s ex 
nihilo theory. I should also note that Vallicella’s claim about the nature of continuants 
does not by itself entail the falsehood of Quinn’s theory. Suppose that continuants are 
naturally self-conserving as Vallicella suggests, but that God somehow hinders them 
from conserving themselves in order to ensure the totality and exclusivity of his own 
contributions. In that case, Quinn’s theory would still be true even though continuants 
have no need of conservation. However, I shall simply ignore such ad hoc possibilities. If 
we assume (a) that the persistence of continuants is not overdetermined, and (b) that God 
does not somehow prevent continuants from conserving themselves, then Vallicella’s 
claim that continuants are self-conserving does entail the falsehood of Quinn’s theory. 
7 Vallicella (2002) p. 193. The fact that Vallicella directs the objection against Craig’s 
agent patient theory explains why he speaks of God’s conserving activity as being 
“directed to the continuant.” Quinn’s ex nihilo theory, which I have been defending, 
rejects this conception of conservation, but Vallicella’s criticism does not depend upon 
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If this is right, then it certainly poses a problem for our attempt to reconcile continuous 
creation with endurantism and its continuant ontology. 
But why exactly is it impossible to make sense of God’s conserving a continuant 
as a whole? Vallicella seems to think that the fact that a continuant “exists as a whole” 
entails that it will continue to exist without any help, but it is not at all clear why. As 
endurantists use it, the description “exists as a whole” applies to entities at specific 
moments and, by itself, says nothing about whether, or under what conditions, that entity 
will continue to exist as a whole at later moments. Suppose that our fundamental particle, 
Speck, exists as a whole right now. According to Vallicella, this fact somehow entails 
that Speck will continue to exist at subsequent moments, unless something actively 
prevents it from doing so (e.g. if God annihilated it). But why should we think that? I 
grant that the supposition that Speck will continue unless actively prevented is not 
inconsistent with endurantism. It is a supposition an endurantist could consistently 
accept; indeed, endurantists who are atheists or deists perhaps should accept it as the best 
explanation of why continuants do in fact continue. But I see no reason to think that 
endurantism entails this supposition. Endurantists are committed only to saying that 
presently existing continuants are capable of continuing to exist at later times (i.e. that 
their continuing is a possibility); they are not committed to saying that they must or
the point. To apply the quoted passage more explicitly to the ex nihilo model, the first 
sentence could simply be revised to say that God’s “conserving activity must [bring about 
the existence of] the continuant as a whole and not [of] its temporal parts.” The rest of the 
argument could be stated precisely as it is. 
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necessarily will continue unless actively prevented from doing so as Vallicella seems to 
suggest.8
Have I perhaps misunderstood Vallicella’s reasoning? Here is a way of reading 
him that seems to do a better job of relating his premises to his conclusions. Perhaps 
Vallicella takes the claim that continuants are capable of existing at more than one time 
to mean that continuants have something like an intrinsic causal capacity of active self-
preservation. That would lend support to the conclusions he draws: if continuants had 
such a capacity, then they would presumably continue on their own unless something 
intervened, just as Vallicella says. However, if that is how Vallicella reasons, then I think 
he is smuggling in assumptions that are not at all essential to endurantism. This causal-
capacity interpretation of what it means for an individual to be “capable of existing at 
more than one time” is surely much stronger than endurantism requires. All endurantism 
needs is a weaker modal interpretation such as: a continuant is capable of existing at 
more than one time if and only if it is possible that it exist at more than one time. 
Furthermore, this modal interpretation is compatible with the assumption that continuants 
have no intrinsic powers of self-preservation and depend entirely upon something else for 
their continued existence. That is, there is nothing inconsistent about the following 
position: a presently existing continuant is capable of continuing to exist at later times 
and will in fact do so if and only if God causes it to. Thus, I conclude that Vallicella’s 
 
8 Cf. Vallicella’s own definition of continuants which says only that they are capable of
existing as a whole at various times and not that they must. He writes: “A continuant, by 
definition, is (1) wholly present, present as a whole, at each time at which it exists, and 
(2) is metaphysically capable of existing at more than one time”; Vallicella (2002) p. 
192, my emphasis. 
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Nature of Continuants objection also fails to demonstrate any inconsistency between 
endurantism and continuous creation. 
So is there any good reason to worry that the moment-by-moment interpretation 
of continuous creation is incompatible with endurantism? In short, I am not aware of any 
compelling reason to think so.9 Those who wish to deny that it is possible for God to 
repeatedly cause the existence of the very same continuant bear the burden of 
demonstrating why it is not possible. But no compelling demonstration has yet been 
 
9 A detailed summary and assessment of Vander Laan’s (2006) recent discussion of 
persistence and conservation would require a lengthy digression, and in the end I do not 
believe it would significantly advance the present discussion. However, in lieu of a 
lengthy digression, perhaps some brief remarks are better than nothing. Vander Laan 
seems to think that not just worm theorists, but endurantists as well, should accept what 
he refers to as the immanent-causation thesis:
Necessarily, if a contingent object O exists at a time t and t is not the 
earliest time at which O exists, then O’s existing at t depends causally on 
O’s existing at some earlier time. (p. 160) 
Indeed, Vander Laan contends that because Quinn’s theory of continuous creation is 
incompatible with the immanent causation thesis, it has difficulty distinguishing between 
God’s continuously creating an enduring entity and God’s creating a succession of 
instantaneous replacements. Those who affirm the immanent causation thesis can 
distinguish between persistence and replacement, at least in part, by pointing out that 
replacements are not immanent-causally connected to one another. But if continuous 
creation is true, the immanent causation thesis is never satisfied. So how, Vander Laan 
worries, can continuous creationists distinguish between these two genuine possibilities? 
 It seems to me that for endurantists, the answer is quite simple. According to 
endurantists, continuants maintain their identity over time in the strict sense of identity.
Thus, what distinguishes between replacement and persistence is that the latter involves 
identity and the former does not. Identity, I believe, is primitive; it does not supervene 
upon or reduce to other more fundamental features of the world. So to demand a more 
informative account of what distinguishes between replacement and persistence seems to 
me to be a mistake. The immanent causation thesis may be plausible for worm theorists, 
who need to explain what unites distinct (i.e. non-identical) temporal stages as parts of a 
single temporally-extended persistent individual. However, I see no reason why 
endurantists (who have nothing distinct for immanent causation to unite!) should feel 
compelled to accept it. 
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offered: Quinn’s defense of the moment-by-moment interpretation of continuous creation 
has thus far withstood criticism unharmed. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 If the arguments of this chapter are correct, then theists are not forced to choose 
between continuous creation and persistence. One can consistently endorse both, and that 
is a welcome conclusion. However, in the process of defending this conclusion I have 
also defended a number of more specific conclusions that are a bit more surprising, and 
for some, perhaps a bit less welcome. I have argued that endurantism is the only theory of 
persistence that is an option for continuous creationists. Personally, I am quite happy with 
this conclusion because I prefer endurantism for independent reasons, but worm theory 
has gained a considerable following in recent years, so others may not welcome the 
conclusion as warmly. As I explained in Chapter Four, a property-causal version of worm 
theory would be a plausible option for continuous creationists if continuous creation can 
be reconciled with secondary causation. However, over the course of the next three 
chapters, we will see that the task of reconciling continuous creation and secondary 
causation is exceedingly difficult. Although I will not argue that the task is impossible, I 





Continuous Creation and Secondary Causes 
 
[Efficacious qualities] are vain pretensions of human pride, chimerical productions of 
the ignorance of philosophers! . . . [T]hey have failed to discern the invisible operation of 
the creator, the uniformity of His conduct, the fecundity of His laws, the continuously 
present efficacy of His volitions . . . [T]he divine decrees are the indissoluble connections 
between all the parts of the universe, and the wondrous chain of the subordination of all 
causes. 




Continuous Creation and the Threat of Occasionalism 
 
Thus far I have responded to two important objections to the doctrine of 
continuous creation. In Part I, I defended it against the charge that it fundamentally 
misconstrues the distinction between creation and conservation, and in Part II, I defended 
it against the charge that it is incompatible with persistence. In this and the following two 
chapters I will consider one last objection to the doctrine, one I consider more powerful 
and troublesome. The objection is that continuous creation entails a commitment to 
occasionalism, the unappealing view that there are no secondary causes. Put roughly, the 
idea is that a world continuously created by God is so saturated with divine causal 
activity that there simply is no room left for the contributions of secondary causes. 
According to occasionalism, the events we commonly identify as causes are in fact no 
more than the occasions upon which God, the only true cause, brings about various 
effects. Occasionalists have offered a variety of arguments in defense of their view, but 
the argument from continuous creation is generally regarded as their strongest. However, 
few contemporary philosophers of religion have paid this argument the careful attention it 
deserves. If continuous creation entails occasionalism, then theists are forced either to 
accept or reject both. That choice is not easy – at least not from the perspective of 
traditional theology – for the fact is that the traditional popularity of continuous creation 
is matched by the general unpopularity of occasionalism. 
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Thus, the argument that occasionalism follows from continuous creation can be 
viewed as an argument for occasionalism (as it was originally intended), or it can be 
turned on its head and treated as an objection to continuous creation. Although 
occasionalism has a small handful of proponents even today, it has always been an 
unpopular position accepted by only a small minority; moreover, I suspect that 
“unpopular” is too weak to capture most contemporary theists’ aversion toward 
occasionalism.1 Many theists view occasionalism in much the same way that most 
philosophers of mind view epiphenomenalism: they are positions one wishes to avoid, 
that one would be embarrassed to espouse openly or be revealed to be committed to. 
The comparison between epiphenomenalism and occasionalism is fitting because 
the two positions are embarrassing for similar reasons. Epiphenomenalists would have us 
believe that contrary to all appearances mental causation is simply an illusion; similarly, 
but even more radically, occasionalists would have us believe that all secondary 
causation – mental and physical – is an illusion. While it may seem pious to insist that 
God is the only true cause, the apparent cost is that God’s creation is reduced to little 
more than a puppet show. Thus, van Inwagen dismisses occasionalism as “one of those 
high-minded philosophical deprecations of God’s works that come disguised as 
compliments to God’s person.”2 Similarly, Philip Quinn describes occasionalism as 
“ugly” and “repugnant” and takes pains to try to show that his theory of continuous 
 
1 Contemporary proponents of occasionalism include McCann & Kvanvig (1991) and 
Vallicella (1996) and (1999). Although he is not a proponent of occasionalism, Freddoso 
(1988) offers a very sympathetic treatment of it, and Plantinga has admitted to finding it 
at least somewhat attractive; see Plantinga (2007) pp. 127, 129 fn. 51, and 133 fn. 55. 
2 Van Inwagen (1988) p. 216, n. 4. 
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creation does not commit him to it.3 I am myself more sympathetic towards 
occasionalism than most, although my sympathy is born more from a fascination with the 
arguments offered in support of the doctrine than from a fondness for their conclusion. 
The assertion that all secondary causation is illusory is quite discomforting, and I agree 
with those who wish to avoid it, although I shall wait to discuss my reasons for this until 
the Conclusion. For now, I will simply assume that being committed to occasionalism is a 
bad thing and so I will treat the argument as an objection to continuous creation. My goal 
in this chapter is simply to clarify the problem. In section I, I will introduce what I refer 
to as “pure” or “unrestricted” occasionalism and briefly discuss its relationship to the 
varieties of occasionalism that were popular among the Cartesians. Then, in section II, I 
will examine Malebranche’s continuous creation argument for occasionalism, presenting 
it in a way that reveals its relation to Quinn’s theory of continuous creation. 
 
I. Pure Occasionalism and Historical Occasionalisms 
Although Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) is history’s most prominent 
occasionalist, he was by no means its first or last noteworthy proponent. Long before its 
culmination in Malebranche, occasionalism was defended by medieval philosophers such 
as al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Gabriel Biel (1425-1495) and criticized by the likes of 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).4 And among 
 
3 See Quinn (1988). He describes occasionalism as “ugly” and “repugnant” on pp. 72, 73. 
I will discuss his attempts to show that he is not committed to occasionalism in Chapter 
Eight. 
4 For helpful discussions and further references see Fakhry (1958); Freddoso (1988); 
Sorabji (1983) ch. 19; and Nadler (1996). Richard Frank denies that al-Ghazali was an 
occasionalist; see Frank (1992) p. 37 and Frank (1994) esp. pp. 42-7, 86-91. 
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Descartes’s followers, Malebranche’s occasionalism was preceded by that of lesser 
known Cartesians such as Louis de la Forge (1632-1666), Claude Clerselier (1614-1684), 
Geraud de Cordemoy (1626-1684), and Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669), not to mention its 
roots in Descartes’s own writings.5 Moreover, Malebranche was followed by such 
notables as Berkeley (1685-1753) and Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758).6 Nevertheless, 
Malebranche’s prominence is well-deserved, for his writings contain the most thorough, 
consistent, and unambivalent defense of occasionalism. His presentation of the argument 
from continuous creation to occasionalism, which we will examine below, is no 
exception. 
For present purposes, I will take occasionalism to be the view that God is the sole 
and total cause of everything that occurs in nature; in other words, I will assume that 
occasionalism involves the rejection of all secondary causation. I stress the universal 
scope of the doctrine in part to combat the common misconception that occasionalism, at 
least in its Cartesian manifestation, was nothing more than an ad hoc attempt to rescue 
 
5 There is a great deal of debate concerning Descartes’s views on causation and their 
relation to the explicit occasionalism endorsed by many of his followers. See for example 
Clatterbaugh (1999) ch. 2; Loeb (1981) pp. 210-222; and Garber (1987) and (1993). 
6 The exact nature of Berkeley’s relationship to Malebranche and occasionalism is a 
complex and debated issue. Berkeley tried to distance himself from Malebranche. 
Moreover, he clearly seemed to think that a mind can actively bring about some changes 
in itself, so he was not what I will refer to below as a thoroughgoing or pure 
occasionalist. But Berkeley is often interpreted as holding that the only things minds can 
actively bring about are certain kinds of changes within themselves, and that all other 
alleged causal interactions should be analyzed along occasionalist lines. For helpful 
discussions of Berkeley’s view, see the discussions in Bennett (2001) v. II, pp. 165-9 and 
Pitcher (1981). Edwards has traditionally been interpreted as a thoroughgoing 
occasionalist, although Lee (2000) has recently offered an influential challenge to this 
view. For a defense of the traditional interpretation of Edwards in response to Lee’s 
criticisms, see Crisp (2003). 
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substance dualism from the embarrassment of explaining how substances as different as 
immaterial minds and material bodies can act upon each other. According to this popular 
myth, certain Cartesians resolved this difficulty by maintaining Cartesian dualism 
without the interactionism, appealing to constant divine interventions to explain away the 
appearance of interaction between mind and body. This story has been exposed as a 
fiction that fundamentally misconstrues the scope of occasionalism, as well as its 
underlying motivations and justifications. Most of the Cartesian occasionalists denied 
that there is any special problem of mind-body interaction, insisting that causal 
interactions between material bodies are no less problematic than interactions between 
minds and bodies.7 To be sure, occasionalism does dispense of dualistic interaction by 
replacing it with constant divine interventions, but it also dispenses of interactions 
between bodies in precisely the same way. Just as occasionalism claims that God brings 
about appropriate mental events on the occasions of various bodily events and 
appropriate bodily events on the occasions of various mental events, it also claims that 
God brings about appropriate physical events on the occasions of other physical events. 
For example, God (not the rock) breaks the window on the occasion of their collision; 
God (not the helium) causes the balloon to rise on the occasion of the helium’s presence 
in the balloon; and so on. Thus, occasionalism is better understood and assessed as a 
 
7 Indeed, since nearly all of the occasionalists denied that material bodies can act upon 
other bodies, they would have remained occasionalists even if they had rejected dualism 
in favor of a materialist account of the mind. For a powerful critique of the myth that 
occasionalism was a response to the problem of mind-body interaction see Nadler (1997). 
According to Nadler, Antoine Arnauld is the sole Cartesian who turned to occasionalism 
as an ad hoc solution to the mind-body problem; see Nadler (1995b) and (1997) p. 94. 
However, Watson (1987, p. 101) categorizes Arnauld as an interactionist. 
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radical theistic philosophy of nature defended on the basis of much broader theological 
and philosophical concerns. 
 However, lest I simply trade one historical misconception for another, I must 
acknowledge that few of the Cartesian occasionalists would have agreed with the wholly 
unrestricted or “pure” version of occasionalism I have proposed to consider in this 
chapter. For example, if Nadler’s interpretation is correct, Louis de la Forge held minds 
to be active causes and restricted his occasionalism to interactions between material 
bodies.8 Moreover, Nadler suggests that some such “limited employment of 
occasionalism . . . is the rule rather than the exception among the Cartesians.”9 Indeed, 
even Malebranche, who is generally understood to be a purely unrestricted occasionalist, 
sometimes appears to grant rather limited causal powers to minds in his attempts to 
preserve their freedom.10 Alfred Freddoso goes so far as to suggest that pure, unrestricted 
occasionalism has never had a significant advocate: “no important occasionalist has ever 
in fact intended to deny that there is such a thing as creaturely free choice or that such 
 
8 See Nadler (1993b) and (1998) for the evidence supporting this interpretation, as well as 
references to alternative interpretations. Watson (1987) seems to suggest at one place that 
la Forge was an occasionalist about mind-body interactions (see p. 86), but at other places 
Watson seems to deny that la Forge was an occasionalist at all (e.g. pp. 101 and 174). 
9 Nadler (1993b) p. 73. 
10 See, for example, Malebranche (1675) pp. 4, 547, and 669. Malebranche’s account of 
freedom and its relation to his occasionalism present difficult interpretive issues. Louis 
Loeb understands Malebranche to be a restricted occasionalist, the mind’s capacity to 
form volitions being the sole exception to his otherwise unrestricted occasionalism; see 
Loeb (1981) pp. 205 ff. However, most interpreters see Malebranche as attempting to 
offer an account of freedom consistent with an entirely unrestricted occasionalism, 
although it is generally doubted that he succeeds. For helpful discussions see McCracken 
(1983) pp. 105-10; Schmaltz (1996) ch. 6; and Kremer (2000). 
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free choice involves a genuine active causal power to produce effects.”11 Freddoso may 
very well be right to insist that none have intended to deny freedom, although I am 
somewhat more doubtful of his further claim that none have intended to deny that 
freedom involves genuine active causal power. Nevertheless, the fact that he makes this 
claim is symptomatic of the complexity involved in the historical picture. 
Thus, from a purely historical perspective my unrestricted definition of 
occasionalism may be a gross oversimplification. At the very least, it certainly flouts 
Nadler’s wise advice that “we should be very careful about any general claims we may be 
tempted to make about ‘the occasionalists.’”12 But my primary concerns in this chapter 
are conceptual rather than historical, and so, although our discussion will profit greatly 
from being historically informed, I shall concentrate only upon those historical details 
that promise to be conceptually illuminating. It seems to me that the various forms of 
impure or restricted occasionalism fail to meet this requirement. 
One reason why these impure occasionalisms are of little interest for our purposes 
is that they generally presuppose substance dualism. The Cartesians’ dualist ontology 
allowed them to distinguish four general types of causal interaction between substances: a 
mind acting upon another mind, a body acting upon another body, a mind acting upon a 
body, and a body acting upon a mind.13 Although an occasionalist account of interactions 
between two bodies was fairly standard among the Cartesians, they were far more divided 
 
11 Freddoso (1988) p. 82, my emphasis. 
12 Nadler (1993b) p. 73. 
13 In addition to these four varieties of transeunt causation, the Cartesians could 
obviously distinguish two types of immanent causation as well: a body acting upon or 
causing some change in itself and a mind acting upon or causing a change in itself. 
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over whether the occasionalist analysis should be extended to other types of interactions 
and, if so, which ones. As a result, they defended a variety of impure occasionalisms 
which can be differentiated based upon which types of interaction are and which are not 
analyzed in occasionalist terms. But of course, such distinctions are useless to those who 
reject substance dualism, and since dualism has fallen largely out of favor in the last half 
century or so, the majority of contemporary philosophers will find them to be of no more 
than historical interest. Contemporary materialists, whose ontology has no place for 
immaterial minds, are unlikely to find these varieties of restricted occasionalism 
particularly illuminating. 
But the general decline of substance dualism is not by itself an adequate 
justification for ignoring impure occasionalisms here. After all, this is an essay in the 
metaphysics of theism, and although dualism has lost ground with theists as well as non-
theists, its fall from grace has been much less pronounced among theists.14 I suspect that 
at least some theistic dualists would be less opposed to occasionalism if it could be 
restricted so as not to extend to the choices and actions of human agents. In other words, 
some contemporary theists may be very interested to know whether such restricted forms 
of occasionalism are defensible. 
 
14 I do not mean to suggest that dualism’s decline among theists has been insignificant. 
Dean Zimmerman recently observed that “at present there seem to be more Christian 
philosophers defending materialism . . . than dualism—at least in print”; see van Inwagen 
& Zimmerman (2007) p. 2. Nevertheless, I am doubtful that tallying recent publications 
in defense of these positions will accurately reflect the level of support for these positions 
among Christian philosophers. I suspect that at least part of the reason that Christian 
materialism has been getting more attention is that it is still a relatively new (and 
controversial) position. Moreover, I do not think it is an accident that more theists than 
non-theists are still attracted to dualism; Plantinga (2007) argues convincingly that many 
of the standard objections to dualism should have little purchase on those committed to 
Christian theism. 
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However, if the general decline of dualism is not a sufficient reason for ignoring 
restricted occasionalisms, the question of their defensibility is. It is one thing to note that 
some of the Cartesians made exceptions to their occasionalism, and another thing entirely 
to show that such exceptions can be justified. Many of the very arguments the Cartesians 
appealed to in defense of an occasionalist analysis of one kind of interaction seem to 
apply with equal force to other kinds of interaction. Malebranche’s continuous creation 
argument is a case in point. Malebranche argues that if God continuously creates a 
material body, then it is impossible for anything other than God to cause any of that 
body’s features. It is a curious fact that Malebranche never explicitly states the argument 
using a mind as his example instead of a body, but there is nearly unanimous agreement 
among his interpreters that there is no legitimate reason for him not to do so. Nothing in 
the argument seems to depend upon any differences between minds and bodies, and so 
we have every reason to believe that it applies equally to both.15 Thus, as I examine 
Malebranche’s argument below, I will assume that it is intended to establish 
occasionalism in the pure, unrestricted sense. 
 
15 To my knowledge, Pessin (2000a) is the only interpreter who disagrees with this 
assessment. However, as I explain in note 26 below, I find Pessin’s interpretation of 
Malebranche’s argument to be highly dubious. The context in which Malebranche 
presents the argument in the Search after Truth seems to me to suggest that he took it to 
apply to minds as well; see Malebranche (1675) pp. 551-2. Nadler comments: 
“Malebranche, interestingly, never explicitly formulates an argument against the causal 
efficacy of minds using claims about divine conservation, as he does with bodies. But he 
clearly did believe that the doctrine of divine conservation leads to the same conclusions 
in the mental realm as it does in the realm of bodies”; Nadler (1998) p. 231, fn. 45; cf. 
Nadler (2000b) pp. 126-8; Loeb (1981) pp. 207-8; and Schmaltz (1996) pp. 218 ff. 
Nadler (1998) argues forcefully that la Forge’s affirmation of the soul’s activity is 
inconsistent with his endorsement of the argument that continuous creation implies 
occasionalism in the realm of bodies. 
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II. Malebranche’s Continuous Creation Argument 
Although Malebranche offers at least four distinct arguments for occasionalism,16 
interpreters generally regard his continuous creation argument as the most powerful. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Malebranche makes only a cursory mention of the argument in 
The Search after Truth.17 Yet its pivotal role in the Dialogues on Metaphysics and 
Religion suggests that Malebranche himself regarded it as his most forceful argument. In 
order to fully understand the argument and the crucial role it plays in the dialectic, it will 
be helpful to briefly consider its immediate context. 
When Theodore (Malebranche’s spokesperson in the dialogues) tries to convince 
the reluctant Aristes of the truth of occasionalism, his first line of argument is based not 
upon the nature of continuous creation, but rather upon the nature of contingent 
 
16 See Nadler (1997) pp. 80-6. 
17 Nadler (1997) says that “the argument does not appear in the Search at all” (p. 84, fn. 
27), but this is a mistake. The argument does appear there, albeit in a rather condensed 
form and in a passage far removed from Malebranche’s primary discussions of 
occasionalism; see Malebranche (1675) pp. 551-2. 
Interestingly, Louis de La Forge offered a very similar argument more than a 
decade before the publication of the Search after Truth; La Forge (1664) writes, 
I also claim that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, which can 
cause change in it or in any of its parts, in the second moment of their 
creation, if the Creator does not do so himself. Since it was He who 
produced this part of matter in place A, for example, not only must he 
continue to produce it if he wishes it to continue to exist but also, since he 
cannot create it everywhere or nowhere, he must put it in place B himself 
if he wishes it to be there. For if he put it anywhere else there is no force 
capable of removing it from that location. (p. 147) 
He concludes that “it is God who is the first, universal, and total cause of motion” (p. 
147), and although he later allows that there is some sense in which bodies and minds 
cause motions, the sense of causation he describes is that of Malebranche’s occasional 
causation. 
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substances. At least for material things, Malebranche thinks that the most direct path to 
occasionalism is simply through contemplation of their nature.18 Theodore contends that 
the idea of matter, or extension, includes nothing but “the passive faculty of receiving 
various figures and movements.”19 Since the idea of matter includes no active powers, 
matter is a purely passive substance; it can be acted upon, but it cannot move itself nor 
can it act upon a mind or another body. Theodore urges Aristes, “Contemplate intelligible 
extension, the archetype of bodies. . . . Do you not clearly see that bodies can be moved, 
but that they cannot move themselves?”20 But in spite of Theodore’s urgings, Aristes 
remains unconvinced. He concedes that some material bodies are entirely passive, but 
questions whether this is true of all bodies. 
Of course, Theodore (i.e. Malebranche) thinks that the idea of bodies possessing 
causal powers is nonsense, but instead of pressing the point he decides to take a different 
tack and introduces the continuous creation argument – an argument based not upon the 
nature of created substances, but upon the nature of the creation of those substances. 
There are several reasons to think that Malebranche considers this continuous creation 
argument to be his strongest argument. One is simply that it is the argument Theodore 
turns to when his first argument fails to convince Aristes. Moreover, it is also the 
 
18 In the Dialogues, Malebranche states the argument only in terms of material substance. 
Other passages seem to suggest that Malebranche would apply the same sort of argument 
to all created substances, material and immaterial; see for example, Malebranche (1675) 
p. 658. However, Malebranche’s views on the mind and what lies within its power are not 
altogether clear. Although it often seems as though he thinks the mind has no powers 
whatsoever, some passages seem to attribute to the mind some very limited powers to 
produce effects within itself – e.g. Malebranche (1675) p. 669. 
19 Malebranche (1688) p. 106. 
20 Malebranche (1688) p. 110. 
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argument to which Aristes finally capitulates. More importantly, it is an argument which 
purports to demonstrate the truth of occasionalism even if Aristes’ non-occasionalist 
assumptions are granted at the outset. Theodore essentially argues that even if we grant 
that bodies possess all of the Schoolmen’s occult powers, God’s continuous creation of 
those bodies would prevent them from ever exercising their powers. Thus, occasionalism 
would be an unavoidable consequence of continuous creation even if creatures did have 
causal powers. 
The argument unfolds over the course of several pages of dialogue, but Theodore 
offers the following summation: 
Creation does not pass, because the conservation of creatures is – on 
God’s part – simply a continuous creation, a single volition subsisting and 
operating continuously. Now, God can neither conceive nor consequently 
will that a body exist nowhere, nor that it does not stand in certain 
relations of distance to other bodies. Thus, God cannot will that this 
armchair exist, and by this volition create or conserve it, without situating 
it here, there, or elsewhere. It is a contradiction, therefore, for one body to 
be able to move another. Further, I claim, it is a contradiction for you to be 
able to move your armchair. Nor is this enough; it is a contradiction for all 
the angels and demons together to be able to move a wisp of straw. The 
proof of this is clear. For no power, however great it be imagined, can 
surpass or even equal the power of God. Now, it is a contradiction that 
God wills this armchair to exist, unless He wills it to exist somewhere and 
unless, by the efficacy of His will, He puts it there, conserves it there. 
Hence, no power can convey it to where God does not convey it, nor fix 
nor stop it where God does not stop it, unless God accommodates the 
efficacy of His action to the inefficacious action of His creatures.21 
In other words, if God is continuously creating everything, there is simply nothing left 
over for secondary causes to do. Suppose, to use Malebranche’s hyperbolic example, that 
all of the angels and demons joined forces to attempt to move a piece of straw. Since God 
is creating the straw at every moment, and since the act of creation requires creating the 
 
21 Malebranche (1688) pp. 115-6. 
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straw in some specific location, what contribution could the angels and demons possibly 
make? They must either (a) cause the straw to be located somewhere other than where 
God creates it or else (b) cause it to be located where God creates it. But since God’s 
volitions are necessarily efficacious, neither option seems to make any sense. Since the 
powers of finite beings cannot outstrip the power of an omnipotent being, it is impossible 
for the angels and demons to cause the straw to exist somewhere other than where God 
puts it. And since God’s volition is sufficient by itself to cause the straw to exist where he 
wills, there is nothing left over for the angels and demons to contribute to its existing 
there.22 Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that angels, demons, or material 
bodies possess occult powers, the doctrine of continuous creation entails that they could 
never produce any effects. And since it is pointless to posit powers that can never be 
exercised, Malebranche concludes that we must rid ourselves of the opinion that creatures 
have powers and concede that they are entirely passive.23 
22 One possibility that Malebranche, to my knowledge, never explicitly discusses is that 
secondary causes are overdetermining causes. Perhaps the possibility never even 
occurred to him, but I suspect that the more likely explanation of his silence is that he 
considered possibility too absurd to merit discussion. A recurring theme in Malebranche 
is that God’s infinite wisdom requires that God do things in the simplest possible way. 
The suggestion that God creates a world full of occult powers that are mere 
overdetermining causes would surely violate Malebranche’s conception of divine 
wisdom. 
23 Freddoso (1988) draws a distinction between a No-action Theory of occasionalism, 
which affirms that creatures have causal powers but denies that they can ever exercise 
them, and a No-nature Theory of occasionalism that denies that creatures have any causal 
powers. Since the continuous creation argument grants at the outset that creatures have 
causal powers, what it establishes, strictly speaking, is only the No-action Theory. But 
Theodore clearly expects Aristes (and Malebranche expects his readers) to reject the 
notion of causal powers that can never be exercised and accept the No-nature Theory.
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Malebranche’s continuous creation argument is not highly complex, but neither is 
it quite as simple as it is sometimes portrayed. Andrew Pessin (2000a) has rightly 
emphasized that continuous creation per se does not entail occasionalism; in order to 
reach that conclusion, Malebranche must supplement continuous creation with some 
other crucial principles and assumptions. This is an important observation because it 
broadens the possible options for escaping Malebranche’s conclusion. Thus, we would do 
well to take a closer look at Malebranche’s argument, relating it to the account of creation 
and conservation defended in the previous chapters and making explicit what additional 
premises it requires. 
Recall that Quinn’s theory of continuous creation, which we have taken as our 
starting point, consists of the following axiom and definitions: 
(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s 
willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t. 
(Cr) God creates x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is no t' prior to t such that x exists at t'.
(Co) God conserves x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is some t' prior to t such that x exists at t'. 
 
As I explained in Chapter Two, Quinn characterizes the bringing about relation used in 
his theory as involving totality, exclusivity, activity, immediacy, and necessity. I think 
Malebranche would agree with this characterization of divine action, and so it will be 
both appropriate and convenient to exposit his argument in terms of Quinn’s theory and 
the causal relation it employs. 
On the face of it, (CC) says nothing even close to occasionalism. (CC) affirms 
that God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all contingent things at all 
times, and thus it clearly entails that secondary causes do not bring about the existence of
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anything.24 But occasionalism claims that secondary causes do not bring about anything 
at all – that is, in addition to denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of 
anything, occasionalism also denies that secondary causes make any contributions to 
properties or states of things. This is clearly a stronger claim, and it is far from obvious 
that (CC) is in any way committed to it. 
However, I think the intuitive connection between continuous creation and 
occasionalism is easier to see if we offer a more positive characterization of 
occasionalism. Just above I characterized it as the view that secondary causes do not 
bring about anything at all. But implicit in this denial is a positive characterization that is 
more helpful. What occasionalism affirms is that God is the total and exclusive cause of 
everything – i.e. not only of the existence of all things, but also of every property or state 
of all things. Thus, following McCann and Kvanvig, we can understand occasionalism as 
the position which affirms the conjunction of (CC) and (O), where F is a variable ranging 
over properties, 
(O) Necessarily, for all x, t, and F, if x is contingent and x is F at t, then God’s 
willing that x is F at t brings about x’s being F at t. 25 
This way of understanding occasionalism highlights the natural connection between it 
and continuous creation. What Malebranche claims is that God cannot be the total and 
exclusive cause of the existence of all things without also being the total and exclusive 
cause of all their properties – accepting (CC) commits us to (O) as well. 
 
24 Recall that we are restricting our discussion to fundamental particles. Thus, familiar 
acts such as “creating” a sculpture or building a house are to be understood simply as acts 
of modifying preexistent things and not, strictly speaking, as acts of bringing about the 
existence of anything new. 
25 McCann and Kvanvig (1991) p. 592. 
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In order to defend this claim, Malebranche needs some additional assumptions. 
(CC) entails, for example, that God’s willing that I exist brings about my existence at this 
moment, but it certainly does not entail (not by itself, anyway) that my being seated at 
this moment is brought about by God’s willing that I be seated. The inference from (CC) 
to (O) depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent 
individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties. Malebranche 
makes this point using the example of a chair and its location: God cannot will that this 
chair exist without willing that it exist in some determinate place, be it here or 
somewhere else. Malebranche focuses on the properties of location and movement 
because they are so fundamental to his Cartesian conception of material bodies, but I do 
not think his point depends in any essential way upon any specific account of matter.26 As 
 
26 Here I disagree with Pessin (2000a). Pessin points out that Malebranche occasionally 
suggests that there is some fundamental difference between God’s conservation of bodies 
and of minds – the modes minds are created with are not “determinate” and “invincible” 
in the way that the modes of bodies are. Unfortunately, Malebranche does not clearly 
explain this difference. Pessin thinks the explanation is to be found in Malebranche’s 
account of material bodies. In dialogue ten (Malebranche 1688, p. 184), Theodore 
explains the nature of material bodies as follows: 
All the modalities of extension are and can be but shapes, configurations, 
observable and unobservable motion, in a word: relations of distance. 
Thus, an indefinite extension without motion, without change in the 
relations of distance between its parts, is but a huge mass of unformed 
matter. When motion is introduced into this matter and moves its parts in 
an infinity of ways, behold then an infinity of different bodies. 
For Malebranche, one body is differentiated from everything else because its material 
parts maintain the same relations to one another, while their relations to other parts of 
matter change. Pessin takes it to be a consequence of this view of bodies that 
what makes the concept of a given particular, token body b the concept of 
that specific body is precisely the information about the material state of 
motion. But if this information is internal to the concept, then . . . even 
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I understand it, his reasoning is perfectly general and is applicable regardless of what 
properties bodies are taken to possess. If Malebranche had thought that bodies have color 
properties, he would have insisted that in creating the chair, God must create it with 
determinate color properties – i.e. God must cause it to be either red or non-red, brown or 
non-brown, etc. It is a simple matter of the law of excluded middle that for any property 
and any given moment, either an individual has that property at that moment or it does 
not. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the 
existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the 
individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t is the first moment of x’s 
 
God could not conceive of b without conceiving of the relevant state of 
motion, for it wouldn’t be b of which He was conceiving (p. 424). 
According to Pessin, this explains the difference between God’s conservation of bodies 
and minds. Each of a body’s properties or modes is essential to it, so God cannot will that 
b exist without willing that it possess each of those specific properties. But unlike bodies, 
which are not substances but rather modes of a substance, minds are distinct substances 
and their modes are not essential to them. Thus, God could will that a mind exist without 
willing that it possess a complete, determinate set of properties. 
 Although I am not sure why Malebranche sometimes suggests that there is an 
important difference between God’s conservation of minds and bodies, it seems clear to 
me that Pessin’s explanation is not satisfactory. Malebranche clearly held that motion is 
required to differentiate bodies within the plenum, but I do not see why Pessin thinks it 
follows that each of a body’s particular modes is essential to it. Moreover, even if that 
inference is legitimate, I do not see any reason to think that Malebranche recognized or 
accepted it. On the contrary, Malebranche clearly does not appeal to such essentialism 
when he applies the continuous creation argument to bodies. When Theodore defends 
creation and conservation with determinate properties, he argues that God “cannot will 
that this chair exist, without at the same time willing that it exist either here or there and 
without His will placing it somewhere, since you cannot conceive of a chair existing 
unless it exists somewhere, either here or elsewhere” (Malebranche 1688, p. 112, my 
emphases). If Pessin’s interpretation were right, Theodore should have said that God 
cannot will that this chair exist, without at the same time willing that it exist here and 
without His will placing it here: after all, for Pessin’s Malebranche, if God had placed it 
there instead of here, it would not have been this chair. The fact that Theodore does not 
reason this way suggests that the argument does not depend upon the sort of radical 
essentialism Pessin attributes to Malebranche. 
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existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t for anything else to act upon x and 
cause it to possess the properties it has at t, and since God creates ex nihilo, x’s properties 
are not determined by the nature of any preexistent stuff out of which it is formed. The 
only viable explanation of x’s possessing the properties it has at t seems to be that God 
causes x to possess them – that is simply part of what is involved in God’s creating x.
Thus, Malebranche assumes that when God creates a new individual, he must 
endow it with a complete, determinate set of properties – I will refer to this as the 
principle of Creation with Determinate Properties, abbreviated as (CrD). It can be stated 
more precisely as follows, 
(CrD) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and God creates x at t, then 
for any property F, if x has F at t, then God’s willing that x has F at t 
brings about x’s having F at t. 
 
In Malebranche’s Dialogues, Aristes willingly grants this much, but he denies that 
occasionalism follows, arguing that “once the moment of creation has passed . . . [b]odies 
dispose themselves haphazardly, or according to the law of the strongest.”27 However, it 
is at this point that Theodore relies upon continuous creation, for as he tells Aristes, “if 
this moment [of creation] does not pass, then you are in a spot, and will have to yield.”28 
That is, if God’s act of conserving x is intrinsically indistinguishable from his act of 
creating x (as the continuous creation doctrine insists), then Aristes’ acceptance of (CrD) 
commits him to an analogous principle of Conservation with Determinate Properties:
(CoD) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and God conserves x at t, 
then for any property F, if x has F at t, then God’s willing that x has F at t 
brings about x’s having F at t. 
 
27 Malebranche (1688) p. 112. 
28 Malebranche (1688) p. 112. 
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This premise clinches Malebranche’s argument: (CC), (CrD), and (CoD) together entail 
(O). The implication of accepting these principles together with (CC) is that God is the 
cause not only of the existence of every contingent individual at every moment but also 
of every property possessed by those individuals at every moment. Thus, even if 
contingent individuals did have active causal powers, continuous creation leaves nothing 
behind for them to do. 
In the next chapter, we will consider three strategies for resisting Malebranche’s 
argument, but first I want to tie up one loose end. I noted in Chapter Two (section II-A) 
that taking medium-sized objects and artifacts to be primary objects of creation and 
conservation is problematic for a number of reasons, and I suggested that we would run 
into fewer problems if we stipulated that the only primary objects of creation and 
conservation are simple atomic particles. Given this stipulation, we can say that God 
creates and conserves composite entities such as chairs only in the sense that he creates 
and conserves the particles that compose them. While this stipulation sidesteps a number 
of problems, I do not believe it can help us to escape Malebranche’s argument, for it 
seems evident that Malebranche’s reasoning can be applied with equal ease to a chair or 
to the atomic particles that compose it. For each of those particles, Malebranche would 
insist that God must create and conserve it with a complete, determinate set of properties. 
Furthermore, since what is true of the chair at any given moment is determined by what is 
true of its parts at that moment,29 God’s continuous creation and conservation of the 
 
29 This strikes me as very plausible, in part because it is vague enough to accommodate 
several views. For example, it is compatible with a strong reductionist view according to 
which any property attributed to a chair is reducible to properties (and relations) of its 
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chair’s particles leaves nothing for secondary causes to contribute. So Malebranche’s 
continuous creation argument poses a threat to secondary causation regardless of whether 
the individuals God creates and conserves include composite entities or only simples.
 
parts. But it is also compatible with a view according to which a chair has emergent 
properties that non-reductively supervene upon the properties (and relations) of its parts.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Three Strategies for Avoiding Occasionalism 
 
Pure occasionalism is the view that God is the sole and total cause of all that 
occurs – that there are no secondary causes. In Chapter Six we examined Malebranche’s 
most powerful argument for occasionalism. According to Malebranche, occasionalism is 
an entailment of the doctrine of continuous creation, together with a few plausible 
assumptions. More specifically, continuous creation, 
(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s 
willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t. 
(Cr) God creates x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is no t' prior to t such that x exists at t'.
(Co) God conserves x at t = def. God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s 
existing at t, and there is some t' prior to t such that x exists at t'. 
 
and the principles of creation and conservation with determinate properties, 
(CrD) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and God creates x at t, then 
for any property F, if x has F at t, then God’s willing that x has F at t 
brings about x’s having F at t. 
 
(CoD) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and God conserves x at t, 
then for any property F, if x has F at t, then God’s willing that x has F at t 
brings about x’s having F at t. 
 
together entail, 
(O) Necessarily, for all x, t, and F, if x is contingent and x is F at t, then God’s 
willing that x is F at t brings about x’s being F at t. 
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Assuming that we wish to avoid occasionalism, the sensible next step is to 
consider our options for resisting Malebranche’s argument. In this chapter I will explain 
and assess three different ways of attempting to reconcile continuous creation with 
secondary causation – causal overdeterminism, strong concurrentism, and weak 
concurrentism. Section I will provide a brief overview of these three strategies, and 
sections II-IV will examine each of them in greater detail. I will argue that causal 
overdeterminism and strong concurrentism are deeply problematic positions and that 
weak concurrentism is the most promising of the alternatives. However, weak 
concurrentism is certainly not without difficulties of its own – whether these difficulties 
can be overcome will be the subject of Chapter Eight. 
 
I. An Overview of the Options 
Since Malebranche’s continuous creation argument is valid, any adequate strategy 
for resisting occasionalism will require rejecting or modifying at least one of its premises 
in order to block the inference to (O). The easiest, but also most extreme, solution is to 
simply abandon continuous creation and deny that contingent beings have any need of 
active conservation subsequent to their initial creation. Following general practice, I will 
refer to positions that take this way out as forms of Deism. Of course, there is a range of 
more specific positions that fit this general description. Just as we distinguished between 
pure and impure forms of occasionalism, we can also distinguish between pure and 
impure deisms. A pure, unrestricted deism would insist that subsequent to the initial 
creation of the world, God has remained wholly detached and uninvolved with it. God is, 
as the old analogy goes, like a clockmaker who initially set the world in motion and has 
- 135 -
left it entirely to itself ever since. Impure forms of deism would agree that God does 
generally stand back and allow the world to continue on its own, but would insist that 
God can and sometimes does step in to influence things (perhaps answering prayers, 
performing miracles, preventing certain catastrophic evils, etc.). 
Deism and occasionalism are extreme positions that traditional theists have 
generally wished to avoid. However, the challenge is to find some stable middle ground. 
As we have seen, (CC), (CrD), and (CoD) together entail (O); thus, any such moderate 
position will have to reject or revise one or both of (CrD) and (CoD). I will focus my 
attention here upon (CoD) rather than (CrD). Part of my reason for this is that (CoD) 
covers all but the very first moment of any individual’s existence, and so it plays a more 
significant role in the discussion. But another reason is that (CrD) strikes me as an 
eminently plausible principle, and thus, I see little justification for modifying or rejecting 
it. It is exceedingly difficult to see how secondary causes could make any contribution to 
the features of individuals at the very first moment that God creates them, and so the only 
plausible explanation of why individuals have the properties they do at the moment of 
their creation seems to be that God creates them with those properties.1 Thus, I will 
 
1 Peter van Inwagen (1988) would disagree. He suggests that God could issue 
indeterminate creative volitions; he believes, for example, that God could issue decrees of 
the form “let either x or y exist,” leaving the specific outcome of such decrees entirely up 
to chance. If that is possible, then it would also seem to be possible for God to decree that 
a specific individual should come into existence, but leave the specific properties of that 
individual entirely to chance. And if that is possible, then (CrD) might be false. 
 I am not convinced that it really is possible for God to issue such indeterminate 
decrees, although I am not certain that it is impossible either. But even if it is a 
possibility, it is unclear why God would choose to play such a cosmic game of creative 
dice. van Inwagen supposes that a sort of Buridan’s Ass situation might arise, in which 
God must choose between incompatible creative options about which God is indifferent. 
In such a situation, van Inwagen finds the suggestion that God might choose arbitrarily to 
be offensive, and so he prefers to think that God would simply issue indeterminate 
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assume that all of the positions we are discussing, even Deism, endorse (CrD). If we 
assume that God creates all individuals with determinate properties, then the question is 
whether God must continue causing them to exist in such a determinate way at 
subsequent moments. Once contingent individuals exist, can they causally interact with 
each other, or does God’s continuous conservation of them preclude such interaction? 
In the remainder of the chapter, we will carefully explore three strategies for 
making room for the contributions of secondary causes without rejecting (CC). Causal 
overdeterminism upholds a weakened version of the principle of conservation with 
determinate properties (CoD), but attempts to make room for secondary causes by 
denying that God’s causal contributions are exclusive. In other words, the properties 
possessed by contingent individuals are causally overdetermined by divine and secondary 
causes. Strong concurrentism seeks to make room for more significant contributions by 
secondary causes. It too upholds a weakened form of (CoD), but in addition to denying 
that God’s causal contributions are exclusive, it also denies that they are marked by 
totality. According to strong concurrentism, divine and secondary causes cooperate or 
concur with one another to bring about the properties of contingent individuals. 
Moreover, although their contributions are jointly sufficient to produce the effect, each is 
insufficient by itself. Weak concurrentism seeks to ensure an even more substantial role 
for secondary causes by simply rejecting (CoD) outright. Unlike strong concurrentism, 
 
volitions and leave the outcome to chance (pp. 228-9). However, I do not share these 
intuitions. I find nothing particularly problematic about God’s choosing arbitrarily 
between genuinely indifferent options. Fortunately, it is not necessary to settle the matter 
because it is not particularly relevant to our current question. We are concerned to 
determine whether it is possible for secondary causes to contribute to the properties 
possessed by individuals. Whether it is possible for the properties of individuals to be 
uncaused, left entirely to chance, has no bearing upon that question. 
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weak concurrentism endorses a sharp division of labor between divine and secondary 
causes: God’s conservation of contingent individuals is generally limited to causing their 
existence (although this may require causing at least some of their properties), while 
secondary causes by themselves bring about at least many of the properties they possess. 
Table 1 on the following page highlights the fundamental points of agreement and 
difference among these three views along with the pure forms of occasionalism and 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































II. Causal Overdeterminism 
Quinn’s bringing about relation, which I utilized in my presentation of 
Malebranche’s continuous creation argument, is marked by the characteristics of totality, 
exclusivity, activity, immediacy, and necessity. That is a rather strong causal relation, 
although as a characterization of divine causation, it does seem intuitively plausible – 
after all, omnipotence seems to demand a pretty strong causal characterization. 
Nevertheless, if we wish to avoid occasionalism, we must consider whether such a strong 
characterization of divine causation is really necessary. It seems likely that we could 
carve out some room for secondary causes and hence prevent the inference to 
occasionalism if we judiciously subtracted from it. 
Exclusivity is a case in point. This characteristic of bringing about stipulates that 
“what does the bringing about is the sole cause of what is brought about.”2 Exclusivity is 
essential to Malebranche’s argument because occasionalism claims not only that God 
causes everything that occurs, but also that God is the only (i.e. exclusive) cause of all 
that occurs. In other words, even if God’s contributions are by themselves sufficient to 
cause every occurrence, occasionalism does not immediately follow. To get 
occasionalism, one must also rule out the possibility that some occurrences are causally 
overdetermined by secondary causes. Whether that possibility can be ruled out depends 
upon whether divine causation is marked by the characteristic of exclusivity. 
A somewhat plausible case can be made for denying that exclusivity is an 
essential feature of divine causation. Omnipotence surely entails that God is capable of 
being an exclusive cause, but I see no reason to suppose that an omnipotent being must in 
 
2 Quinn (1993) p. 597; cf. Quinn (1988) p. 53. 
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fact always be an exclusive cause. Thus, a rather minimalist approach to modifying 
Malebranche’s premises is to introduce a second causal relation that includes all of the 
characteristics of the standard bringing about relation, minus exclusivity – call this 
relation bringing about1. (CoD) can then be replaced with (CoD1), 
(CoD1)Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and God conserves x at t, 
then for any property F, if x has F at t, then God’s willing that x has F at t 
brings about1 x’s having F at t. 
 
This slight change blocks the inference from (CC) to (O). What follows now is, 
(O1) Necessarily, for all x, t, and F, if x is contingent and x is F at t, then God’s 
willing that x is F at t brings about1 x’s being F at t. 
 
But the conjunction of (CC) and (O1) does not amount to occasionalism because (O1)
does not preclude the possibility that x’s being F at t is causally overdetermined – caused 
both by God and by the contributions of secondary causes. 
 Unfortunately, although causal overdeterminism does carve out a place for 
secondary causes, this minimalist departure from Malebranche’s view is a halfway house 
so uncomfortable that no thinker I am aware of has chosen to dwell in it.3 The role of 
secondary causes in the theory is too insignificant, utterly dwarfed by the still 
overwhelming role of divine causation. The problem is that even though God’s causal 
contributions are not entirely exclusive, they are still characterized by totality – that is, 
God’s contributions alone are sufficient for every effect. Furthermore, God’s 
contributions are also necessary for the effect. After all, apart from God’s conserving 
them, individuals would not exist, and hence no secondary causes could act upon them. 
 
3 Gorham (2004) argues that Descartes accepted a limited form of overdeterminism 
according to which some events in the material world are caused by both God and minds. 
I am not sure whether this is the correct way to understand Descartes, but even if it is, 
Descartes can hardly be said to have been very explicit about adopting the view. 
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So it turns out that God’s causal contributions are both necessary and sufficient for all of 
their effects, and that leaves the contributions of the purported secondary causes neither 
necessary nor sufficient. Depending upon how we understand causation, the idea of a 
cause that is neither necessary nor sufficient for its effect may not even make sense. But I 
do not wish to delve into the details of specific causal theories at this point,4 so I will set 
this concern aside. For now I simply want to raise the more modest objection that 
avoiding occasionalism by appealing to overdeterminism renders secondary causes 
objectionably superfluous. 
As I have already said, causal overdeterminism is a position without any 
defenders (at least to my knowledge). Nevertheless, in order to clarify why it is so 
objectionable, let us consider what imaginary proponents of the view might say in its 
defense. Perhaps they would argue as follows: 
You object that causal overdeterminism renders secondary causes 
superfluous. So what? That is a trivial observation. Every instance of 
causal overdeterminism is, by definition, a situation in which there is an 
overabundance of causes. Moreover, if you will ignore your worries about 
occasionalism for the moment, you surely must admit that there are many 
perfectly legitimate and familiar examples of causal overdeterminism. If I 
told you that the death of a criminal executed by a firing squad was 
causally overdetermined, you could not reasonably criticize my claim on 
the grounds that it would render some of the causes of his death 
superfluous. That would be no criticism at all. For one thing, it is 
essentially just another way of saying what I said. For another, it is true:
the criminal’s death does have an excess of causes. The firing squad 
simply illustrates the fact that there is nothing particularly objectionable 
about superfluous causes. So why should we care that overdeterminism 
renders secondary causes superfluous? They are causes nonetheless! 
 
The answer to this challenge is that there are crucial differences between divine-
secondary overdeterminism and unobjectionable examples like a firing squad. The 
 
4 I will discuss several causal theories in Chapter Eight. 
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contributions of the members of a firing squad all stand on an equal footing in a way that 
divine and secondary causes do not. Given the presence of the other causes, each of the 
individual causes of the criminal’s death is unnecessary for the effect; nevertheless, each 
is also sufficient to produce the effect by itself. Yes, they are all superfluous, but only 
accidentally so – only, that is, because several other causes happen to be present. But 
divine and secondary causes are not on an equal footing. The divine causes are not 
superfluous: take away the divine cause, and the secondary causes could bring about 
nothing because there would be nothing for them to affect. But take away a secondary 
cause, and things would still go precisely as they would if it were there. Thus, secondary 
causes are essentially superfluous, and while accidentally superfluous causes do not seem 
objectionable, essentially superfluous causes do. If a theory entails that overdeterminism 
is pervasive and unavoidable – the rule instead of the exception – considerations of 
simplicity suggest that something has gone awry.5
Ubiquitous overdeterminism is especially problematic on the assumption of 
theism. Why would a being of unsurpassable knowledge and wisdom bother to give 
creatures causal capacities if their causal contributions would never be necessary, always 
superfluous? As Stephen Schiffer put it, “it is hard to believe that God is such a bad 
engineer.”6 Malebranche, who always insisted that divine wisdom demands that God 
accomplish things in the simplest possible ways, could not have agreed more. 
 
5 The rejection of pervasive or systematic causal overdetermination is a widely accepted 
assumption of the causal exclusion arguments discussed in the philosophy of mind. Lowe 
(2000) says that it “looks suspiciously ad hoc” (p. 572, n. 5) and Kim (1993) regards it as 
“absurd” (see pp. 280-1, 291, 354, and 360-1). 
6 Schiffer (1987) p. 148. 
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Thus, although causal overdeterminism would allow us to maintain continuous 
creation without being technically committed to occasionalism, it is not surprising that it 
has lacked defenders. Overdeterminism is a defective strategy for resisting occasionalism 
because its secondary causes are nothing more than ad hoc extras. Any plausible account 
of the role of secondary causes must assign them a non-superfluous role, and that will 
require a more substantial modification of Malebranche’s position. 
 
III. Strong Concurrentism 
A more popular strategy for avoiding occasionalism holds that God and secondary 
causes somehow work together to bring about effects. Secondary causes make a genuine, 
non-superfluous contribution, although their contributions would not be efficacious if 
God did not lend them his cooperation or concurrence. The chief challenge for 
concurrentist accounts is to explain what God’s concurrence with secondary causes 
consists of. In this section and the next, we will consider two versions of concurrentism 
which I will refer to as Strong and Weak Concurrentism. Weak concurrentism, which we 
will examine in greater detail in section IV below, endorses a sort of division of labor for 
divine and secondary causes – they concur with each other by contributing to different 
aspects of the effect. Generally speaking, God’s conservation of contingent individuals is 
limited to causing their existence, while secondary causes by themselves bring about at 
least many of the properties they possess. So the weak concurrentists’ strategy for 
avoiding occasionalism is to reject the principle of Conservation with Determinate 
Properties (CoD). By contrast, strong concurrentism insists that God’s concurrence with 
secondary causes is much more thoroughgoing. God not only causes the existence of
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contingent individuals, but also cooperates with them in their specific causal interactions 
with each other. According to strong concurrentism, God does actively participate in 
bringing about the specific characteristics or properties of contingent individuals; 
however, God does not bring them about by himself but rather in cooperation with 
secondary causes. Thus strong concurrentists would uphold a version of (CoD), but the 
version they uphold will have to be even weaker than causal overdeterminism’s (CoD1). 
Whereas overdeterminists weaken the principle by subtracting the characteristic of 
exclusivity from the bringing about relation, strong concurrentists will have to subtract 
the characteristic of totality from it as well. Call the resulting relation brings about2 and 
the corresponding principle (CoD2). 
A characterization of divine causation this weak may seem problematic: if God is 
omnipotent, how could God’s causal contributions lack the characteristic of totality – i.e. 
how could they not be sufficient by themselves to bring about an effect? However, I think 
strong concurrentists can reply to this worry in essentially the same way that 
overdeterminists can reply to the worry about their weakened conception of divine action. 
Although God’s omnipotence undoubtedly implies that God is capable of making causal 
contributions that are sufficient by themselves for their effects, it is hardly clear that 
omnipotence implies that God must always do so. It is conceivable that God limits his 
causal influence, contributing just enough to make up for whatever is lacking in 
secondary causes. If that is right, then totality is not essential to divine causation. 
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Strong concurrentism was quite standard in the medieval and early modern 
periods, especially among scholastic philosophers and theologians.7 When Malebranche 
defended occasionalism, he was well aware that strong concurrentism was a popular 
alternative and he went out of his way to demonstrate the extent to which his own views 
agreed with those of the scholastics. But he also pointed out that the scholastics could not 
agree among themselves concerning the exact nature of divine concurrence, adding that 
he could not “conceal the fact that their language appears to me to be quite equivocal and 
confused.”8 Malebranche wasted little effort explaining what exactly was objectionable 
about strong concurrentism, apparently judging a clear exposition of his own view to be 
of more value.9
7 It is, I admit, somewhat anachronistic to present a position popular among medieval 
thinkers as a strategy for resisting Malebranche’s continuous creation argument. 
Nevertheless, the proponents of strong concurrentism were familiar with the views of 
earlier occasionalists. Furthermore, they seem to have been making a conscientious effort 
to assign as central a causal role to God as they possibly could without going so far as to 
commit themselves to either occasionalism or causal overdeterminism. 
8 Malebranche (1675) pp. 678 ff. More recently Peter van Inwagen (1988) has offered a 
similarly brief and dismissive criticism of the doctrine. He writes: “I find this doctrine 
hard to understand. Does it credit created things with the power to produce effects or does 
it not? In the former case, why is God’s cooperation needed to produce the effect? In the 
latter case, Creation is devalued” (pp. 215-6, fn. 4). 
9 Malebranche (1675, p. 680) explained: 
[W]ith the possible exceptions of Biel and Cardinal d’Ailly, all [the 
Scholastics] I have read think the efficacy that produces effects comes 
from the secondary cause as well as the primary. But as I am attempting to 
observe this law, to say only what I conceive clearly and to side with what 
best agrees with religion, I believe I shall not be found amiss in 
relinquishing a view that to many people seems the more 
incomprehensible the more effort is spent to understand it, and in 
establishing another that perfectly agrees not only with reason but also 
with the sanctity of religion and Christian morality. 
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Somewhere along the line, strong concurrentism fell out of fashion, and among 
contemporary philosophers of religion it has had very few defenders. The reason for this 
is somewhat unclear. Perhaps many contemporary philosophers have agreed with 
Malebranche’s assessment that the doctrine is confused and incomprehensible, and so 
have purposefully rejected it. But I suspect that many have not so much explicitly 
rejected strong concurrentism, as simply forgotten or ignored it. Many contemporary 
philosophers, myself included, are unfamiliar (and uncomfortable) with the complex 
language and conceptual apparatus of medieval scholasticism, and this creates a natural 
barrier to seriously engaging with strong concurrentism. But in recent years Alfred 
Freddoso has begun to revive this medieval doctrine, attempting to present and defend it 
in terms that are at least somewhat more suitable to contemporary ears.10 I will rely upon 
his expositions of strong concurrentism in my discussion below. 
III-A. Freddoso’s Exposition of Strong Concurrentism 
Freddoso presents strong concurrentism as a position that seeks to find a middle 
ground between the excesses of occasionalism and overdeterminism on the one hand and 
the alleged shortcomings of weak concurrentism on the other. While occasionalism grants 
secondary causes no role and overdeterminism grants them too small and insignificant a 
role, Freddoso believes that weak concurrentism grants them too great a role. In spite of 
some recent popularity, he asserts that “almost all the important figures in the history of 
philosophical theology have rejected [weak concurrentism] as philosophically deficient 
 
10 However, Freddoso’s presentations still contain a fairly heavy dose of scholasticism. 
This may be unavoidable, but it is probably also somewhat intentional; Freddoso (2002) 
says he is convinced “that the scholastics by and large came closer to the truth in 
metaphysics than either their classical predecessors or their modern and postmodern 
successors” (p. xi). 
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and theologically ‘unsafe’.”11 Moreover, he charges that weak concurrentism tends 
toward “a form of deism which, however weak, falls beyond the pale of theistic 
orthodoxy.”12 On the spectrum of positions we are considering, it must be admitted that 
weak concurrentism is closer to deism than the others (see Table 1 on p. 138). But it 
remains a rather large step removed from deism, and so I think Freddoso’s criticism is 
somewhat uncharitable, at least insofar as it relies upon “guilt by association.” On the 
other hand, his historical point about the prevalence of strong concurrentism is well 
taken. However, it remains to be seen whether this traditional position can withstand 
scrutiny. As we will see below, the success or failure of strong concurrentism depends 
fundamentally upon whether it can make sense of its notion of cooperative action 
between God and secondary causes. 
Freddoso offers the following general characterization of strong concurrentism: 
According to [strong] concurrentism, a natural effect is produced 
immediately by both God and created substances, so that (pace 
occasionalism) the latter make a genuine causal contribution to the effect 
and indeed determine its specific character, but (pace [weak 
concurrentism]) they do so only if God cooperates with them 
contemporaneously as an immediate cause in a certain “general” way 
which goes beyond conservation and which makes the resulting 
cooperative transeunt action to be in all relevant respects the action of 
both God and the secondary causes.13 
11 Freddoso (1991) p. 555; cf. Freddoso (1994) p. 134. Much of the material in these 
essays also appears in Freddoso (2002), the substantial introduction to his translation of 
Suarez’s Metaphysical Disputations 20-22. According to Freddoso, William Durandus is 
weak concurrentism’s “only well-known medieval proponent”; see Freddoso (1991) p. 
555; cf. Freddoso (1994) p. 134. 
12 Freddoso (1991) p. 579.  
13 Freddoso (1991) p. 554; cf. Freddoso (1994) p. 134. I have inserted the bracketed 
words to adapt Freddoso’s terminology to my own. He refers to the position I have 
labeled strong concurrentism simply as concurrentism, and he gives the position I call 
weak concurrentism the implicitly pejorative label mere conservationism. It seems to me 
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So strong and weak concurrentists agree that God continually conserves, or causes the 
existence of, contingent individuals – i.e. both affirm (CC). But weak concurrentists hold 
that that is all that God does, and that the specific properties or characteristics of 
individuals are determined by the causal contributions of secondary causes. Strong 
concurrentists, on the other hand, insist that God cooperates with secondary causes in 
some further sense. 
But what exactly does this further cooperation consist of? Freddoso describes 
God’s contributions as general, but general can mean many different things, so without 
some clarification, this description is too vague to be of any help. Freddoso repeats the 
point in another essay where he explains that one of strong concurrentism’s central tenets 
is that “the secondary agent acts by its created or natural powers as a particular cause of 
the effect, whereas God acts by his uncreated power as a general or universal cause of 
the effect.”14 Here Freddoso seem to treat generality and universality as synonymous and 
contrasts them with the particularity of secondary causes. 
That helps, although it is still plagued by vagueness. One might be tempted to 
understand it along the following lines: God transmits or emanates a sort of general, 
indeterminate force or energy that secondary causes harness or direct in some particular 
way, much as a lens focuses and directs a beam of light. On this picture, God is like a 
universal power supply that secondary causes plug into and particularize in various ways. 
 
that both positions involve a sort of concurrence or cooperation between God and 
secondary causes, so the labels strong concurrentism and weak concurrentism strike me 
as both descriptively accurate and less partial. 
14 Freddoso (2002) p. xcvii-iii. 
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However, Freddoso warns against such an interpretation, insisting instead that whenever 
secondary agents causally interact God “tailor[s] his proper causal influence in each case 
to what is demanded by the natures of the relevant secondary agents.”15 Clearly then, 
saying that God’s contributions are general is not meant to imply that they are 
indeterminate or non-specific. If God “tailors” his causal contributions to the specifics of 
each situation, then God’s contributions are quite determinate and specific. 
Perhaps when Freddoso says that God’s contributions are general and secondary 
causes’ contributions are particular, he means simply to affirm that God’s contributions 
are ubiquitous. Any given secondary agent contributes to a limited number of particular 
effects, whereas God is universally or generally involved, concurring with every causal 
interaction. But I suspect that he also means to emphasize that it is the particular nature 
of the secondary cause that determines the nature of the effect – i.e. God always 
conforms his own contributions to fit those of the secondary causes, and not vice versa. 
These observations are helpful, as far as they go, but they still leave a great deal 
about the nature of God’s concurrence unexplained. What exactly does God do in 
concurring with secondary causes? Likewise, what is it that secondary causes do? And 
why are they in need of God’s cooperation? According to Freddoso, strong concurrentism 
understands God and secondary causes as quite literally acting together, jointly producing 
their effects. Although they are jointly sufficient for the effect, neither contribution can 
be sufficient by itself.16 For if the contributions of secondary causes were sufficient by 
themselves, they would have no need of God’s concurring with them; and if God’s 
 
15 Freddoso (2002) p. xcviii. 
16 Cf. Freddoso (1994) pp.151-2. 
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contributions were sufficient by themselves, then strong concurrentism would collapse 
into causal overdeterminism. Thus, the following claims are both essential to strong 
concurrentism: 
(SC1) Secondary causes make genuine, non-superfluous causal contributions. 
(SC2) Secondary causes can accomplish nothing at all without God’s specific 
concurrence. 
 
Intuitively, (SC1) and (SC2) seem to be in tension. It is paradoxical to insist that 
secondary causes really do something, and yet that they are also in essential need of 
divine assistance to do anything. Is it possible to make sense of these claims? Is there a 
coherent and plausible model of cooperative action that meets all the requirements of 
strong concurrentism? 
III-B. Models of Cooperative Action 
Let us begin by considering several types of circumstance in which causal agents 
need the assistance or cooperation of other causal agents. One familiar type of 
circumstance is when an agent lacks a certain kind of causal power that is needed to 
produce an effect. Suppose I want to finish writing my dissertation, but an unfortunate 
accident has left me paralyzed from the neck down. Lacking the causal powers needed to 
gather books and articles from the library or type my chapters, my only hope of finishing 
will depend upon the cooperation of other causal agents taking care of the aspects of the 
task I cannot take care of myself. A second type of circumstance in which one agent 
needs the cooperation of another is when the agent has all of the kinds of causal powers 
necessary for a task, but does not possess them to the requisite degree. Suppose I need to 
lift something very heavy, say a piano. Although I have the kinds of causal powers 
needed to lift things, I do not have them to the degree needed to lift a piano by myself, so 
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I must compensate for my deficiency by gathering several friends to help me. A third 
type of circumstance in which one agent might need the cooperation of another is when 
the agent has all of the kinds of causal powers necessary for the task and even has them to 
the requisite degrees, but is prevented, for some reason or other, from exercising them all 
together. Suppose I (foolishly) decide to repair my car on my own instead of paying a 
professional mechanic to repair it for me. In order to install a new part I need to (a) hold 
it in a rather awkward position while at the very same time (b) attaching it with two bolts. 
Although I have the kinds of causal powers needed for both tasks (and I have them to the 
requisite degrees), I may be physiologically incapable of performing both simultaneously 
and thus need the cooperation of another causal agent to assist me with one of them. 
I believe that these three general types of circumstance cover the vast majority of 
cases in which an agent needs the cooperation of another. (There surely are more 
complex examples, but I expect that they will all involve some combination of the types 
discussed above – that is, they will simply be more complex combinations of lacking 
necessary kinds of causal power, not having causal powers to the requisite degrees, and 
being prevented, for some reason or other, from exercising causal powers one possesses.) 
The question is: do any of these general types suggest a model of cooperative action 
appropriate for strong concurrentism? Let us consider each in turn. 
I think we can set aside the third type rather quickly. When strong concurrentists 
affirm that secondary causes are in essential need of divine concurrence, they surely do 
not mean to affirm that secondary causes have all the requisite kinds and degrees of
powers needed for their effects but are systematically prevented from simultaneously 
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exercising them all. The need for divine concurrence is not analogous to my need of an 
extra pair of hands to help me repair my car! 
What about the first type? Perhaps what strong concurrentists mean to affirm is 
that secondary causes lack some particular kind of causal power that is necessary for any 
effect, some special power that only God can contribute. This would plausibly explain 
why secondary causes have an essential need for divine concurrence. It would also seem 
to explain why the contributions of secondary causes are not superfluous: God and 
secondary causes each exercise different kinds of causal powers, both of which are 
necessary in order to produce the effect. Unfortunately, this model wanders too far 
towards the province of weak concurrentism. Distinct kinds of causal powers are 
differentiated by the kinds of effects they produce. Thus, the claim that God and 
secondary causes each exercise different kinds of causal powers seems to imply that God 
is responsible for certain aspects of the total effect and secondary causes are responsible 
for others. But that is precisely what weak concurrentism says: it claims that God is 
responsible for bringing about the existence of things, and secondary causes are 
responsible for bringing about the particular properties of those things. Strong 
concurrentists, on the other hand, do not want God’s contribution to be limited to certain 
aspects of the effect. They want God to be involved in all aspects of the effect; more 
specifically, they maintain that God must concur with secondary causes in the specific 
aspects of the effect that they bring about. Thus, although this may be an appealing model 
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of cooperative action for weak concurrentism, the model is not appropriate for strong 
concurrentism.17 
The fact that strong concurrentists want God to be involved in all aspects of the 
effect, including those that secondary causes contribute to, suggests that they might be 
happier with the second type of cooperation I discussed above. Perhaps secondary causes 
simply do not have their causal powers to the degree needed to achieve their effects, so 
God fills in what is lacking. I illustrated this model above using the example of trying to 
lift a piano – I have the kinds of causal power needed to lift a piano, but I need the 
cooperation of others because I do not have them to the requisite degree. Freddoso 
discusses a highly similar example. He imagines that someone needs to lift the back end 
of his car ten inches to get it over a ridge of ice in his driveway and into the garage. By 
himself he cannot lift the car off the ground at all, and he has a friend who also cannot lift 
it off the ground by himself. But lifting together they can get it all the way over the ridge. 
Both friends act upon the car in the same way – i.e. they exercise the same kinds of causal 
powers. Freddoso goes so far as to suggest that we should not think of them as 
performing two separate acts, but rather as jointly performing a single unitary action.18 
Furthermore, Freddoso seems to endorse this as the right model of cooperative action for 
strong concurrentism; he claims that this model is 
a fitting one for the [strong] concurrentist, since according to [strong] 
concurrentism neither God’s concurrence nor the secondary cause’s 
 
17 Freddoso discusses matters closely related to those of this paragraph in Freddoso 
(1994) pp. 142-5. 
18 This point does not at all convince me, but I will set my doubts about it aside in order 
to focus on what I take to be more serious and important difficulties with modeling 
concurrentism on such cases. 
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influence can effect anything, or even exist, in the absence of the other. So 
the [strong] concurrentist must hold that in their cooperative actions God 
and the secondary cause constitute a single total cause that produces the 
relevant unitary effect by means of a single, undivided, action.19 
It must be admitted that this model of cooperative action does a good job of accounting 
for certain central features of strong concurrentism. For example, it explains how God 
might actively and directly contribute to the very same features of the effect that 
secondary causes actively and directly contribute to. In other words, it seems to explain 
how God and secondary causes might literally act together. However, Freddoso does not 
seem to realize that this model of cooperative action is inconsistent with other central 
features of strong concurrentism. 
III-C. Strong Concurrentism’s Dilemma 
I suggested above that there seems to be a tension between two of strong 
concurrentism’s essential claims: that secondary causes make genuine, non-superfluous 
causal contributions (SC1), and that secondary causes can never accomplish anything 
without God’s specific concurrence (SC2). But now that we have a specific model of 
cooperative action, we can see that (SC1) and (SC2) are not merely in tension, but flatly 
conflict with each other. According to the model, both agents exercise the same kinds of
causal powers, and hence influence the same aspects of the effect. God’s concurrence 
with secondary causes, then, is simply a matter of making up for whatever degree of
causal power a secondary cause is lacking. But in that case, assuming that secondary 
causes make genuine contributions, God’s concurrence should not always be necessary. 
 
19 Freddoso (1994) pp. 153-4. 
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To see why, let us return, for a moment, to the example of two friends lifting a 
car. We may grant that neither could produce this effect by themselves; nevertheless, if 
both are making genuine contributions, then each of them should be able to lift a lighter 
object without any assistance. Suppose we were told that a certain agent, s has the kinds 
of causal power needed to lift things, but that although s frequently lifts things in 
cooperation with others, s is incapable of lifting anything on her own. We would dismiss 
such a claim as utter nonsense, and rightly so! The very same point can be made 
concerning divine concurrence with secondary causes. Strong concurrentism wants to 
maintain that God’s concurrence is required in principle. But if secondary causes have 
genuine powers, and if they and God contribute to the same aspects of the effects, then 
there should be cases in which their powers, if they are genuine, are sufficient to produce 
the effect without any divine assistance. In short, strong concurrentists face a dilemma, 
and each horn requires rejecting a claim essential to their view. If they continue to 
maintain that secondary causes make genuine, non-superfluous contributions (SC1), then 
they are forced to deny that divine concurrence is always required (SC2). On the other 
hand, if they continue to maintain that divine concurrence is always required (SC2), it 
seems that they will be forced to deny that secondary causes really make genuine non-
superfluous contributions (SC1). 
The moral is this: the only way to maintain that secondary causes make genuine 
contributions and ensure that divine concurrence is always necessary is to acknowledge 
that God’s contributions differ in kind from those of secondary causes. God’s 
contribution, whatever it is, must be something that is necessary for any effect to obtain 
and such that no secondary cause can contribute it. If that is right, then there simply does 
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not seem to be any model of cooperative action that can satisfy all the criteria of strong 
concurrentism. 
Freddoso comes very close to some of these conclusions himself, but he tries to 
stop short. When he introduces strong concurrentism’s claim that God acts as a general or 
universal cause of effects while secondary causes act as particular causes of those effects, 
Freddoso admits that this assertion “requires careful unpacking” if strong concurrentism 
is to avoid rendering either God’s contributions or secondary causes’ contributions 
unnecessary. Moreover, he concedes, 
The only viable way to do this is to claim that certain features or aspects 
of the unitary effect are traceable primarily to God and that certain other 
features of the unitary effect are traceable primarily to the secondary 
agents.20 
The suggestion that some features of the effect can be traced primarily to God and others 
primarily to secondary causes seems to be a thinly veiled attempt to have it both ways. 
On the one hand, Freddoso wants to deny that God and secondary causes make distinct 
kinds of contributions, but on the other hand he seems to recognize that some such 
distinction is needed. But it is hardly clear that it is possible to have it both ways. How 
are we to understand this notion of a feature’s being traceable primarily (as opposed to 
entirely) to only one agent, and how is it supposed to solve strong concurrentism’s 
problems? Freddoso tries to illuminate the idea with the following analogy: 
Suppose that I use my favorite pen to write you a letter. It seems clear that 
both the pen and I count as joint immediate causes of a single effect, 
though in different ‘orders of causality’. More specifically, I am a 
principal cause of the letter, while the pen is an instrumental cause. Yet 
the fact that the letter is written in black rather than in some other color 
depends primarily on the causal powers of the pen as an instrumental 
 
20 Freddoso (2002) p. xcviii, emphasis added. 
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cause rather than on any of my powers as a principal cause. (Remember 
that we are concentrating on my action just insofar as it is identical with 
the pen's action; my further reasons for choosing this particular pen do not 
enter into that.) On the other hand, the fact that the word ‘philosophy’, 
rather than some other word, occurs at a certain place on the piece of 
paper—or, even better, the fact that there is any word produced at that 
place rather than none at all—depends primarily on my influence as a 
principal cause rather than on the pen's as an instrumental cause.21 
However, this analogy does not support Freddoso’s case. Aside from his prior act 
of choosing which pen to use (which Freddoso himself acknowledges is not pertinent), I 
see no reason to think that Freddoso is at all responsible for the fact that the letter is in 
black ink rather than some other color. That aspect of the effect would seem to be entirely 
– not merely primarily – attributable to features of the pen. Likewise, although the pen 
certainly bears some responsibility for the fact that anything at all is written on the page, 
the fact that the word ‘philosophy’ occurs there rather than some other word is surely 
attributable entirely to Freddoso. Surely his pen does not play any role in determining 
which specific words Freddoso writes! (Just imagine what a convenient excuse that 
would provide for those who regret having written something. Defense lawyers would 
certainly make endless use of it!) The fact is that Freddoso and his pen make 
fundamentally different kinds of contributions to the total effect. So instead of 
illuminating the strong concurrentist position, the analogy lends further support to my 
own conclusions: the only way to ensure both that secondary causes make genuine 
contributions and that divine concurrence is always necessary is to acknowledge that they 
make different kinds of contributions to different aspects of an effect. 
 
21 Freddoso (2001) pp. 14-5. 
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III-D. Conclusion 
 Strong concurrentism seeks to find a middle ground between occasionalism and 
overdeterminism on the one hand and weak concurrentism on the other, but this middle 
ground has proven elusive. Unless they can make sense of their problematic notion of 
cooperative action, strong concurrentists cannot claim to offer a plausible alternative to 
Malebranche’s occasionalism. None of the models of cooperative action we have 
considered is able to satisfy all of strong concurrentism’s demands, and I can think of no 
other candidates that would fare better. Of course, it is always possible that some 
successful model will emerge, but at this point it seems unlikely. After a closer 
examination, it seems likely that Malebranche was correct when he judged strong 
concurrentism to be “equivocal and confused.” 
 
IV. Weak Concurrentism 
In the previous two sections, we have examined two strategies for avoiding 
occasionalism – overdeterminism and strong concurrentism – and have found both to be 
defective. However, the criticisms raised against strong concurrentism have given us 
reason to hope that weak concurrentism might succeed where it failed. I suggested above 
that any plausible concurrentist alternative to occasionalism will have to attribute certain 
aspects of the effect entirely to God and others entirely to secondary causes and that is 
precisely what weak concurrentism does. According to weak concurrentism, God’s causal 
contributions are generally restricted to conserving the existence of contingent 
individuals, while causal interactions between those individuals are responsible for 
bringing about their precise features or properties.
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Unlike strong concurrentism, weak concurrentism was not a popular position in 
Malebranche’s time.22 Still, he did recognize it as an alternative to occasionalism and 
explained why he found it unacceptable, albeit ever so briefly. Malebranche says that 
weak concurrentism is “untenable in every way,” but as he continues, he offers a 
somewhat more restrained assessment: “although this opinion might contain fewer 
difficulties than that of other theologians, it appears to me so contrary to Scripture, and so 
consonant with prejudice, to say no more of it, that I do not think it can be maintained.”23 
Malebranche’s comment that weak concurrentism “might contain fewer difficulties than 
that of the other theologians” is intriguing because the other theologians he is referring to 
are the strong concurrentists. In other words, although Malebranche considered weak 
concurrentism to be highly problematic theologically, he also admitted that he found it 
less problematic philosophically. Given the source, I think that is a considerable 
(although certainly unintentional) commendation of weak concurrentism. 
One of the reasons that weak concurrentism seems to involve fewer difficulties is 
that it involves a much simpler, more decisive approach to resisting Malebranche’s 
argument for occasionalism. Unlike strong concurrentism, which invokes an emasculated 
bringing about2 relation in an attempt to sustain some version of the principle of 
conservation with determinate properties (CoD2), weak concurrentism blocks 
Malebranche’s inference from (CC) to (O) by rejecting (CoD) outright. Contra 
 
22 The only weak concurrentist Malebranche mentions by name is Durandus of Saint-
Pourçain (ca. 1270-1334). 
23 Malebranche (1675) p. 680. 
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Malebranche, weak concurrentists maintain that God can cause individuals to exist 
without causing them to possess complete determinate sets of properties. 
 What can be said in favor of this claim that we can maintain (CC) without 
accepting (CoD) in any form? What is said most often is simply that (CC) does not entail 
(CoD); that is, the claim that God brings about the existence of every contingent 
individual at each moment does not entail the much stronger claim that God brings it 
about that those individuals possess the properties they possess. For example, Kvanvig 
and McCann write, 
As Creator, God is directly and primarily responsible for the fact that there 
is something rather than nothing: that is, it is His creative activity that is 
causally responsible for the existence of the physical universe. To say this 
is not to say He is directly responsible for the states of things in the 
universe, or the changes they undergo. . . . [W]e see no direct conflict 
between the doctrine that the creation and sustenance of the universe are 
one and the same and the claim that secondary causes are operative in 
nature.24 
This distinction between the existence and the properties or states of things is crucial to 
weak concurrentism. I briefly raised this issue in Chapter Two (section II-C), although I 
approached it there from a more linguistic standpoint: when God wills that some 
individual, x, should exist, how extensive must the descriptive content of that volition be? 
Malebranche’s principle of conservation with determinate properties (CoD) asserts that 
the descriptive content must be complete (for any property P, if x has P then the divine 
volition must specify that x has P). Weak concurrentists, on the other hand, deny that the 
 
24 Kvanvig & McCann (1988) p. 16; cf. Pessin (2000). In McCann and Kvanvig (1991) 
the authors appear to have changed their views. Here they reject weak concurrentism and 
embrace occasionalism, basing their conclusions at least it in part on the basis of 
Malebranche’s continuous creation argument. In the later essay, they reject the strategy of 
divorcing God’s causing the existence of things from God’s causing the states of those 
things. 
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descriptive content of God’s volitions must be complete. This denial will be defensible 
only if there is some underlying metaphysical grounding for the distinction between an 
individual’s existence and its properties. 
Thus, the legitimacy of weak concurrentism depends upon the answers to 
fundamental metaphysical questions about the nature of properties and their relation to 
the individuals that bear them. Some answers to these questions clearly seem to render 
weak concurrentism’s existence/property distinction illegitimate. Nominalism, for 
example, asserts that only particular individuals exist, and that all apparent references to 
properties or universals can be understood as disguised ways of referring to something 
else (perhaps to particulars themselves, or to linguistic expressions). Thus, nominalism 
provides no metaphysical grounding for the existence/property distinction. Neither would 
the bundle theory of particulars; this theory asserts that only properties exist, and that 
particulars are reducible to bundles of properties. If particular individuals are just bundles 
of properties, then it is impossible to draw a distinction between causing their existence 
and causing them to have the properties they have. 
However, other answers to these fundamental metaphysical questions seem to 
lend support to the distinction. For example, at the far opposite extreme of the bundle 
theory is the view that individuals are bare particulars – that is, an individual is a 
propertyless substratum in which its properties inhere. The substratum conception of 
individuals comports well with weak concurrentism because it provides a sharp 
metaphysical basis for the distinction between causing an individual to exist and causing 
it to possess its properties. However, I do not think that the substratum theory is the only 
conception of individuals consistent with weak concurrentism. One of our fundamental 
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pre-philosophical intuitions about individuals is that they could have differed from the 
way they actually are in many, but not all, respects. The substratum theory seems to 
contradict the intuition that there are some limitations on the ways in which an individual 
could have been different than it is. If this intuition is to be preserved, an account of the 
nature of individuals must distinguish between the properties that are inseparable from an 
individual (its essential properties) and the properties that the individual happens to have 
but need not have had (its accidental or contingent properties). In a somewhat 
Aristotelian vein, individuals could be conceived of as irreducibly structured substances 
that possess certain of their properties and/or powers essentially. Given such a 
conception, even if God’s conserving individuals would entail causing them to exist with 
their essential properties and powers (whatever those are), it would not in any 
straightforward way entail causing them to exist with their accidental properties. So such 
an Aristotelian conception of individuals would also provide a basis for weak 
concurrentism’s existence/properties distinction.25 
My intention here is not to defend any specific account of the nature of 
particulars. I simply want to highlight the general point that weak concurrentism’s 
distinction between causing an individual’s existence and causing its states or properties 
must be grounded in some corresponding metaphysical distinction in the nature of 
individuals. As long as there is some such metaphysical distinction, weak concurrentists 
seem to be justified in their insistence that conservation does not by itself entail anything 
like (CoD). 
 
25 Something like this seems to be what van Inwagen (1988) has in mind. 
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However, this rather minimal defense of weak concurrentism remains 
unsatisfying because it fails to address the full force of Malebranche’s argument. After 
all, Malebranche does not contend that each property an individual possesses is essential 
to it, but rather that existing individuals always possess a complete determinate set of 
properties. To return to Malebranche’s favored example, a chair must exist at some 
specific location; God cannot cause it to exist nowhere, so would it not involve a 
contradiction to suppose that God creates (or conserves) it at some moment without 
placing it at some specific location? (And the same point holds if we shift the example 
from that of a chair to a fundamental particle.) Weak concurrentists surely owe us some 
explanation of where Malebranche goes wrong. Their most plausible reply, I think, is to 
insist that Malebranche moves too quickly from the observation that any existing 
individual must possess a complete determinate set of properties to the conclusion that 
God must be responsible for individuals’ possessing the precise sets of properties they do. 
Weak concurrentists will want to maintain that as long as an individual has a complete 
determinate set of properties there is no contradiction, regardless of whether the 
individual’s having those properties is brought about by God or by secondary causes. 
Thus, the Malebranchean conclusion is simply a non sequitur.
Perhaps that is right, but part of the appeal of Malebranche’s reasoning is that it is 
exceedingly hard to see how secondary causes could bring about these effects if God is 
continuously creating everything. So even if weak concurrentists are right to insist that 
Malebranche fails to reveal an outright contradiction in their view, his argument may still 
be persuasive. Philip Quinn, himself a weak concurrentist, identifies the tension in the 
weak concurrentist position acutely in the following thought experiment: 
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Let us imagine that the world of contingent things is partitioned into time-
slices by the relation of absolute simultaneity. If the contingent things that 
exist at a time-slice depend for their existence solely and totally on God’s 
creative activity at that time-slice, then except for connections among 
time-slices made from outside nature by divine activity, what exists 
contingently at one time-slice within created nature is completely 
independent of what exists contingently at any other. But this appears to 
leave little or no room for what happens at one time-slice to exercise any 
influence on what happens at any other by means of a path that remains 
wholly internal to the created realm. So there seems to be a problem of 
trans-slice causation, and the possibility of there being secondary causes in 
nature appears threatened.26 
Take two time-slices of the world, S1 and S2, and for the sake of simplicity let us assume 
that they are temporally contiguous.27 According to (CC), neither S1 nor any of its spatial 
parts is capable of bringing about the existence of S2 or any of its spatial parts; apart from 
a divine volition, S2 and its spatial parts simply would not exist. Nevertheless, weak 
concurrentists want to insist that S1 and its spatial parts are causally responsible for (at 
least many of) the properties possessed by S2 and its parts. But this alleged causal 
influence seems utterly mysterious. If S1 is causally isolated from the very existence of 
S2, how can it be more than a mere occasional cause of S2’s properties? Apart from an 
adequate answer to this question, weak concurrentism cannot claim to provide a plausible 
alternative to Malebranche’s occasionalism. 
 
26 Quinn (1988) p. 55. 
27 If time-slices are instantaneous and time is a continuum, then strictly speaking, no two 
time-slices can be contiguous. However, their non-contiguity can only complicate the 
position of weak concurrentism, not help it to resolve the difficulties under discussion. 




 In this chapter we examined three strategies for resisting Malebranche’s 
continuous creation argument for occasionalism. Causal overdeterminism and strong 
concurrentism both attempt to carve out some space for secondary causes by weakening 
the causal relation in (CoD), but I argued that both of these strategies are deeply flawed 
and should be rejected. Weak concurrentism, on the other hand, is a somewhat more 
promising alternative. Rather than tinkering with (CoD), weak concurrentism denies 
(CoD) outright and endorses a much cleaner division of labor: secondary causes by 
themselves are responsible for many of the properties possessed by contingent 
individuals, while God alone is responsible for the existence of contingent individuals at 
every moment. But although weak concurrentism avoids many of the complications and 
confusions of strong concurrentism, the alleged efficacy of secondary causes remains 
deeply mysterious. It is one thing to insist that secondary causes can bring about the 
properties of continent individuals, but quite another to offer a plausible explanation of 
this alleged causal influence. In the next chapter we will consider whether weak 
concurrentism can meet this challenge. 
166
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Weak Concurrentism and Causal Theories 
 
Weak concurrentism endorses the doctrine of continuous creation (CC) as well as 
the principle of creation with determinate properties (CrD), but attempts to avoid 
occasionalism (O) by rejecting the principle of conservation with determinate properties 
(CoD). Although God causes the existence of all contingent individuals at all times, after 
the moment of their initial creation God is not (typically) involved in causing them to 
possess the properties they have – that task is left to secondary causes. I argued in 
Chapter Seven that weak concurrentism is the most promising strategy for resisting 
Malebranche’s continuous creation argument for occasionalism. However, as we saw at 
the end of that chapter, the alleged efficacy of secondary causes remains utterly 
mysterious. If God is continuously creating everything, how can secondary causes make 
genuine, rather than merely occasional, causal contributions? If weak concurrentists want 
to offer a plausible alternative to occasionalism, they cannot be content with merely 
claiming that secondary causes are efficacious; they need to back up that claim with 
something like a positive theory of secondary causation. 
That is not an easy undertaking, in part because causation is such a complicated 
problem in its own right. Philosophers are deeply divided over how to understand 
causation, so even if weak concurrentists can demonstrate that some particular causal 
theory is consistent with continuous creation, they will only have succeeded in 
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convincing those who find that particular causal theory plausible. Thus, weak 
concurrentists seem to be faced with a doubly difficult task: first, of demonstrating that a 
particular causal theory is consistent with continuous creation and second, of defending 
the truth or plausibility of that causal theory. But there is another strategy for defending 
weak concurrentism that is, in differing respects, both more and less ambitious. If weak 
concurrentists could demonstrate that continuous creation is consistent with any causal 
theory – or at least with any of the most commonly accepted causal theories – then they 
would not need to convince others of the truth or plausibility of any particular causal 
theory. One weak concurrentist has attempted to carry out this latter strategy. Rather than 
focusing on any one particular theory, Philip Quinn (1988) considers simple versions of 
three of the most popular approaches to causation and argues that each of them is 
consistent with continuous creation. His overall argument can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the regularity theory of 
secondary causation. 
 
(2) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the counterfactual theory of 
secondary causation. 
 
(3) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the necessitarian theory of 
secondary causation. 
 
(4) Thus, regardless of the outcome of the debate over the nature of secondary 
causation, there is no reason to think that continuous creation (CC) is 
inconsistent with secondary causation. 
 
If this argument were sound, it would constitute a powerful defense of weak 
concurrentism. Unfortunately, it is not sound. 
In order to understand why the argument fails, we will first need to consider the 
methodological question of how a causal theory could be shown to be consistent with 
continuous creation. In section I, I will argue that Quinn overlooks an important 
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requirement that any adequate theory must fulfill: namely, an adequate theory of 
secondary causation must be able to distinguish between real and merely occasional 
causes. Then, in sections II and III, I will argue that the regularity and counterfactual 
theories fail to meet this requirement, and in section IV I will defend the more general 
conclusion that any reductionist theory of causation will fail to meet this requirement. 
Finally, in section V I will argue that non-reductionist theories of causation such as the 
necessitarian theory do meet the requirement. Hence, there is at least some hope for 
reconciling continuous creation with secondary causation; however, contrary to Quinn, 
continuous creationists cannot remain neutral concerning the outcome of debates over the 
nature of secondary causation. 
 
I. Methodology: What does Consistency Require? 
I-A. Quinn’s Method 
Quinn’s defense of weak concurrentism rests upon three crucial premises, each of 
which asserts that continuous creation is consistent with a particular causal theory. But 
how can we determine whether continuous creation is consistent with a theory of 
secondary causation? As we all learned in introductory logic, a set of statements is 
consistent if it is possible for them all to be simultaneously true; or equivalently, a set of 
statements is consistent if the conjunction of those statements implies no contradictions. 
Thus, Quinn’s strategy for establishing that (CC) is consistent with a specific theory of 
secondary causation is, reasonably enough, to show that their conjunction has no 
problematic implications. 
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To see how this goes, let us consider Quinn’s argument for premise (1) – i.e. the 
claim that (CC) is consistent with the regularity theory. His first step is to introduce a 
simple version of the regularity or “constant conjunction” causal theory. Consider a 
familiar type of causal interaction such as a lit match causing some water to be heated. 
According to Quinn’s simple regularity theory, this example is analyzed as follows: 
(5) The match’s being lit at a certain time is a cause of the water’s being 
heated slightly later iff: 
i. the match’s being lit at a certain time occurs 
ii. the water’s being heated slightly later occurs 
iii. whenever such a match’s being lit at a time occurs such 
water’s being heated slightly later occurs. 
 
In its more general form, Quinn’s simple regularity theory of causation states (note: ∆t
indicates a small temporal increment): 
(6) i1’s being F at t1 is a cause of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t iff: 
i. i1’s being F at t1 occurs 
ii. i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t occurs 
iii. for all t, if, for some x, x is similar to i1 and x’s being F at 
t occurs, then, for some y, y is similar to i2 and y’s being 
G at t + ∆t occurs.1
Quinn’s second step is simply to examine the consequences of conjoining (6) with (CC), 
(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s 
willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t. 
What are those consequences? First, we seem to get the favorable consequence that there 
are instances of secondary causation. Many pairs of events seem to satisfy (6)’s definition 
of secondary causation – lit matches cause water to warm, billiard balls that strike other 
billiard balls cause them to roll, flying rocks cause windows to break, and so on. Thus, 
there will be many true statements of the form, 
 
1 As Quinn (1988, p. 57) notes, condition 6-iii must be interpreted in terms of a ceteris 
paribus clause. 
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(7) i1’s being F at t1 is a cause of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t.
Secondly, there simply does not appear to be a way to derive any contradictory or 
otherwise problematic consequences. If we make the plausible actualist assumption2 that, 
(8) Necessarily, for all x, t, and F, if x’s being F at t occurs, then x exists at t
then from statements of the form of (7) we can derive, 
 
(9) i1 exists at t1
and 
 
(10) i2 exists at t1 + ∆t. 
 
And from (9), (10), and (CC) it follows that, 
 
(11) God’s willing that i1 exists at t1 brings about i1’s existing at t1
And 
 
(12) God’s willing that i2 exists at t1 + ∆t brings about i2’s existing at t1 + ∆t .
But these consequences are perfectly innocent – indeed, they are precisely what we 
would expect from (CC). To get a contradiction, we would need to be able derive 
something like, 
(13) God’s willing that i2 be G at t1 + ∆t brings about i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t.
(13) would be problematic because it contradicts (7) – if God is the total and exclusive 
cause of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t then i1’s being F at t1 could not be a cause of that event. 
But it simply does not seem to be possible to derive (13), nor is there any way to derive 
 
2 I refer to this as an actualist assumption because I take it to imply that nothing ever 
instantiates such dubious properties as non-existence or being impossible. Hence, such 
properties cannot constitute counterexamples to (8). Quinn (1988, p. 57) does not 
describe the assumption as actualist; rather, he simply treats such substitutions for F as 
“peculiar” exceptions that can be noted and henceforth ignored. 
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anything like Malebranche’s principle of conservation with determinate properties (CoD) 
or (O). Thus, Quinn concludes that (CC) and (6) are consistent. 
Of course, Quinn recognizes that his simple regularity theory is vulnerable to 
familiar counterexamples – e.g. it will fail to distinguish between genuinely causal 
regularities and merely fortuitous, non-causal regularities. A fully adequate regularity 
theory of causation (assuming this is possible) would need to be supplemented with other 
conditions. Nevertheless, Quinn contends that a strengthened analysis, “no matter how 
complicated and sophisticated it may be, will still comport well with my theory of 
creation and conservation, provided the Humean pattern is followed to the extent of using 
only de facto regularities in the analysans.”3 That seems right. If (CC) is consistent with 
(6), then it will also be consistent with a strengthened form of (6) that includes, say, a 
condition requiring spatial contiguity between i1 and i2. Thus, Quinn concludes that 
continuous creation is consistent with the regularity theory of secondary causation, and so 
those who are attracted to that theory have little reason to worry about being committed 
to occasionalism. 
Quinn’s arguments for premises (2) and (3) follow the same pattern. He 
introduces a simple counterfactual theory and a generic necessitarian theory, and in each 
case argues that nothing problematic can be derived from the conjunction of these 
theories with (CC). Thus, he concludes that (CC) is consistent with counterfactual and 
necessitarian theories of causation as well. I will forgo a detailed presentation of Quinn’s 
arguments for premises (2) and (3); in light of the preceding summary of his defense of 
premise (1), the basic gist of those arguments should be tolerably clear. In the following 
 
3 Quinn (1988) p. 61. 
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sections, I will argue that Quinn’s approach to defending these premises is inadequate. I 
will begin with an informal, intuitive statement of my criticism. 
I-B. A Worry about Quinn’s Method 
Let us briefly review the big picture. The chief challenge faced by weak 
concurrentists is that of explaining how secondary causes can make genuine, as opposed 
to merely occasional, causal contributions: given that God is continuously creating 
everything, how can secondary causes get in on the action? Quinn attempts to meet this 
challenge by demonstrating that three popular definitions of causation are consistent with 
continuous creation – i.e. that these definitions can be conjoined with (CC) without 
contradiction. I am willing to grant that (CC) is formally consistent with each of these 
definitions, but I do not believe that that is sufficient to show that (CC) is consistent with 
genuine secondary causes. After all, even Malebranche allowed that we can continue to 
speak of secondary “causes,” so long as we are clear about the fact that they do not really 
produce any effects – that is, so long as we are clear that they are not true causes at all. 
For Malebranche, what we refer to as causes are simply “occasional causes” – i.e. the 
occasions upon which God brings about the effects. 
The inadequacy of Quinn’s method is most easily recognized in his argument that 
continuous creation is consistent with the regularity theory. History is illuminating on this 
point, for although Hume is generally regarded as the original regularity theorist, it is no 
secret that Hume owed a great debt to Malebranche for his views on causation.4 Indeed, 
Hume’s famous argument against necessary connections between natural events was 
 
4 For a more detailed discussion of Malebranche’s influence on Hume see McCracken 
(1983) ch. 7. 
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adapted from one of Malebranche’s other arguments for occasionalism. According to 
Malebranche, occasionalism is a straightforward consequence of the observation that 
there must be a “necessary connection” between cause and effect. He writes, 
A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a 
necessary connection between it and its effect. Now the mind perceives a 
necessary connection only between the will of an infinitely perfect being 
and its effects. Therefore, it is only God who is the true cause and who 
truly has the power to move bodies.5
In other words, Malebranche believed that causes must necessitate their effects – that if a
causes b, then given the occurrence of a it should be impossible for b to fail to occur. 
Furthermore, he argued that when we examine alleged instances of secondary causation 
and seek to identify this necessary connection, we find ourselves at a loss. Granted, 
whenever one billiard ball strikes another, the second always does in fact roll away; 
nevertheless, it is perfectly conceivable that instead of rolling away, the second ball 
might remain stationary, or jump straight into the air, or simply disappear, etc. We simply 
cannot detect any necessity underlying this regularity, and the same thing can be said of 
other alleged instances of secondary causation. Thus, Malebranche concluded that alleged 
secondary causes are not true causes at all. God, on the other hand, is omnipotent; and 
since it is inconceivable that an omnipotent being should will that some event occur 
without the event’s occurring, divine volitions do necessitate their effects. So divine 
volitions are true causes – indeed, they are the only true causes. 
Hume adapted part of Malebranche’s “necessary connection” argument, albeit to 
defend a rather different conclusion. Much like Malebranche, he insisted that the most 
important component of our idea of causation is that of a necessary connection between 
 
5 Malebranche (1675) p. 450. 
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cause and effect.6 He also agreed with Malebranche that we perceive no such necessary 
connection between natural events. However, unlike Malebranche, Hume considered 
notions such as power, efficacy, and necessary connection no less problematic when 
applied to the divine will than when applied to secondary causes.7 Thus, while 
Malebranche concluded that God is the only genuine cause, Hume drew radically 
different conclusions. Hume concluded that the idea of a necessary connection has a 
purely psychological origin. Having always observed like causes to be followed by like 
effects, we are led by force of habit to think that they must do so of necessity; but in 
reality there are no necessary connections. For Malebranche, the regularities or “constant 
conjunctions” we observe in the world are simply the occasions upon which God acts as 
the true cause, but for Hume these constant conjunctions are all there is to causation in 
the world.8 Thus, as Stuart Brown has observed, “Hume, if this is not a contradiction in 
terms, seems like an occasionalist, only without God.”9
6 A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.2; Hume (1740) p. 55.  
7 A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.14; Hume (1740) pp. 107-8. Cf. An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, VII-II; Hume (1777) pp. 72-3. 
8 I should note that there is a lively debate over how to interpret Hume’s views on 
causation. Hume does sometimes speak as though there is a sort of “secret connection” 
that lies beyond our epistemic grasp, but which is nonetheless real. Until recently, most 
interpreters have not taken such comments seriously; for example, Mackie (1974) 
suggests that Hume “may well have his tongue in his cheek here, as he does when he 
speaks about the deity” (p. 21). However, Galen Strawson (1989) and others have called 
this traditional interpretation into question, urging that Hume should be understood as a 
sort of “skeptical realist” about causation. This “New Hume” believed in the existence of 
powers or necessary connections in nature; rather than trying to convince us that there are 
no powers or necessary connections, he was simply concerned to show us that they lie 
beyond our epistemic grasp. Thus, Hume’s regularity or constant conjunction theory is 
understood as an account of what we can know of causation as it is in the world, but not 
as an account of causation itself. For an excellent collection of essays on Hume’s views 
on causation, see Read and Richman (2000). In the text above I assume the traditional 
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I think this comparison between Hume and Malebranche helps to clarify why 
Quinn’s approach to reconciling continuous creation and secondary causation is 
unpersuasive. Even Malebranche would have agreed that the regularity theory’s 
definition of causation is formally consistent with continuous creation; after all, the 
regularity theory is essentially what Malebranche had in mind when he spoke of mere 
occasional causes. But Malebranche would have vehemently denied Quinn’s apparent 
assumption that the regularity theory identifies true causes. Hume, of course, promoted 
Malebranche’s occasional causes to the status of causes (i.e. causes simpliciter), but in 
order to do so he did away with God as a true necessitating cause. Quinn also wishes to 
promote Malebranche’s occasional causes to causes, but unlike Hume, Quinn agrees with 
Malebranche that divine volitions necessitate their effects. If Hume can be described as 
an occasionalist without God, then Quinn seems to be trying to be Hume with God! How, 
then, can he avoid being an occasionalist? The mathematics of the situation seems quite 
simple: if (Hume = Malebranche – God) and (Quinn = Hume + God), then (Quinn = 
Malebranche)! 
Perhaps that is a bit too simplistic, but the crucial point I want to stress is this: the 
mere fact that continuous creation is formally consistent with a definition of causation is 
not sufficient to guarantee that continuous creation is consistent with genuine secondary 
causation. The reason is that formal consistency alone does not distinguish between 
genuine causation and occasional causation: for all we know, a definition of causation 
 
interpretation of Hume; however, my doing so does not reflect a judgment that this is the 
superior interpretation, but rather a desire for ease of exposition. 
9 Brown (2000) p. 266. 
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may identify nothing more than the occasions upon which God brings about effects. In 
order to demonstrate that continuous creation is consistent with genuine secondary 
causation, weak concurrentists must somehow show that continuous creation is consistent 
with a definition of causation and that that definition identifies real rather than 
occasional causes.10 Thus, Quinn’s overall argument must be revised (or clarified) along 
the following lines: 
(1*) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the regularity theory of 
secondary causation, and this is a theory of genuine secondary causation. 
 
(2*) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the counterfactual theory of 
secondary causation, and this is a theory of genuine secondary causation. 
 
(3*) Continuous creation (CC) is consistent with the necessitarian theory of 
secondary causation, and this is a theory of genuine secondary causation. 
 
(4*) Thus, regardless of the outcome of the debate over the nature of secondary 
causation, there is no reason to think that continuous creation (CC) is 
inconsistent with genuine secondary causation. 
 
I-C. Distinguishing between Real and Occasional Causes 
I have argued that weak concurrentists need to do more than show that a 
definition of causation is formally consistent with (CC); they must also demonstrate that 
the definition in question identifies real secondary causes, and not merely occasional 
causes. But how can weak concurrentists meet this additional requirement? It would be 
helpful if there was a sort of litmus test for causal theories – a simple experiment that 
would separate theories that define genuine causation from theories that define mere 
 
10 Quinn (1988) does briefly anticipate the concerns I have raised here, but his response is 
rather dismissive. He simply notes that (CC) “entails nothing about whether or how 
events such as i2 being G at t1 + ∆t are brought about. For all it says, such events have 
only Humean causes and do not have true causes in Malebranche’s sense.”10 That may be 
technically correct as far as it goes, but it does not cut to the heart of the problem. It 
certainly does not answer my more formal statement of the objection in section I-C. 
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occasional causation. I will propose a simple test that, I believe, fulfills this purpose. 
First, I will describe two possible worlds: both are highly similar, but the first involves 
genuine secondary causes, and the second does not. Then I will test definitions of 
causation simply by applying them to both worlds. If a definition describes both worlds 
accurately – that is, if correctly implies that the first contains secondary causes and that 
the second does not – then we have a good reason to accept it as a definition of genuine 
causation.11 However, if a definition wrongly implies that the second world contains 
secondary causes, it will have been exposed as a theory of mere occasional causation. 
I have defined occasionalism as the view that God is sole and total cause of 
everything that occurs – i.e. God not only brings about the existence of every contingent 
individual at every moment (CC), but also brings about all of the states or properties of 
those individuals at every moment (O). Thus, I will refer to possible worlds in which 
(CC) and (O) are both true as occasionalist worlds. And I have defined weak 
concurrentism as the view that God brings about the existence of every contingent 
individual at every moment but generally leaves it to secondary causes to bring about the 
states or properties of those individuals. Thus, I will refer to possible worlds in which 
(CC) is true but (O) is false as weak concurrentist worlds. The basic premise of my test is 
that any theory of genuine secondary causation must be able to properly distinguish 
between occasionalist and weak concurrentist worlds. 
Applying the test will be easiest if we narrow our focus to two worlds that are 
highly similar; thus, let us consider one weak concurrentist world, Wwc, and one 
 
11 Describing both worlds accurately is at least a necessary condition for being a 
definition of genuine causation. Is it also a sufficient condition? Perhaps, but I am less 
certain about that, so I will not insist upon it. 
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occasionalist world, Woc. Furthermore, let us stipulate that both are as similar to the actual 
world as possible (identity with the actual world being the obvious limiting case of 
similarity). Since we can assume for present purposes that (CC) is true, it follows that 
either Wwc or Woc is the actual world. For the sake of simplicity, I will provisionally 
assume that weak concurrentists (and commonsense) are correct to insist that there are 
genuine secondary causes; that is, I will assume that Wwc is the actual world and that Woc 
is merely possible. Thus, we can characterize these two worlds as follows: 
Wwc: The actual world. (CC) is true, but (O) is false; there are genuine secondary 
causes of (at least some) contingent events. 
 
Woc: As similar to the actual world (Wwc) as is compatible with (O)’s being true. 
God is the total and exclusive cause of every contingent event, and hence there 
are no genuine secondary causes. 
 
The question, of course, is whether the assumption that there are secondary causes can be 
backed up with an adequate theory of secondary causation. We can now state the test 
simply: 
(14) Any adequate theory of genuine secondary causation must properly 
distinguish between Wwc and Woc – that is, it must not only imply that Wwc 
does contain secondary causes but also that Woc does not contain 
secondary causes. 
 
A theory that fails this test obviously cannot serve Quinn’s purpose of demonstrating that 
(CC) is compatible with genuine secondary causes. If a theory falsely implies that Woc 
contains secondary causes, it cannot credibly claim to offer a definition of genuine 
causation; such a theory would not recognize occasionalism even if it were, so to speak, 
right in front of it. In the following three sections I will apply this test to each of the 
causal theories Quinn defends. In sections II and III, I will argue that the regularity and 
counterfactual theories fail the test, and in section IV, I will argue that any reductionist 
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theory of causation will fail for similar reasons. However, in section V I will argue that 
non-reductionist theories have the resources needed to pass the test. 
 
II. Continuous Creation and the Regularity Theory 
 Let us begin by considering Quinn’s simple regularity theory which, as I 
explained above, defines causation as follows: 
(6) i1’s being F at t1 is a cause of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t iff: 
i. i1’s being F at t1 occurs 
ii. i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t occurs 
iv. for all t, if, for some x, x is similar to i1 and x’s being F at 
t occurs, then, for some y, y is similar to i2 and y’s being 
G at t + ∆t occurs. 
 
Does the regularity theory pass the test I have proposed? I think it pretty clearly does not. 
We stipulated above that Woc is as similar to the actual world (Wwc) as is compatible with 
God, rather than secondary causes, bringing about all the states or properties of things. As 
an omnipotent being, the task of creating a world that is a perfect qualitative replica of 
Wwc would pose no difficulty for God. Thus, Woc will be qualitatively indistinguishable 
from Wwc, and hence the two worlds will contain precisely the same regularities. That 
means, of course, that the regularity theory will fail the test. For suppose that it correctly 
identifies a causal regularity in Wwc (say, that whenever a rock with a certain mass and 
velocity collides with a window, the window breaks); then, since Woc will contain the 
very same regularity, the regularity theory will falsely report this as instance of secondary 
causation there. In general, any instance of secondary causation that the regularity theory 
correctly reports in Wwc, it will falsely report in Woc as well. 
This gives us, 




(16) The regularity theory is not an adequate theory of genuine secondary 
causation. [From (14) and (15)] 
 
So premise (1*) of Quinn’s overall defense of weak concurrentism is false; although 
(CC) and the regularity theory are formally consistent, the regularity theory is not a 
theory of genuine secondary causation. 
 
III. Continuous Creation and the Counterfactual Theory 
We have seen that the regularity theory fails the litmus test for adequate theories 
of genuine secondary causation. The next question we must address is whether the 
counterfactual theory fares any better. I will begin by summarizing the counterfactual 
theory Quinn defends. Next, I will consider an initially plausible, but ultimately 
unsatisfactory, case for thinking that the counterfactual theory does pass the test. Finally, 
I will argue that the counterfactual theory fails the test of properly distinguishing between 
Wwc and Woc and that it’s failure is closely related to the failure of the regularity theory. 
III-A. The Counterfactual Theory 
The second theory Quinn discusses is a simple version of the counterfactual 
approach to causation popularized by David Lewis.12 The hallmark of counterfactual 
theories is that they analyze causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals, which in 
turn are analyzed in terms of possible worlds.13 The basic gist of the counterfactual 
 
12 See Lewis (1973). 




approach to causation is that causes make a difference: thus, whether two actual events 
are related causally boils down to the question of what would have happened (more 
specifically, what would not have happened) if the alleged causal event had not occurred. 
For example, to say that a gunshot caused the untimely death of Bambi’s mother is to say, 
roughly, that if the gunshot had not occurred, then the untimely death of Bambi’s mother 
would not have occurred. 
That is the basic idea, but we need to get a little more precise. As Quinn presents 
the counterfactual theory, it analyzes the case of a lit match causing some water to be 
heated as follows: 
(17) The event of the water’s being heated at a certain time depends causally 
on the event of the match’s being lit slightly earlier iff: 
i. the match’s being lit at a certain time occurs 
ii. the water’s being heated slightly later occurs 
iii. the match’s being lit at a certain time and the water’s 
being heated slightly later are distinct events 
iv. if the match’s being lit at a certain time were not to occur 
then the water’s being heated slightly later would not 
occur14 
In its more general form the theory states that, 
(18) The event of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t depends causally on the event of i1’s 
being F at t1 iff: 
i. i1’s being F at t1 occurs 
ii. i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t occurs 
iii. i1’s being F at t1 and i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t are distinct 
events 
 
The proposition that if p were to obtain then q would obtain is true = df
either (i) there are no possible worlds in which p obtains, or (ii) some 
possible world in which p obtains and q obtains is more similar to the 
actual world than any possible world in which p obtains and q does not 
obtain. 
14 Quinn (1988) p. 63. 
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iv. if i1’s being F at t1 were not to occur then i2’s being G at 
t1 + ∆t would not occur.15 
Just as he did with the regularity theory, Quinn argues that this definition of causation is 
formally consistent with (CC).16 However, as we have seen, formal consistency with a 
definition of causation is not enough to demonstrate that (CC) is consistent with genuine 
secondary causes. If a theory offers a definition of genuine causation, it should be capable 
of distinguishing between Wwc and Woc. Thus, the crucial question is whether the 
counterfactual theory passes the test of (14). Can it get things right when it comes to Woc,
or does it (falsely) imply that Woc contains pairs of causally dependent events? 
A point of clarification is in order before we proceed. The counterfactual analysis 
clearly could not be faulted for correctly implying that events in Woc are causally 
dependent on divine volitions, so if divine volitions are events we must understand the 
question as restricted to pairs of events involving contingent individuals. What we want 
to know is whether the counterfactual account mistakenly implies that Woc contains 
events causally dependent on events other than divine volitions. Thus, except where 
otherwise noted, subsequent references to pairs of events are implicitly restricted to 
events involving contingent individuals. 
Woc clearly contains pairs of events that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of (18), 
but it is less obvious whether any of these pairs would also satisfy (iv), the counterfactual 
 
15 Quinn (1988) p. 63. 
16 Moreover, although Quinn acknowledges that simple versions of the counterfactual 
account such as (18) are susceptible to some well-known counterexamples, he professes 
his confidence that the more sophisticated counterfactual analyses designed to avoid 
these counterexamples will also be consistent with (CC) as long as they start from similar 
definitions and assumptions. See Quinn (1988) p. 67. 
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condition. Among the pairs of events that satisfy the first three conditions, is there a pair, 
e1 and e2, such that if e1 were not to occur, e2 would not occur? The answer to that 
question depends on what happens in the possible worlds most similar to Woc in which e1
does not occur. If e2 does not occur in the nearest such world(s), then the counterfactual 
analysis gets Woc wrong, but if e2 does occur in those worlds, then the counterfactual 
analysis gets Woc right. 
III-B. A Failed Attempt to Pass the Test 
There is an intuitively plausible line of reasoning for the conclusion that the 
counterfactual analysis does get Woc right, and hence passes the test of (14). It begins by 
noting that the fact that God is the total and exclusive cause of everything that occurs in 
Woc seems to be a very important feature of that world – a feature that all the worlds most 
similar to Woc would share. That is, since Woc is an occasionalist world, all of the worlds 
most similar to Woc will be occasionalist worlds as well. Moreover, in occasionalist 
worlds, events are directly related only to God; thus, the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
one event has no direct connection to the occurrence or non-occurrence of any other. So 
among occasionalist worlds, it seems natural to suppose that comparisons of overall 
similarity should be a simple matter of setting two worlds side-by-side and counting how 
many events they share in common and how many events God brings about in one but 
not in the other. 
Consider two worlds, W1 and W2, defined as follows: 
W1: exactly the same as Woc, with the exception that God does not bring about 
e1.
W2: exactly the same as Woc, with the exception that God does not bring about 
either e1 or e2.
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Judged simply by the events God brings about in them, W1 would seem to be more 
similar to Woc than W2 is. If that is right, then the counterfactual account of causation 
correctly implies that in Woc, e1 is not causally dependent on e2 because they do not 
satisfy condition (iv). Thus, the counterfactual analysis seems to have the resources for 
getting Woc right, and so it appears to pass our litmus test for theories of genuine 
secondary causation. 
 Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is flawed. For one thing, it is a mistake to 
think that similarity among occasionalist worlds would simply be a matter of tallying up 
the number of differences in the events God brings about. There are other significant 
respects in which occasionalist worlds might differ. For example, suppose that e1 and e2
fall under certain event-types, Type-1 and Type-2 respectively; moreover, suppose that in 
Woc God determines to bring about a Type-2 event immediately following every Type-1 
event. In that case, the claim that W1 is more similar to Woc than W2 is should strike us as 
less plausible, for W2 is compatible with such a divine determination, while W1 is not. 
Thus, similarity comparisons for occasionalist worlds would need to take into 
consideration not only what events God brings about, but also how God determines 
which events to bring about. And this makes it far less likely that the counterfactual 
theory will pass the test of properly distinguishing between occasionalist and non-
occasionalist worlds. 
Secondly, there is another, much deeper flaw in the above reasoning. The 
fundamental difficulty is that it appeals to causal facts about the various worlds in order 
to make judgments of overall similarity between them. But since the counterfactual 
theory analyzes causation in terms of counterfactuals, and analyzes counterfactuals in 
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terms of overall similarity between worlds, it cannot appeal to facts about causation to 
make those similarity judgments. To do so would be viciously circular.17 Thus, I 
conclude that the above reasoning fails to demonstrate that the counterfactual theory can 
pass the test of (14). 
III-C. Why the Counterfactual Theory Fails the Test 
The notion of overall similarity between worlds clearly plays a crucial role in the 
counterfactual theory of causation. I think that a closer look at this aspect of the theory 
will reveal that the counterfactual theory is incapable of properly distinguishing between 
Wwc and Woc. More specifically, I will argue that the account of overall similarity needed 
to produce the correct implications for Wwc will yield the wrong implications for Woc.
Let us suppose that e1 and e2 are the following events: e1 = one billiard ball’s 
striking another, and e2 = the second billiard ball’s rolling away from the first. We have 
stipulated that Wwc (the actual world) contains genuine secondary causes, so we may 
suppose that in Wwc e1 causes e2. If the counterfactual analysis is correct, that means that 
the worlds most similar to Wwc in which e1 does not occur are worlds in which e2 does not 
occur either. What account of similarity among worlds would give this result? It cannot 
be an account that simply tallies the number of differences between the events in the 
worlds, for then a world in which e1 did not occur but e2 did would be more similar. So 
an adequate account of similarity must take some other factor(s) into account as well. We 
have already seen that causal facts are off limits; so what other facts can enter into 
consideration? The only obvious candidates are facts about the regularities that obtain in 
 
17 This point is noted by Lowe (2002) pp. 186-8. 
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various worlds.18 For example, if in Wwc events of Type-2 are always preceded by events 
of Type-1, then other things being equal, we might expect the same regularity to obtain in 
the worlds nearest to Wwc. Since e1 and e2 fall under such event types, an approach to 
similarity that factors in such regularities would yield the right result for Wwc – i.e. it will 
imply that e2 is causally dependent on e1.
But does this approach to similarity get things right when it is applied to Woc?
That is very doubtful. As we already saw when we discussed the regularity theory, all of 
the events and regularities found in Woc are found in Wwc as well. So if the counterfactual 
analysis yields the correct result in Wwc (viz., that e2 is causally dependent on e1), then it 
seems that it will unavoidably yield the wrong result in Woc – that is, it will (falsely) 
imply that e2 is causally dependent on e1 there as well. 
Of course, things are somewhat more complicated in Woc because it contains 
additional events and regularities that are not included in Wwc. Since every event in Woc is 
brought about by a divine volition, there will be a divine volitional event that corresponds 
to each regular event. That is, corresponding to e1, there will be event v1, where v1 =
God’s willing that e1 occur; corresponding to e2, there will be event v2, where v2 = God’s 
 
18 Lewis (1973) treats the similarity relation as primitive, noting that the relevant factors 
are “many and varied” (p. 560). However, the two factors he specifically draws attention 
to are closely related to the factors I have mentioned above; corresponding to my 
similarities among the events that occur, Lewis speaks of “similarities in particular 
matters of fact”, and corresponding to my similarities in the regularities that obtain, 
Lewis speaks of “similarities of law.” According to Lewis, these factors “trade off 
against” each other; considerations of similarities in the laws or regularities are crucial, 
although they must be weighed against similarities in the particulars. In Lewis (1979, p. 
472), he offers a more specific ranking (from most to least important) of various types of 
similarity: (1) “avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law;” (2) “maximize the 
spatiotemporal region through which perfect match of particular fact prevails;” (3) “avoid 
small, localized, simple violations of law;” and (4) “secure approximate similarity of 
particular fact.” The fourth type of similarity is, says Lewis, “of little or no importance.” 
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willing that e2 occur; and so on. Furthermore, for any event-types and regularities that 
obtain among the regular events, corresponding event-types and regularities will obtain 
among the divine volitional events. If e1 and e2 are instances of a lawful regularity, then 
v1 and v2 will instantiate a corresponding regularity. There will also be regularities 
between the divine volitional event-types and regular event-types – e.g. events of the type 
under which e1 falls will always be preceded by (or simultaneous with) events of the type 
under which v1 falls. 
However, although these additional events and regularities complicate matters in 
Woc, they do not provide the counterfactual analysis with the means of getting Woc right. 
To see why, we should observe that the extra divine volitional events that are present in 
Woc (and the regularities that obtain between them) are like doppelgangers of the events 
and regularities present in Wwc – they mimic them exactly. As a short-hand way of 
making this point, I will refer to occasionalist worlds related to non-occasionalist worlds 
in this way as doppelganger worlds – e.g. Woc is Wwc’s doppelganger world. The problem 
the counterfactual theory faces is that the worlds most similar to Wwc and Woc will 
correspond to each other just as Wwc and Woc do. That is, let Wwc* name the nearest world 
to Wwc in which e1 does not occur; then the nearest world to Woc in which e1 does not 
occur, call it Woc*, will be Wwc*’s doppelganger world. Woc* will contain the same non-
divine volitional events that Wwc* contains, plus all of their divine volitional 
doppelganger events. So if the counterfactual theory has the (true) consequence that e2 is 
causally dependent on e1 in Wwc, it will also have the (false) consequence that e2 is 
causally dependent on e1 in Woc.
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That is all quite technical, but here is a slightly simpler way of putting the 
problem. Many occasionalist worlds perfectly replicate the events and regularities found 
in non-occasionalist worlds. The occasionalist worlds will also contain an extra set of 
divine volitional events that closely mimic the regular events. In an occasionalist world, 
only the divine volitional events are true causes, but the counterfactual theory is 
incapable of recognizing this fact because it has no means by which to separate the 
genuinely causal regularities from the non-causal ones. For example, it has no way of 
recognizing that v2 (and not e1) is the true cause of e2 in Woc.19 In hindsight, this failure 
 
19 It might be objected at this point that I have too quickly dismissed all causal facts from 
consideration. After all, Quinn’s attempt to marry (CC) with the counterfactual theory 
involves accepting two disparate kinds of causal relations. The primitive necessitarian 
bringing about relation that holds between divine volitions and the events they bring 
about – e.g. between v1 and e1 – and the counterfactual dependence relation that holds 
between events involving contingent individuals. Perhaps facts about where the primitive 
bringing about relation obtains could be included in comparisons of overall similarity 
between worlds without falling into a vicious circle. In other words, perhaps the only 
causal facts that are off limits are the causal facts the theory is intended to analyze – 
namely, facts about secondary causation. 
That may be right, but even if it is it cannot solve the counterfactual theory’s 
problems. The counterfactual theory has the false consequence that e2 is causally 
dependent on e1 in Woc because of the regularities that e1 and e2 exemplify. Including facts 
about divine causation in the similarity comparisons would in no way change or eliminate 
those regularities. Of course, one could always rig the theory’s definition of causation in 
a way that would make facts about divine causation more helpful. For example, (18) 
could be modified as follows: 
 
(18*)   The event of i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t depends causally on the event of i1’s 
being F at t1 iff: 
i. i1’s being F at t1 occurs 
ii. i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t occurs 
iii. i1’s being F at t1 and i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t are distinct 
events 
iv. if i1’s being F at t1 were not to occur then i2’s being G at 
t1 + ∆t would not occur 




seems predictable. After all, we have already seen that the regularity theory does not 
properly distinguish between real causes and occasional causes; since the counterfactual 
theory depends upon regularities in order to make comparisons of overall similarity, we 
should not be surprised to learn that it fails in a similar way. 
Continuous creationists who are attracted to the counterfactual theory may wish to 
propose some other approach to similarity among worlds, but they have a rather difficult 
task ahead of them. An adequate account of similarity must manage to have the right 
causal implications for Wwc, without yielding the wrong implications for Woc. The 
problem is that, apart from the causal facts, Wwc and Woc parallel each far too closely. 
Since causal facts cannot enter into the similarity comparisons, the prospects for finding 
an adequate account of similarity look terribly grim. Thus, I think we can reasonably 
conclude that, 
(19) The counterfactual theory does not properly distinguish between Wwc and 
Woc.
And hence, 
(20) The counterfactual theory is not an adequate theory of genuine secondary 
causation. [From (14) and (19)] 
 
So premise (2*) of Quinn’s overall defense of weak concurrentism is also false; although 
(CC) and the counterfactual theory are formally consistent, the counterfactual theory does 
not offer a theory of genuine secondary causation. It is, at best, a theory of occasional 
causes. 
 
(18*) would correctly describe Woc as an occasionalist world, and so it would pass our 
litmus test for theories of causation. However, it accomplishes this only by adding a 
condition that seems objectionably ad hoc. 
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IV. Continuous Creation and Reductionism 
Before moving on to consider whether Quinn’s necessitarian theory fares any 
better than the regularity and counterfactual theories, I want to pause briefly and draw a 
more general conclusion from the arguments to this point. We have seen that both the 
regularity and the counterfactual theories fail the test of (14) because neither theory is 
capable of properly distinguishing between occasionalist and non-occasionalist worlds. 
These two theories are prominent examples of the more general reductionist approach to 
causation that has dominated ever since Hume; what I want to suggest now is that any
reductionist theory of causation will fail the test of (14). 
What I mean by a reductionist theory of causation is a theory that attempts to 
define causation entirely in terms of non-causal features of the world. The regularity 
theory, for example, attempts to reduce causation to non-causal regularities, or “constant 
conjunctions,” and the counterfactual theory attempts to define it in terms of 
counterfactual dependence and ultimately, similarity between worlds. Why did both of 
these theories fail the test of (14)? Why were they incapable of properly distinguishing 
between Wwc and Woc? Simply put, the reason they both failed is that in terms of their 
non-causal features, Wwc and Woc resemble each other far too closely. The non-causal 
features of the world that the regularity and counterfactual definitions of causation appeal 
to are found in both worlds. Furthermore, I do not see any reason to think that this 
problem is peculiar to these two reductionist theories. It seems that whatever non-causal 
features a reductionist theory appeals to will be equally present in both Wwc and Woc; thus, 
any reductionist theory that manages to get Wwc right is bound to get Woc wrong and 
hence, bound to fail the test of (14). The moral to be drawn is that any attempt to 
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reconcile (CC) with a reductionist theory of causation will fail for essentially the same 
reason. 
If this is correct, then only a non-reductionist approach to causation holds any 
hope for reconciling (CC) with genuine secondary causes. Contrary to what Quinn 
suggests, continuous creationists clearly have a vested interest in the outcomes of current 
debates about causation. That can hardly be considered good news, but I do not think it is 
especially bad news either. For one thing, reductionist theories of causation and laws of 
nature have not fared well in recent years anyway, and that for reasons quite independent 
of theological concerns about continuous creation and occasionalism. Although the 
reductionist program still has many advocates, an increasing number of prominent voices 
are urging that it is broken beyond repair and should be abandoned in favor of non-
reductionist approaches to causation and laws.20 The tides seem to be changing – non-
reductionism on its way in and reductionism headed out – and so if continuous 
creationists should be forced to cast their lots with one side or the other, non-
reductionism seems to be a safer bet. Furthermore, in hindsight it seems that the attempt 
to wed (CC) with reductionist theories of secondary causation was fated to produce an 
unhappy marriage. The reductionist approach to causation is attractive only insofar as our 
robust commonsense notion of causation – i.e., as involving real power, production, 
and/or necessitation – is thought to be fundamentally misguided. But adherents of (CC) 
 
20 These voices include: Harré & Madden (1975); Anscombe (1975); Dretske (1977); 
Tooley (1977), (1987) and (1990); Armstrong (1983) and (2004); Freddoso (1986); 
Cartwright (1994) and (1997); Swinburne (1997); O’Connor (2000), esp. ch. 4; and Ellis 
(2002). It is perhaps no coincidence that a number of scholars have recently begun to 
question whether Hume, the father of reductionism, was really a reductionist after all (see 
note 8 above). 
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have little reason to think that since (CC) itself invokes a robust realist approach to divine 
causation. The marriage of such disparate accounts of divine and secondary causation 
seems ad hoc at best, and if the arguments of the preceding sections are correct, then their 
differences are truly irreconcilable. Since (CC) invokes a non-reductionist account of 
divine causation, a similarly robust account of secondary causation would seem to be a 
much more natural match.21 Thus, it is time to take a closer look at the non-reductionist 
necessitarian theory. 
 
V. Continuous Creation and non-Reductionist Theories 
So far we have discussed the regularity theory and the counterfactual theory. It 
has been clear (I hope) that these definite descriptions – e.g. “the regularity theory” – are 
only convenient simplifications. In reality, there are numerous regularity and 
counterfactual theories, most of them subtle variations upon the simple versions we have 
examined. The particular theories we considered have essentially served as “family 
representatives.” But as we now turn our attention to non-reductionist causal theories, the 
differences are even greater. To make the discussion more manageable, I will focus 
primarily upon the particular non-reductionist theory Quinn discusses – the necessitarian 
theory. Although non-reductionist theories of causation constitute a rather diverse family, 
they nevertheless share common features that allow the necessitarian theory to serve as 
their family representative. I will explain why below. 
 
21 Here I am rejecting the common wisdom that opposites attract. At least in theoretical 
marriages, opposites tend to resist each other. 
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V-A. Quinn’s Necessitarian Theory. 
Even among the non-reductionist causal theories that can be broadly categorized 
as necessitarian there are differences that are, in some instances, more substantial than 
subtle. Nevertheless, for our purposes it will be preferable to avoid getting bogged down 
in too many details and so I will focus upon Quinn’s simple, generic necessitarian theory. 
Quinn states his theory in terms of a modified version of the bringing about relation used 
in (CC). The standard version of that relation is marked by the characteristics of totality, 
exclusivity, activity, immediacy, and necessity; but in order to render it more suited to 
secondary causes, Quinn takes away the characteristic of immediacy. (Secondary causes 
often bring about effects, not immediately, but by means of causal chains and/or by using 
other things as causal instruments.) To explicitly mark this difference from the various 
other bringing about relations we have discussed, I will refer to this modified version of 
the relation as brings about3.
The generic necessitarian theory analyzes the example of a lit match heating some 
water as follows: 
(21) The match’s being lit and being such that C at a certain time brings about3
the water’s being heated slightly later. 
 
Quinn explains that the ‘C’ represents whatever additional conditions are required “to 
ensure the presence of the marks of totality and exclusivity”22 – for example, C might 
include conditions specifying that there is an adequate supply of oxygen, that the match 
and the water are within a specified proximity of each other, etc. However, somewhat 
 
22 Quinn (1988) p. 68. 
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confusingly, Quinn includes no such condition when he states his necessitarian theory in 
its general form: 
(22) i1’s being F at t1 brings about3 i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t.
Perhaps the absence of condition C in (22) is an accidental omission, or perhaps Quinn 
intends that any conditions needed to ensure totality and exclusivity will simply be built 
into the predicate F. For present purposes, I will assume the latter explanation. 
V-B. Why Quinn’s Necessitarian Theory Passes the Test 
Just as he did for each of the previous theories, Quinn argues that this 
necessitarian definition of causation is formally consistent with (CC). But can the 
necessitarian theory pass the test of (14)? That is, can it properly distinguish between an 
occasionalist world (Woc) and a weak concurrentist world (Wwc)? Yes, it can, and the 
reason is really quite simple: unlike reductionist theories, which attempt to analyze 
causation in terms of more basic non-causal facts, the necessitarian theory takes causal 
facts to be fundamental features of the world. Quinn’s version of the theory posits brings 
about3, a primitive causal relation that obtains between secondary causes and their 
effects. Since none of the events (or states of affairs) in Woc will stand in this relation to 
each other, Quinn’s necessitarian theory will correctly identify Woc as an occasionalist 
world, devoid of secondary causes. 
V-C. Why non-Reductionist Theories in General Pass the Test 
Moreover, this is not merely a convenient or contrived consequence of Quinn’s 
particular theory. Although the details will differ from case to case, any non-reductionist 
theory will take causal facts to be in some sense primitive. Some versions, for example, 
take laws of nature to express a primitive (although perhaps contingent) modal 
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relationship between two universals – i.e. being an F necessitates being a G. Other 
versions take laws of nature to obtain (to the extent that they do obtain) in virtue of the 
more fundamental fact that individuals possess irreducible causal powers, or dispositions, 
or capacities: that is, the primitive causal powers (capacities, dispositions) of individuals 
give rise to lawful regularities. But however the details of a non-reductionist theory are 
filled in, the fact that two events in Wwc are related to each other as cause and effect will 
express or be explained by some sort of primitive causal fact about Wwc. If a non-
reductionist theory of causation is correct, then no matter how perfectly Woc may mimic 
Wwc’s non-causal features, they will differ vastly when it comes to their primitive causal 
features – universals in Woc will not stand in a primitive modal necessitation relationship 
to each other; individuals in Woc will not possess any primitive causal powers; and so on. 
Thus, regardless of exactly how the details get fleshed out, it seems that non-reductionist 
theories of causation will have the resources to properly distinguish between Wwc and Woc.
They pass our litmus test for theories of genuine secondary causation. 
V-D. Is Secondary Causation still too Mysterious? 
Non-reductionist theories of causation are both formally consistent with (CC) and 
capable of distinguishing between real and occasional causes, and that is certainly good 
news for weak concurrentists. On the other hand, the case for weak concurrentism is not 
nearly as strong Quinn originally set out to prove. Weak concurrentists cannot remain 
neutral in the debate over the nature of causation; rather, they are forced to adopt a 
particular approach to causation. As I noted at the beginning of the chapter, that places an 
added burden upon them to defend the truth or plausibility of that approach. 
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So just how plausible are the non-reductionist versions of weak concurrentism? 
To make the question more manageable, let us focus it more narrowly: just how plausible 
is Quinn’s necessitarian version of weak concurrentism? Before we try to answer that 
question, perhaps it would help to remind ourselves of the problem that got us started 
down this path in the first place. Recall from the end of Chapter Seven how Quinn 
initially explained the problem continuous creation poses for secondary causation. 
According to (CC), God is the sole and total cause of the existence of every contingent 
being at every moment. Thus, the fact that I exist right now and am typing on my 
computer has no direct bearing upon whether I or my computer will exist a moment from 
now. What exists at any given moment is entirely up to God, so I will exist a moment 
from now if, and only if, God causes me to exist then – same goes for my computer and 
every other contingent thing. So where do secondary causes enter the picture? As Quinn 
noted, “this appears to leave little or no room for what happens at one time-slice to 
exercise any influence on what happens at any other by means of a path that remains 
wholly internal to the created realm.”23 For example, I would like to believe that the 
actions I am performing right now will cause certain words and sentences to be recorded 
on my laptop’s hard drive at later times. But if God must repeatedly cause my computer 
to exist at every subsequent moment, then it is hard to see how anything other than God 
can determine the state of its hard drive at those moments. 
 Does the necessitarian theory offer a plausible solution to this problem? In truth, 
the “solution” it offers seems exceedingly mysterious. According to Quinn’s 
necessitarian theory, events that occur at one moment (e.g., i1’s being F at t1) are related 
 
23 Quinn (1988) p. 55. 
197
to events that occur at subsequent moments (e.g., i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t) by brings about3,
a primitive relation of causal necessitation. But in light of the doctrine of continuous 
creation, is this alleged necessitation credible? In order for i2 to be G at t1 + ∆t, it must 
exist at t1 + ∆t. But of course, i1 has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not i2 will 
exist at t1 + ∆t – that depends entirely upon whether God chooses to conserve i2 when that 
moment arrives. If i1’s being F at t1 does not even necessitate i2’s existing at t1 + ∆t, how
could it possibly necessitate i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t?
An initially attractive thought is that weak concurrentists could overcome this 
problem by claiming only that secondary causes conditionally necessitate their effects. In 
other words, perhaps what i1’s being F at t1 necessitates is something like the following 
conditional: if God conserves i2 at t1 + ∆t, then i2 will be G at t1 + ∆t.24 Unfortunately, 
this does not seem to be an adequate solution either. Suppose God has some reason to 
want i2 to be non-G (or to have another property that cannot be co-instantiated with G), 
and so God wills, “let i2 exist and be non-G at t1 + ∆t.” In that case, i2 would not be G at 
t1 + ∆t, notwithstanding i1’s having been F at t1. Thus, i1’s being F at t1 does not even 
conditionally necessitate i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t. Of course, this problem could be 
remedied by adding yet another condition. Perhaps what i1’s being F at t1 really 
necessitates is something like the following conditional: if God conserves i2 at t1 + ∆t, 
and if God does not actively prevent i2 from being G at t1 + ∆t, then i2 will be G at t1 + ∆t.
24 Or, equivalently, perhaps we are to understand the condition that God will conserve i2
at t1 + ∆t as being built into the predicate F. (Recall that we are supposing that F includes 
Quinn’s original catchall condition C.) Of course, this renders F a rather awkward 
predicate, as it treats being such that God will conserve i2 at t1 + ∆t as a property of i1.
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Perhaps some such conditional version of the necessitarian theory would be 
technically adequate, but it would also be implausible for at least two reasons. First, with 
each added condition, the theory sounds increasingly ad hoc and loses credibility. But 
even more importantly, the alleged necessitation remains deeply mysterious. The 
necessitarian version of weak concurrentism claims that things happening in the world 
right now can somehow necessitate that if God chooses to cause some individual to exist 
a short time from now, then it will possess certain specific properties (as long as God 
does not prevent it from possessing them). But how could anything happening now 
necessitate that? Of course, it is conceivable that God has determined to always bring 
about the existence of an individual that is G a short while after bringing about an 
individual that is F, and if God has determined to act in such a way, then i1’s being F at t1
might necessitate i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t. However, the former event would necessitate the 
latter only as its occasional cause, and not as its genuine productive cause. Obviously, 
this is not an explanation of the necessitation that weak concurrentists can accept! The 
problem is that there simply does not seem to be any other plausible explanation. 
 So far the necessitarian version of weak concurrentism has not looked very 
promising. However, I think it might fare better if we reconsider it in light of the 
distinction between the moment-by-moment and the interval interpretations of (CC). The 
criticisms I have just raised against the necessitarian view have generally presumed the 
moment-by-moment interpretation. For example, when I questioned how i1’s being F at t1
could possibly necessitate i2’s being G at t1 + ∆t, I assumed that at t1 it was an open 
question whether i2 would exist at t1 + ∆t. In other words, I assumed that it depends upon 
what God chooses to do when t1 + ∆t rolls around. If God will have to step in again at t1 +
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∆t to cause everything to exist, then it is very difficult to see how anything happening at 
t1 could causally necessitate their having the properties they have. Thus, at least on the 
moment-by-moment interpretation of continuous creation, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that there are no genuine secondary causes and that Malebranche was right to 
insist that the doctrine leads to occasionalism. 
But the interval interpretation seems at least somewhat less problematic. 
According to this interpretation, God’s creating and conserving an individual is simply a 
matter of forming a single volition – e.g. “let Speck exist throughout t6t'.” Thus, whether 
or not Speck will exist at a later moment is not an open question – it has already been 
settled – and this helps the necessitarian theory of causation to seem a little more 
plausible. Imagine a toy universe in which i1 and i2 are the only individuals. According to 
the interval interpretation, God simply wills that they exist (perhaps with certain causal 
powers, or dispositions, or something of the sort) throughout some interval of time. What 
happens during that interval is left to be determined by interactions between them. In 
other words, God’s creation and conservation of this toy world might consist of forming a 
single volition. Something roughly like: “let i1 exist with causal powers a, b, and c
throughout t6t', and let i2 exist with causal powers d, e, and f throughout t6t'.”25 Thus, 
God does not step in at each moment to cause i1 and i2 to exist; their existence at each 
moment of the interval is guaranteed by the single volition that has already been decreed 
(either timelessly, or in the past). 
 
25 According to (CrD), God’s volition would also need to specify exactly which 
properties they possess at t. For present purposes we can ignore this complication. 
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I do not mean to suggest that the interval interpretation magically renders the 
necessitarian approach to secondary causes entirely un-mysterious. However, what I do 
mean to suggest is that on the interval interpretation, the doctrine of continuous creation 
is no longer the source of the mystery. In my opinion, necessitarian theories of causation 
are, by their very nature, somewhat mysterious (a point I will return to in a moment); but 
unlike the moment-by-moment interpretation, the interval interpretation of continuous 
creation does not, as far as I can see, add to the mystery. It leaves the necessitarian 
version of weak concurrentism no more (nor less) mysterious than the necessitarian 
theory of causation is on its own. If that is right, then the plausibility of this version of 
weak concurrentism rests solely upon the plausibility of the necessitarian approach to 
causation. 
So how plausible is the necessitarian approach? As I suggested above, it is 
somewhat mysterious by its very nature – indeed, this point applies to non-reductionist 
theories quite generally. I say this because non-reductionist theories all posit the 
existence of something – bringing about relations, causal powers, dispositions, modal 
relations between universals, something – that is primitive and fairly obscure. Hume (and 
Malebranche before him) offered rather forceful criticisms of such notions. As they 
explained, we simply cannot perceive any necessary connection between natural causes 
and their effects, nor do we have clear ideas of notions such as causal powers or 
dispositions. So why has there been a revival of non-reductionist theories in recent years? 
It is not that we suddenly evolved a new faculty for perceiving necessary connections or 
that we now have a clearer notion of causal powers. Rather, the driving force of this 
revival has been a growing conviction that the problems facing the reductionist program 
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are irremediable. In other words, there simply does not seem to be any promising 
alternative to positing such things. We have tried to analyze causation in terms of less 
mysterious features of the world – spatial and temporal contiguity, regularities, 
counterfactual dependence,26 and so on – but these efforts seem to have proven futile. 
Thus, returning to the non-reductionist approach is, in a sense, a matter of giving in and 
embracing the mystery of causation. Philosophers are generally disposed to resist 
mysteries, not embrace them, but in light of the persistent failures of reductionism, the 
non-reductionist approach to causation seems to be our best option – even if it is 
mysterious. 
Thus, non-reductionist versions of weak concurrentism such as the necessitarian 
version seem to have a lot going for them. They are (a) formally consistent with (CC), (b) 
capable of distinguishing between genuine and merely occasional causes, and (c) seem, at 
least at the moment, to offer the most plausible approach to causation. In short, they seem 
to offer a plausible weak concurrentist alternative to occasionalism. However, before I 
draw this chapter to a close, I want to note that in some respects, occasionalism still has 
the advantage. I suggested just above that even though they are mysterious, non-
reductionist approaches to secondary causation are probably our best option. But this 
needs an important qualification: they are probably our best option, assuming that there is 
genuine secondary causation. There lies the catch. Given the present dialectic between 
weak concurrentism and occasionalism, it must be admitted that the mystery of non-
reductionist secondary causation favors occasionalism over weak concurrentism. This 
 
26 Of course, counterfactual conditionals are fairly mysterious creatures in their own 
right. Whether they are any less mysterious than causation is perhaps open to debate. 
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seems to be the point of Plantinga’s recent observation that occasionalism is “neater and 
cleaner” than weak concurrentism. He explains: 
[T]he problem with secondary causation is the nature of this creaturely 
causality. What is this causation? And what kind of necessity (if any) goes 
with it? When God says “Let there be light,” there is light; indeed, 
necessarily, when God says “Let there be light,” there is light. Here the 
necessity is just metaphysical or broadly logical necessity, the same kind 
that is enjoyed by the truths of logic and mathematics. But what about the 
necessity that is supposed to go with creaturely causation? Suppose the 
cause does its thing; it is still possible, one thinks, that the effect may fail 
to occur. God, for example, could suppress the effect. Still, some kind of 
necessity seems to be involved here: what kind?27 
It seems likely that the kind of necessitation involved in secondary causation will always 
remain mysterious in comparison to the straightforward necessity involved in divine 
causation. And if that is right, it helps Malebranche’s position to look somewhat more 
attractive. 
Of course, weak concurrentists might respond that the rejection of secondary 
causation is simply too jagged a pill to swallow – “better to have mysterious secondary 
causation than no secondary causation at all!” All things considered, that may be the 
appropriate response. But we have found occasionalism to be an extremely difficult 
position to avoid; indeed, we have gone to great lengths seeking plausible alternatives, 
and we have had rather limited success. If the case for occasionalism is really that strong, 
maybe we ought to reconsider the assumption that it is a position we must avoid. What is 
so bad about it, anyway? I will briefly offer my take on that question in the concluding 
chapter. 
 
27 Plantinga (2005) p. 35. Cf. Plantinga (2007) p. 133, fn. 55. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 According to weak concurrentists, God and secondary causes cooperate by 
contributing to fundamentally different aspects of a total effect; God causes the existence 
of all contingent individuals, while secondary causes by themselves cause at least many 
of the properties of those individuals. I have argued in this chapter that reductionist 
theories of causation fail to properly distinguish between occasionalist and weak 
concurrentist worlds – that is, reductionist theories falsely imply that occasionalist worlds 
contain secondary causes. What follows, I have argued, is that non-reductionism is the 
only approach to causation open to weak concurrentists. In this concluding section, I will 
briefly do two things: first, I will note that this argument has some more far-reaching 
implications and secondly, I will note its relation to the discussion of persistence in Part 
II (Chapters Four and Five). 
Although my goal in this chapter has been to determine what theory (or theories) 
of causation are open to weak concurrentists, it is worth noting that the preceding 
arguments can also be applied to many who are not weak concurrentists. Any theist, weak 
concurrentist or not, must acknowledge that occasionalist worlds are metaphysically 
possible – i.e. they must acknowledge that God could have created Woc. Thus, assuming 
that an adequate theory of causation should accurately describe any possible situation, it 
follows that non-reductionism is the only legitimate approach to causation for theists. 
Indeed, even some non-theists are affected by this argument. Generally speaking, those 
who deny God’s existence can be divided into two camps: those who believe the 
proposition God exists is necessarily false and those who believe it is only contingently 
false. Non-theists who acknowledge that God’s existence is possible must also 
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acknowledge that occasionalist worlds are metaphysically possible; hence, the argument 
applies to them as well. In other words, anyone who acknowledges that theism is even 
possible must acknowledge that Woc is possible, and anyone who acknowledges that is 
thereby committed to a non-reductionist approach to causation.  
 Finally, I need to tie up one loose end from the discussion of continuous creation 
and persistence in Part II. I argued in Chapter Four that continuous creationists cannot 
adopt property-causal worm theory because the doctrine of continuous creation renders 
causal relations between stages problematic. However, in the present chapter I have (at 
least to some extent) defended the compatibility of continuous creation and secondary 
causation. So does my argument here undermine my earlier criticism of property-causal 
worm theory? I do not think it does. In section V-D above, I argued that weak 
concurrentists should adopt the interval interpretation of continuous creation because 
secondary causation is objectionably mysterious on the moment-by-moment 
interpretation. But the interval interpretation of the doctrine does not comport well with a 
temporal parts ontology. On the interval interpretation, God does not will the existence of 
a succession of instantaneous individuals; rather, God wills the continued existence of a 
single individual – “let x exist throughout t6t'.” So it seems that the only plausible weak 
concurrentist approach to secondary causation is one that demands a continuant ontology. 




At the outset I described this dissertation as an attempt to understand and assess 
the traditional doctrine of divine conservation (which came to be identified with the 
doctrine of continuous creation). I hope it has achieved the goal of providing readers with 
a clearer understanding of continuous creation. Moreover, the preceding chapters have 
taken some important steps towards an overall assessment of the doctrine. I have argued 
that continuous creationists can answer each of the major objections that have been raised 
against their position, and that certainly seems to support a positive overall assessment. 
Thus, there is a sense in which continuous creation has been vindicated and its critics 
shown to be wrong. 
But in reality, the task of assessing continuous creation has only just begun. 
Although the doctrine can be defended against objections, we have also seen that each 
criticism exacts a certain cost. Yes, continuous creation can be reconciled with 
persistence, but not with the theories of persistence offered by temporal parts theorists; 
continuous creationists are forced to accept the endurantist conception of persistence. 
Yes, continuous creationists can avoid committing themselves to occasionalism, but the 
costs here are even higher. In Chapter Seven I argued that weak concurrentism is the only 
plausible alternative to occasionalism, but it comes with a hidden fee: it requires a 
conception of the nature of particulars that can provide a metaphysical basis for the 
existence/property distinction. That means that continuous creationists are forced to reject 
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both nominalism and the bundle theory, and forced to accept something like either bare 
particulars or irreducibly structured substances. Furthermore, if the arguments in Chapter 
Eight are correct, weak concurrentists are also forced to accept the non-reductionist 
approach to secondary causation. Thus, it is impossible to fully assess continuous 
creation without assessing the total metaphysical package it comes bundled with: 
endurantism, non-reductionist causation, and your choice of bare particulars or structured 
substances. A seemingly straightforward task has turned into a rather complicated and 
overwhelming undertaking; an adequate assessment of that entire package could easily 
require several more dissertations – it certainly lies beyond the compass of this 
concluding chapter. 
Of course, I could simply point out that each of the package’s components has 
respected defenders, and thus that the package itself is certainly respectable. On the other 
hand, it must be admitted that continuous creationists have been painted into a rather 
small corner of metaphysics. But what are the alternatives? It goes without saying that 
continuous creationists who do not care for this package can challenge my arguments that 
the doctrine requires certain of its components. But assuming those arguments are 
correct, the options are really quite limited: continuous creationists can either accept the 
package, or else reject the fundamental commitments (i.e. persistence and secondary 
causation) that required it. I argued in Part II that rejecting persistence is not an option for 
theists because it is essential to many central doctrines and concepts of theistic religions. 
Thus, assuming that the arguments of Part II are correct, endurantism is a non-negotiable 
component of the bundle. However, in Part III I simply took it for granted that rejecting 
secondary causation (i.e. accepting occasionalism) is not an option. As I noted at the end 
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of Chapter Eight, since occasionalism has proven to be such a difficult position to avoid, 
and since it is “neater and cleaner” than weak concurrentism, perhaps continuous 
creationists should reconsider it. 
In fact, in recent years a small handful of theists have revisited occasionalism, and 
some of them have come to the conclusion that it is far more plausible than it is often 
made out to be – many of the knee jerk reactions and objections to occasionalism simply 
are not compelling.1 However, there is one objection that seems to me to be decisive: 
occasionalism is inconsistent with free will. The problem is not merely that it is 
incompatible with a robust libertarian conception of free will; rather, I mean that 
occasionalism is incompatible with free will of any kind, even compatibilist or soft 
determinist varieties. Libertarians and compatibilists may disagree over whether free 
actions require alternate possibilities, but they all agree that in order for an agent to act 
freely, that agent has to cause something. Occasionalism denies that any agent (other than 
God) ever causes anything, and so it is incompatible with creaturely freedom of any kind. 
Since that is not a consequence theists can accept, occasionalism is unacceptable. 
Of course, this criticism assumes that the occasionalism in question is pure or 
unrestricted. As I suggested in Chapter Six, occasionalism would be a less problematic 
and more attractive position if it could somehow be restricted so that it did not encompass 
human choices.2 But I also noted there that the case for such restricted or impure forms of 
occasionalism is incredibly weak – many of the arguments for occasionalism seem to be 
 
1 See, in particular, McCann & Kvanvig (1991); Vallicella (1996) and (1999); and 
Freddoso (1988). For a recent critique of occasionalism, see Rogers (2001). 
2 Cf. Rogers (2001) p. 365. 
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such that they either support it in its pure, unrestricted sense or not at all. This certainly 
seems to be true of Malebranche’s continuous creation argument. If occasionalism 
follows from continuous creation, and if God continuously creates every contingent 
individual, then it is hard to see how occasionalism could be restricted. The problem is 
especially acute for physicalists who take mental states (including volitions) to be 
identical with physical states. Suppose that my volitions are identical with certain 
physical states of my brain. Then if God creates and conserves my brain with determinate 
properties, God is the sole and total cause of all my mental states; I do not cause any of 
them and hence, I am not free. 
Non-reductive physicalism may have a better chance of restricting occasionalism. 
Non-reductive physicalists deny that mental states are identical to physical states, 
insisting instead that they supervene upon physical states. That suggests a strategy for 
blocking God’s responsibility for our mental states: perhaps the principles of creation and 
conservation with determinate properties, (CrD) and (CoD), could be restricted to the 
physical properties/states of individuals. In other words, when God creates and conserves 
my brain, all God does is cause it to exist with determinate physical properties; my 
mental states are not directly brought about by God, but rather supervene upon my 
brain’s physical states. However, this strikes me as a desperate strategy. Besides the 
problem that the notion of supervenience is notoriously vague (it is far from clear exactly 
what the claim that mental states supervene upon physical states amounts to), there is the 
more serious problem that non-reductive physicalism seems to be incompatible with 
mental causation. This is the point of Kim’s famous causal exclusion argument, which 
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can be roughly summarized as follows.3 At a bare minimum, we need mental events to be 
able to cause other mental events.  Suppose, then, that M1 causes M2 (fig. 1): 
 
According to non-reductive physicalism, M2 supervenes upon a physical event P2, and 
that means that M1 is at most an overdetermining cause of M2 (fig. 2). 
 
But this is unacceptable – we do not want mental causes to be mere overdetermining 
causes. Perhaps then we should say not that M1 causes M2, but rather that it causes M2’s 
supervenience base, P2 (fig. 3): 
 
3 Kim has developed and defended this argument in numerous places; see Kim (1993), 










However, physicalists believe that physical events are caused by other physical events; in 
the case of P2, M1’s supervenience base, P1, is the most likely candidate (fig. 4): 
 
But since we do not want mental events to be mere overdetermining causes, P1’s causing 
P2 excludes M1 from being its cause (fig. 5): 
 
The result is that mental events appear to be nothing more than epiphenomena – impotent 
byproducts of underlying physical processes; thus, non-reductive physicalism has a hard 
time accounting for mental causation even apart from worries about occasionalism. The 
situation can only get worse once occasionalism enters the picture, for if the impure 
version of occasionalism (restricted to only physical properties) is correct, there is simply 








For non-reductive physicalists who are also occasionalists, physical events are 
themselves epiphenomenal and mental events are second-order epiphenomena. There is 
simply no opportunity for secondary (or “horizontal”) causes of any kind (mental or
physical) to make non-superfluous contributions. Thus, although non-reductive 
physicalists may be able to restrict occasionalism, it does not seem as though this strategy 
holds any promise for safeguarding mental causation and free will. Even if supervenient 
mental states (including volitions) are not caused directly by God, they cannot in any 
meaningful sense be described as free.  
 Does dualism fare any better? That is, can dualists plausibly restrict occasionalism 
in such a way that free will would be preserved? Although some of the Cartesians 
apparently thought so, it does not seem to me that dualism is of any help. Even if minds 
are immaterial souls, they are still contingent individuals and hence continuously created 
by God. Thus, if God creates and conserves things with determinate properties, it follows 






material bodies.4 Regardless of one’s position on the mind-body problem, there simply 
does not seem to be any plausible way of restricting occasionalism in a way that would 
make room for mental causation; thus, my criticism of occasionalism – that it is 
inconsistent with free will – stands. Since free will is essential to theism, continuous 
creationists cannot reject secondary causation; hence, if the arguments of Chapters Seven 
and Eight are correct, non-reductionist causation and a conception of individuals as either 
bare particulars or structured substances are also non-negotiable components of the 
continuous creation bundle. 
 Thus, I conclude that the entire bundle is non-negotiable – if my arguments have 
been correct, continuous creationists are forced to accept the entire package. Their only 
alternative is to reevaluate their commitment to continuous creation; in other words, 
 
4 Quinn (1983, pp. 58, 64-5) makes an intriguing, but highly speculative, suggestion that 
might provide dualists who are occasionalists with a strategy for making room for free 
choices; he proposes that immaterial minds might be capable of acting instantaneously. 
The idea is that physical actions and changes all take time to perform because they 
involve motion; since minds are immaterial and hence, never in motion, perhaps they 
could act, or change, instantaneously. If that is right, then even if God conserves my mind 
in a particular mental state, perhaps I could instantaneously change that state. Suppose, 
for example, that in the moments leading up to t I am deliberating about whether to 
perform action A. Suppose further, that at t God conserves me still in a state of indecision 
regarding A. If minds are capable of acting instantaneously, then perhaps I can choose A 
precisely at t – instantaneously altering the state in which God conserved me at that 
moment. 
 As I said, the idea is highly speculative; moreover, I think it faces some 
significant obstacles. First, in order to be plausible it would need to take empirical and/or 
phenomenal evidence into account: does empirical/phenomenal evidence support the 
thesis that some mental acts are instantaneous? Second, it would need to address 
conceptual concerns: for example, are instantaneous mental acts consistent with the 
assumption that the mind is in some sense connected to and dependent upon a material 
body? Finally, even if those concerns can be adequately addressed, there is the further 
problem that the proposal appears to require rather unattractive alterations to logic. What, 
after all, would be the truth value of the statement, “at t I was in a state of indecision 
concerning A”? Is it neither true nor false? Then we would have to reject excluded 
middle. Is it both true and false? Then we would have to reject non-contradiction. 
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theists who do not care for this bundle of metaphysical views could always reconsider the 
“D-word” (I am referring to deism). For many theists, deism is an almost unthinkable 
position, and as a result, it is often dismissed more quickly than I think it deserves.5 Much 
of the reason for this is probably that deism is usually associated with it most extreme, 
pure form – that is, it is thought of as the view that God has been and always will be 
entirely uninvolved and uninterested in what happens in the created world. But as I noted 
in Chapter Seven, what I mean by deism is simply the view that things persist on their 
own without God’s needing to actively conserve them; although that view is compatible 
with pure deism, it does not entail it. It is also compatible with impure, restricted forms of 
deism; although impure deism would deny that God must constantly conserve the 
existence of creatures, it would nonetheless maintain that God is actively involved with 
the creation – answering prayers, performing miracles, and so on. The scriptures that 
support conservation/continuous creation are neither overwhelming in number nor 
entirely unambiguous, and it seems entirely possible that they could be interpreted in 
ways that carry less metaphysical baggage. Thus, some such impure form of deism may 
be a legitimate option for otherwise traditional theists who are dissatisfied with the 
metaphysical commitments of continuous creation. 
 
5 One noteworthy exception is Kvanvig & McCann (1988); they argue at length that 
divine conservation is the only plausible explanation of persistence, and hence that deism 
is not a philosophically tenable position. Their argument is one that would-be deists will 
need to address. 
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